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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores the Confederate home front experience in South Carolina by
examining the state government in 1861-1862 and the controversies that arose after the state
seceded from the Union. It challenges the common assumption that citizens in the state were
politically united in that period. Many historians have recognized the central role of South
Carolina in the secession movement but few have paid attention to political developments there
during the ensuing war. This project seeks to rectify that oversight by looking at the crucial role
of the state government in conducting the early war effort and at the political and ideological
conflicts that its actions provoked. In response to the Union invasion of coastal South Carolina in
November 1861, state political leaders instituted radical measures. The convention of the people
of South Carolina was called back into session and proceeded to create an executive council with
extraordinary powers that displaced the regular government and even superseded the state
Constitution, thus overturning South Carolina’s antebellum political tradition of very limited
executive power. The council subsequently stirred up a storm of controversy that shook the state
during 1862. Many politicians and ordinary citizens denounced this revolutionary experiment in
government and demanded that the convention be dissolved and the council abolished. This
conflict, along with the demands of war, fostered a new, more intimate relationship between the
state and citizen. The state government was forced to respond to the anti-council movement, to
the planters and slaves who resisted calls for labor to work on coastal fortifications, and to the
white plain folk, including many women, who demanded that the state intervene to help them
survive wartime hardships. The operations of the state government were thus an essential
element of the Confederate home front experience and played a more conspicuous role in the war
effort than historians have heretofore acknowledged.
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Introduction
On 25 November 1862, Governor Francis W. Pickens informed the members of the South
Carolina legislature that they must act quickly, for a vexing issue was dividing the polity. The
question was whether the legislature should keep the executive council in existence or abolish it.
Pickens hoped that it would be abolished at once. He warned the legislators that the public’s
“dissatisfaction and restiveness under this new and unauthorized system” of government had
reached a feverish pitch. This resentment arose not from any disloyalty to the Confederate cause
“but from a feeling of sensitiveness under what [the citizens] deemed an unnecessary and
arbitrary establishment of an unusual and irregular Government.”1
The political disquiet described by the governor is remarkable. Two years earlier, on 20
December 1860, the delegates of the convention of the people of South Carolina had voted
unanimously, 169-0, to secede from the Union. The Palmetto State was the only state that
manifested such complete political unity in the Southern conventions that were called to consider
secession. A considerable number of historians have analyzed antebellum politics in South
Carolina to explain why it became the most unified and secessionist state in the South. Some
have pointed to the state’s relative economic decline. Others have argued that South Carolina
developed a degree of insularity not known anywhere else in the United States, thereby creating
a closed society impermeable to external influences. Several studies have emphasized the
importance of race and the large proportion of slaveholders in the white population. Many others
have cited South Carolina’s failure to develop a two-party political system. Despite some
disagreements on these points, scholars agree in general that South Carolina developed along a

1

Journal of the Senate of South Carolina: Being the Session of 1862 (Columbia, SC: Charles P. Pelham, 1862), 33,
hereafter cited as Senate Journal (1862).

1

different trajectory from other Southern states and evolved a unique political ideology and
culture, creating what James Banner has dubbed “The Problem of South Carolina.”2
Given South Carolina’s pivotal role in the creation of a Southern confederacy, it is not
surprising that historians have focused on the state’s political development prior to the Civil
2

Journal of the Convention of the People of South Carolina, Held in 1860, 1861 and 1862, together with the
Ordinances, Reports, Resolutions, etc. (Columbia, SC: R. W. Gibbes, 1862), 42-45, hereafter cited as Convention
Journal; James A. Banner, “The Problem of South Carolina,” in Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, eds., The
Hofstadter Aegis: A Memorial (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), 60-93; James Haw, “‘The Problem of South
Carolina’ Reexamined: A Review Essay,” South Carolina Historical Magazine 107 (2006): 9-25; David MoltkeHansen, “Protecting Interests, Maintaining Rights, Emulating Ancestors: U.S. Constitution Bicentennial Reflections
on ‘The Problem of South Carolina,’ 1787-1860,” South Carolina Historical Magazine 89 (1988): 160-82. On South
Carolina’s antebellum political ideology and culture, see Lacy K. Ford Jr., Origins of Southern Radicalism: The
South Carolina Upcountry, 1800-1860 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Stephanie McCurry, Masters of
Small Worlds: Yeoman Households, Gender Relations, and the Political Culture of the Antebellum South Carolina
Low Country (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Manisha Sinha, The Counterrevolution of Slavery:
Politics and Ideology in Antebellum South Carolina (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Steven
A. Channing, Crisis of Fear: Secession in South Carolina (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970); Harold S.
Schultz, Nationalism and Sectionalism in South Carolina, 1852-1860: A Study of the Movement for Southern
Independence (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1950); Alfred Glaze Smith Jr., Economic Readjustment of an
Old Cotton State: South Carolina, 1820-1860 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1958); Carl J.
Vipperman, William Lowndes and the Transition of Southern Politics, 1782-1822 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1989); Peter Coclanis, The Shadow of a Dream: Economic Life and Death in the South Carolina
Lowcountry, 1670-1920 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); George C. Rogers Jr., Charleston in the Age of
the Pinckneys (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966); Lacy K. Ford Jr., “Republics and Democracy: The
Parameters of Political Citizenship in Antebellum South Carolina,” in David R. Chesnutt and Clyde N. Wilson, eds.,
The Meaning of South Carolina History: Essays in Honor of George C. Rogers (Columbia: University of South
Carolina Press, 1991), 121-45; Drew Gilpin Faust, “The Rhetoric and Ritual of Agriculture in Antebellum South
Carolina,” Journal of Southern History 45 (1979): 541-68; John Barnwell, Love of Order: South Carolina’s First
Secession Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982); William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil
War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (New York: Harper and Row, 1965); William H.
Denny, “South Carolina’s Conception of the Union in 1832,” South Carolina Historical Magazine 78 (1977): 17183; Phillip M. Hamer, The Secession Movement in South Carolina, 1847-1852 (1918; repr., New York: Da Capo
Press, 1971); Rosser Howard Taylor, Ante-bellum South Carolina: A Social and Cultural History (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1942); John Harold Wolfe, Jeffersonian Democracy in South Carolina (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940); Robert M. Weir, “The South Carolinian as Extremist,” South
Atlantic Quarterly 74 (1975): 86-103; Jeffrey Robert Young, Domesticating Slavery: The Master Class in Georgia
and South Carolina, 1610-1837 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Kenneth S. Greenburg,
“Representation and the Isolation of South Carolina,” Journal of American History 64 (1977): 723-43; Rebecca Star,
A School for Politics: Commercial Lobbying and Political Culture in Early South Carolina (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1998); Pauline Maier, “The Road Not Taken: Nullification, John C. Calhoun, and the
Revolutionary Tradition in South Carolina,” South Carolina Historical Magazine 82 (1981): 1-19; Lacy K. Ford Jr.,
“Recovering the Republic: Calhoun, South Carolina, and the Concurrent Majority,” South Carolina Historical
Magazine 89 (1988): 146-59; Joan E. Cashin, “‘Decidedly Opposed to the Union’: Women’s Culture, Marriage, and
Politics in Antebellum South Carolina,” Georgia Historical Quarterly 78 (1994): 735-39; Stephen A. West, “Minute
Men, Yeomen, and the Mobilization for Secession in the South Carolina Upcountry,” South Carolina Historical
Magazine 71 (2005): 75-104; Lacy K Ford Jr., “Origins of the Edgefield Tradition: The Late Antebellum Experience
and the Roots of Political Insurgency,” South Carolina Historical Magazine (1997): 328-48; Lillian A. Kibler,
“Unionist Sentiment in South Carolina in 1860,” Journal of Southern History 4 (1938): 346-66; Bernard E. Powers
Jr., “‘The Worst of all Barbarism’: Racial Anxiety and the Approach of Secession in the Palmetto State,” South
Carolina Historical Magazine 112 (2011): 139-56.
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War. These studies have added immensely to our understanding of why and how South Carolina
led the secession movement. Few attempts, however, have been made to trace the state’s political
course during the war. This dissertation seeks to expand our knowledge of that subject by
examining the political bodies responsible for conducting the daily operations of state
government in 1861-1862. The South Carolina legislature and convention played an important
role in the war effort by implementing policies to meet the needs of South Carolinians at home
and by assisting Confederate military authorities. The section of the Confederate Constitution
that enumerated the powers of Congress did not mention the “general welfare” of the states.
This implied that fostering the public welfare was a responsibility of the constituent states, and
the Confederate government gave those states a considerable measure of autonomy to direct a
wide range of domestic activities. The legislature and governor also played an important part in
organizing and commanding the militia. To a large degree, then, the state government was
responsible for social and military matters. This fact has important implications for studying the
relationship between war and politics on the Confederate home front.3

3

May Spencer Ringold, The Role of State Legislatures in the Confederacy (Athens: University of Georgia Press,
1966), vi. The only study that specifically examines politics in South Carolina during the Civil War is Charles
Edward Cauthen, South Carolina Goes to War, 1860-1865 (1950: repr., Columbia: University of South Carolina
Press, 2005). Cauthen is actually far more concerned with the political events leading up to secession; eight of his
sixteen chapters focus on developments prior to the firing on Fort Sumter. W. Scott Poole has written the most
recent book on South Carolina’s Civil War experience, but it is a synthesis of secondary works and is not based on
archival research; see W. Scott Poole, South Carolina’s Civil War: A Narrative History (Macon, GA: Mercer
University Press, 2005). Robert Olsberg has examined race and class during the war but his study is mainly a
biography of William Henry Trescot and is only marginally concerned with state politics and legislation; see Robert
Nicholas Olsberg, “A Government of Class and Race: William Henry Trescot and the South Carolina Chivalry”
(Ph.D. diss., University of South Carolina, 1972). John Edmunds has written an excellent biography of Francis W.
Pickens that covers his time in office during the Civil War; see John B. Edmunds Jr., Francis W. Pickens and the
Politics of Destruction (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986). On Pickens, see also Edward H.
Keel Jr., “Francis Wilkson Pickens, Governor of South Carolina, 1860-1862” (M.A. thesis, University of South
Carolina, 1961). On Governor Andrew Magrath and the final months of the war in South Carolina, see Joel. R.
Williamson, “The Disruption of State Government in South Carolina during the Magrath Administration” (M.A
thesis, University of South Carolina, 1949). On conscription and impressment, see Alva Dozier Gaskin,
“Conscription and Impressment in South Carolina, 1860-1865” (M.A. thesis, University of South Carolina, 1936).
On Charleston, see Jack Alexander Sutor, “Charleston, South Carolina, during the Civil War Era, 1858-1865” (M.A.
thesis, Duke University, 1942). On the executive council journals of 1861 and 1862, see Lowry Price Ware, “The
South Carolina Executive Councils of 1861 and 1862” (M.A. thesis, University of South Carolina, 1952). On the
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Historians have long recognized the significance of conditions on the home front for the
Confederate war effort. These conditions varied considerably at different points during the war
and they encompassed a myriad of political, social, and economic factors. Political decisions had
to be made in response to the fluctuating social conditions. The social fabric was in turn affected
by events on the battlefields and by economic disruption. Military and economic initiatives were
also essential to counter a powerful Union war machine. In all of these areas active governance
was required at the state level. Recognizing this crucial role of the state government is critical if
we are to understand the experience of the Confederate home front.4

radical nature of politics in Civil War South Carolina, see Eric A. Lager, “Radical Politics in Revolutionary Times:
The South Carolina Secession Convention and Executive Council of 1862” (M.A. thesis, Clemson University,
2008). There are two useful collections of essays on Civil War South Carolina: see Lawrence S. Rowland and
Stephen G. Hoffius, eds., The Civil War in South Carolina: Selections from the South Carolina Historical Magazine
(Charleston, SC: Home House Press, 2011); and Michael Brem Bonner and Fritz Hamer, eds., South Carolina in the
Civil War and Reconstruction Eras: Essays from the Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2016). For general histories of the war in South Carolina see David
Duncan Wallace, The History of South Carolina (3 vols.; New York: American Historical Society, 1934), 3: 170221, and Walter Edgar, South Carolina: A History (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 354-76.
There are several studies of state politics and public policy in other Confederate states useful for comparative
purposes: see Michael B. Dougan, Confederate Arkansas: The People and Policies of a Frontier State in Wartime
(University: University of Alabama Press, 1976); Malcolm C. McMillan, The Disintegration of a Confederate State:
Three Governors and Alabama’s Wartime Home Front, 1861-1865 (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1986);
Christopher Lyle McIlwain Sr., Civil War Alabama (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2016); John K.
Bettersworth, Confederate Mississippi: The People and Politics of a Cotton State in Wartime (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1943); John E. Johns, Florida During the Civil War (Gainesville: University of
Florida Press, 1963); James Marten, Texas Divided: Loyalty and Dissent in the Lone Star State, 1856-1874
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1990); Robert E. Baker, “Class Conflict and Political Upheaval: The
Transformation of North Carolina Politics during the Civil War,” North Carolina Historical Review 69 (1992): 14878. On Confederate politics at the national level, see Frank Lawrence Owsley, State Rights in the Confederacy
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1925); Frank E. Vandiver, Jefferson Davis and the Confederate State
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); Wilfred Buck Yearns, The Confederate Congress (Athens: University
of Georgia Press, 1960); Paul D. Escott, After Secession: Jefferson Davis and the Failure of Confederate
Nationalism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978); Emory M. Thomas, The Confederate Nation:
1861-1865 (New York: Harper and Row, 1979); Drew Gilpin Faust, The Creation of Confederate Nationalism:
Ideology and Identity in the Civil War South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988); George C.
Rable, The Confederate Republic: A Revolution Against Politics (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1994); William C. Davis, Look Away!: A History of the Confederate States of America (New York: Free Press,
2002); Anne Sarah Rubin, A Shattered Nation: The Rise and Fall of the Confederacy, 1861-1868 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Stephanie McCurry, Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the
Civil War South (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).
4
On the Confederate home front, see Charles H. Wesley, The Collapse of the Confederacy (1937: repr., Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 2001); David Williams, Georgia in the Civil War: Conflict on the Home Front
(Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2017); William Blair, Virginia’s Private War: Feeding Body and Soul in the
Confederacy, 1861-1865 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Daniel Sutherland, ed., Guerrillas, Unionists

4

The historical literature devoted to state government operations in the Confederacy is
thin. The only general study of the subject is by May Spencer Ringold, who properly emphasizes
the extraordinary new responsibilities that fell on the state legislatures. Indeed, she says, state
legislation attained “unprecedented significance” during the war. State governments faced
challenges that required novel responses and forced legislators to greatly expand the
bureaucracy. As Richard Bensel noted, “southern mobilization was far more state-centered and
coordinated than its northern counterpart.” As a result, Southern citizens found themselves
enmeshed in a new relationship with the state. Yet this need to strengthen the hand of the state in
order to manage the war effort effectively often generated public resentment; citizens protested
that the government was exceeding its proper functions and exercising unwarranted power. On
the other hand, as the scale of the war escalated and material deprivations multiplied, the
citizenry demanded that state authorities remedy the afflictions of the people. The need for “wise
heads” in the legislature was often the subject of newspaper editorial comment. As Ringold
points out, when home-front problems became more difficult to solve, “public regard for the
legislative personnel ran the gamut from hopefulness to waning enthusiasm to disappointment, if
not downright contempt.”5
In South Carolina public contempt was not confined to the legislature. As in other
Confederate states, the demands of war required that the powers of the executive branch be
enlarged. The situation was unique in the Palmetto State, however, owing to its peculiar tradition

and Violence on the Confederate Home Front (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1999); Stephen V. Ash,
When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861-1865 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1995); John Hammond Moore, Southern Homefront, 1861-1865 (Columbia, SC: Summerhouse
Press, 1998); Catherine Clinton, ed., Southern Families at War: Loyalty and Conflict in the Civil War South (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Jacqueline Glass Campell, When Sherman Marched North from the Sea:
Resistance on the Confederate Home Front (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).
5
Ringold, Role of State Legislatures, 1-5; Richard Franklin Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State
Authority in America, 1859-1877 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 94-99; McCurry, Confederate
Reckoning, 4.

5

of very limited executive power. During the antebellum period the governor was little more than
a figurehead, lacking the powers of veto and appointment and ineligible to serve more than two
years in office. Moreover, by 1860 South Carolina was the only state in the Union where the
governor was elected by the legislature rather than by popular vote. The legislature of South
Carolina thus wielded far more power than any other in America. The exigencies of war
dramatically changed this tradition of legislative dominance. Executive powers were not only
expanded but transformed. W. Buck Yearns argues that in the Confederate states the governors’
powers “increased dramatically, and the visibility of the governors increased proportionately.” It
was under these circumstances that “The modern pattern of acting in an emergency was
beginning to emerge.”6
This dissertation explores how South Carolina’s government dealt with the emergency of
war by undertaking a revolutionary political experiment: the creation of the executive council.
The political landscape in South Carolina changed dramatically in 1862. Aside from the
executive and legislative branches, another political entity wielded considerable power. Indeed,
many contemporary South Carolinians argued that it possessed unlimited power. This body was
the convention of the people of South Carolina (also known as the secession convention), but
passing the secession ordinance was only one of many acts that it performed. The convention
assumed legislative functions and completely overhauled the structure of the executive
department. As Ralph Wooster shows, the various secession conventions across the South often
“assumed and wielded tremendous power.” None, however, sat longer or exercised more power
than South Carolina’s.7

6

Banner, “Problem of South Carolina,” 76; W. Buck Yearns, ed., The Confederate Governors (Athens: University
of Georgia Press, 1985), 7-9.
7
In every future state of the Confederacy where a convention assembled for the purpose of seceding from the
Union, it adjourned sine die soon after ratifying the Confederate Constitution. South Carolina’s convention was not
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Why the convention created the executive council is a central question of this study.
Multiple factors were at work, but primary among them were the repercussions of the Union
invasion of Port Royal Sound and nearby Sea Islands on the South Carolina coast in November
1861. Federal troops captured and occupied one of the wealthiest regions of the state. Moreover,
eight out of ten inhabitants of the Sea Islands were black. The Union invasion dealt a powerful
blow to the state’s plantation system as thousands of slaves made their way to Union lines and
millions of dollars’ worth of property was lost. The efforts of planters and the state authorities to
remove slaves from the coast to the interior proved to be a logistical nightmare. Contributing to
this disconcerting situation was the myth of invincibility that pervaded the minds of many white
South Carolinians in the months leading up to the invasion. Southern martial superiority and the
stability of the social order were loudly proclaimed by leading politicians and newspaper editors.
Yet Port Royal fell in less than five hours. In the eyes of many citizens and politicians, Governor
Pickens’s leadership during this crisis was inept and he was to blame for the disaster. Anger was
also directed at the legislature for failing to make adequate preparations. In the weeks following
this calamity a widespread belief developed, particularly among convention delegates, that the
governor and legislature were incapable of controlling the situation and that the great
achievement of Southern nationhood that the convention had inaugurated was faltering.
Additionally, just weeks after Port Royal was lost a great fire in Charleston destroyed much of
the city and left many citizens homeless and destitute. These distressing conditions created the
climate that gave birth to the executive council experiment.8

dissolved until 17 December 1862, precisely two years after coming into existence. See Ralph A. Wooster, The
Secession Conventions of the South (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962).
8
Ira Berlin, et al., eds., The Destruction of Slavery (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 103-14;
James Oakes, Freedom National: The Destruction of Slavery in the United States, 1861-1865 (New York: W. W.
Norton, 2013), 198-208; Willie Lee Rose, Rehearsal for Reconstruction: The Port Royal Experiment (Indianapolis,
IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), 3-31; Walter J. Fraser Jr., Charleston! Charleston!: The History of a Southern City
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 253-55. The belief that the South was unconquerable was

7

Having little confidence in the wisdom of Governor Pickens and believing that the
legislature lacked adequate powers to meet the emergency, the convention delegates convened
once again and took drastic action, passing an ordinance creating an executive council of five
men that essentially usurped the power of the governor as commander in chief and rendered the
legislature impotent. The governor was a member of the council but could not act independently.
Thus, throughout 1862 South Carolina had a plural executive and a dual government: a governor
and legislature elected under the state Constitution and an executive council appointed by the
convention. The council was given authority to exercise extraordinary powers. It could draw
money from the state treasury without legislative authorization and could make appointments
without the consulting the Senate. The council had blanket authority to declare martial law, order
the arrest of persons suspected of disloyalty to the Confederacy, and seize private property
deemed necessary for public use. Laws previously passed by the legislature could be amended or
abrogated at the will of the council. A plural executive and the concentration of virtually
unchecked power in the hands of the council rode roughshod over South Carolina’s tradition of
limited executive power and strict construction of the Constitution. Significantly, South Carolina
was the only state in the Confederacy to inaugurate such a radical and unique political
experiment.9

widespread at this time: see Jason Phillips, Diehard Rebels: The Confederate Culture of Invincibility (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 2007), 2-3.
9
Cauthen, South Carolina Goes to War, 141-42. There were a total of four sessions of the convention. The first,
lasting from 17 December 1860 to 5 January 1861, was called together by an act of the legislature to take into
consideration “the dangers incident to the position of the State in the Federal Union” and to “take care that the
Commonwealth of South Carolina shall suffer no detriment.” The second session sat from 26 March 1861 to 10
April 1861; it was called to ratify the Confederate Constitution. The third, lasting from 26 December 1861 to 8
January 1862, was called to address the problems created by the Union invasion of Port Royal. It was during this
third session that the executive council was created. The fourth session, lasting from 9 September to 17 September
1862, was convened to consider repealing the ordinance creating the executive council. See John Amasa May and
Joan Reynolds Faunt, South Carolina Secedes (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1960). South
Carolina actually had two executive councils. The first was created in 1861 to reorganize South Carolina’s new
status as an independent republic. The state Constitution was changed to give the governor presidential powers and
he was authorized to have a cabinet whose members were appointed by him and confirmed by the convention. This

8

One of the recurring issues in Civil War historiography is how the Confederacy
marshalled and allocated the resources necessary to wage war. Much of this debate has focused
on the national government in Richmond. While the importance of President Jefferson Davis’s
leadership and the Confederate Congress’s legislation cannot be denied, it would be beneficial
for historians to look more closely at the actions of state governments. The executive council
created several departments independent of the legislature to carry out the task of waging war. A
Department of the Military operated under the leadership of James Chesnut Jr.; it was Chesnut,
not Governor Pickens, who made all state military decisions in 1862. A Department of Treasury
and Finance assumed responsibility for the state’s fiscal affairs. Isaac W. Hayne became the
Chief of Justice and Police, with broad powers over internal security matters. To alleviate
shortages in war materiel a Department of Construction and Manufacturing was created with
William H. Gist serving as its head. With a few exceptions, the efforts of the council to place the
state on a sound war footing were successful, and the council thus serves as a good example of
how state authorities were instrumental in sustaining the Confederate war effort.10
The expansion of executive power was common to all the Southern states during the Civil
War, but South Carolina’s executive council was the most radical political experiment in the
Confederacy, save for the act of secession itself. The council was created not by the legislature
but by the convention, a body that theoretically could exercise unlimited power. In a state that
prided itself on limited government and constitutional restraint, the council represented a
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fundamental departure. There is little doubt that the council was an unconstitutional body, for it
could simultaneously exercise legislative and executive powers. The citizenry recognized and in
many cases resented this aberration in state government and decried the political division that the
council stirred up. A campaign arose to dissolve the convention and abolish the council, led by
newspaper editors, politicians, and ordinary citizens who adhered to libertarian principles and
regarded this political experiment with dismay and foreboding.11
This remarkable experiment has received surprisingly little attention from scholars.
Charles Cauthen’s South Carolina Goes to War, published in 1950, devotes two short chapters to
the council. Cauthen was primarily interested in the relations between the council and the
Confederate government and he therefore pays little attention to the social and economic impact
of the council’s actions. Nor does he examine the significant divisions within the council. An
important article by Laura A. White, published in 1929, explains the constitutional anomaly of
the council but does not explore how the citizenry reacted to the constitutional crisis it provoked.
This dissertation builds on their work, offering analyses of the social and economic repercussions
of the council’s actions. During 1862 the South Carolina polity was riven by the council
controversy to a degree that historians have not fully appreciated.12
This controversy is important because it unequivocally refutes the notion that white South
Carolinians carried out their revolution without any internal divisions. The unanimous
convention vote in favor of secession has obscured the subsequent heated debates over the
powers of the convention and the legitimacy of the council. Divisions of this sort were precisely
what secessionists wanted to avoid when they embarked on their crusade. Ideological conflict
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and the resulting factionalism that had marked the prewar decades resurfaced in 1862. Lengthy
newspaper editorials meticulously rehashed arguments from the nullification controversy of
1832-1833 concerning the powers of the convention. These debates, however, were not confined
to the press. Much time and energy was consumed in the convention and in the legislature by
arguments over where ultimate sovereignty in the state resided. Did the convention of the people
constitute the supreme power in South Carolina or was it embodied in the state Constitution?
Definitive answers did not come easily and the fierceness of these debates alarmed the polity.
Public opinion was inflamed over theoretical abstractions that had little relevance to those
suffering from material deprivation.13
A study of the state government is valuable on another level as well. In recent years
historians of the Confederacy have shifted their focus of inquiry away from the actions of the
elite white men in high political offices to pay closer attention to the plain folk, especially the
disfranchised. Consequently the definition of “politics” has greatly expanded to include the
actions of slaves and women. Thanks to the work of Stephanie McCurry and others we now have
a better understanding of how those who were formally excluded from politics were able to exert
pressure on government officials through acts of resistance, thereby shaping public policy for
their own benefit. McCurry is primarily concerned with how slaves and women affected
Confederate rather than state policy, but her work is useful for a study of the state government
because it prompts us to shift the focus back to the actions of those elite white men in positions
of power and ask questions about how they responded to wartime disruption and pressure from
below. In South Carolina the response was the creation of the executive council. Although the
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Union army acted as a powerful force for emancipation, in their thirst for freedom slaves often
took the initiative to escape from bondage. In the process they forced the state to recognize them
as political actors. In January 1862 the convention created commissions charged with removing
slaves from the proximity of the enemy. This task proved impossible to carry out. The resistance
of slaves to forced removal hamstrung the commissions and necessitated large expenditures of
state money and resources in an effort to maintain slave discipline. By the end of 1862 South
Carolina’s plantation system was severely disrupted. McCurry’s thesis that slaves were a
political force to be reckoned with is therefore a worthy subject to investigate from the
standpoint of the state government.14
Another area where slaves made their influence felt was military labor policy. Both the
legislature and the council were repeatedly called on by Confederate authorities to procure slave
labor to build coastal fortifications. While acknowledging the need, many planters deeply
resented the state’s claim that it had the unrestricted right to impress their private property in
slaves for public use. Moreover, as McCurry points out, “Slaves made no secret of their
opposition to labor on the public works, and deployment only provided additional incentives and
opportunities to escape.” In many instances slaves refused to cooperate with labor requisitions by
running away or engaging in other acts of resistance. Many slaveowners, too, refused to
cooperate. The legislature and council were thus forced repeatedly to revise their policies for
procuring labor, which in turn undermined the program while increasing planter resentment
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toward the state. The need to procure labor and the problems associated with obtaining it were a
constant source of friction between the state and the slaveholders.15
A final area where attention can be fruitfully shifted back to the state government is what
McCurry calls the “politics of subsistence.” In 1862 the government in Columbia demanded
more sacrifices from its citizens. But what is not often recognized are the increasing demands
that citizens, particularly women, made on the state. As McCurry explains, there “came the
necessity of a social contract between the people and their new [Confederate] government that
would be adequate to the times.” This social contract mandated not only that men had an
obligation to provide military service in defense of the nation but also that the nation was obliged
to support and protect soldiers’ families. A similar understanding was manifested at the state
level. Women bombarded state authorities with letters and petitions demanding aid for their
families, claiming that because their menfolk were in the army they were entitled to state
assistance. These demands were not ignored. In December 1861 the legislature passed a law
providing relief for soldiers’ families but complaints that this law was inadequate were loud and
frequent, and the legislature had to amend it at the end of 1862 to address these concerns.16
There is also a need to better understand basic governance at the state level. George
Rable has urged that “it is time to examine the gritty reality of day-to-day administration” in the
Confederacy. This dissertation heeds that call by investigating the daily proceedings of South
Carolina’s legislature, convention, executive council, and various state departments. All too
often individual legislators and other state agents remain obscure in studies of the home front.
Yet their words and actions can tell us much about a society at war. An original contribution of
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this study is to bring lesser known politicians to center stage. As James Roark reminds us,
“multiple and sometimes clashing experiences” were an essential part of the Confederate
experience. In South Carolina, a state heretofore insufficiently studied by Civil War scholars,
these clashing experiences often took the shape of heated debates among the men entrusted with
carrying out the duties of state government. Examining these and the controversies surrounding
them adds an important dimension to our understanding of the Confederate home front.17
A few words are in order here explaining how this dissertation is organized and the
parameters of my research. This is not a study of the ideology that brought about the secession
movement or of South Carolina’s role in creating the Confederacy. Nor is it a comprehensive
study of South Carolina’s Civil War experience. At heart it is an investigation of the relationship
between politics and the efforts of the state government to wage war in 1861-1862. Although the
years 1863-1865 are hardly less important, the executive council period deserves to be treated
separately because of its radical nature and the public uproar it created. While “high politics” is
the primary focus of this study, the governmental and social elements of life on the home front
constantly intersected and deeply affected one another. Much of my research therefore draws
from evidence left by citizens who did not hold public office.
The first chapter, a synthesis of secondary works, explains the major economic, social,
and political forces that shaped the state’s development during the antebellum period up to the
outbreak of war in 1861. My original research contributions begin with chapter two, which
shows that white South Carolinians harbored a false sense of security about the durability of their
social fabric and the state’s ability to wage war. Chapter three examines the social and economic
consequences of the Union invasion of Port Royal and analyzes how the state authorities
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responded to this crisis. Chapter four is concerned with how the executive council marshalled the
resources to wage war and the problems it encountered. The fifth chapter explores the serious
divisions within the council and the growing public opposition to the convention and the council.
Chapter six sheds light on the legislative process that abolished the council. The conclusion
traces how the council controversy continued to reverberate in early 1863.
This dissertation, while focused on South Carolina, argues more broadly that the
operations of the state governments were essential elements of the Confederate home front
experience and need more scholarly attention. I show that an intimate relationship developed
between the Palmetto State’s government and its citizens. Voters paid close attention to the
actions of their political representatives and did not hesitate to voice sharp opinions on their
performance. Politicians in turn attempted to respond to the demands of their constituents. A
corollary argument is that in order to meet the exigencies of war the convention embarked on a
radical experiment in government that transformed South Carolina’s executive department and
temporarily overturned the state’s ultraconservative Constitution. Despite the elaborate reasoning
employed to justify the creation of the council, however, and despite the dire emergencies the
state confronted, white South Carolinians ultimately refused to countenance this challenge to
their traditional form of government, even for the sake of victory. At the height of the
controversy the Charleston Daily Courier described the executive council as “an oligarchy of
politicians, the most odious of all conceivable tyrannies, without parallel, unless we go back to
find it in the thirty tyrants of Athenian history.” Yet the editor correctly predicted that “The reign
of our petty tyrants must be brief.” Indeed it was brief. The council existed for just one year. The
experiment was abandoned because citizens made their voices heard and demanded the return of
regular government, and state politicians obeyed their will. In December 1860 South Carolinians

15

would not have been able to imagine that such political strife would be engendered by the
convention called to take the state out of the Union. And yet it did so, revealing that the citizenry
was far more divided politically than historians have heretofore assumed.18
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Chapter One
“The Glorious Little State of South Carolina”:
Places, People, and Politics in the Palmetto State from White Settlement to Civil War
In early November 1861 a Union armada approached the entrance to Port Royal Sound
near Hilton Head Island off the South Carolina coast. Among those on board were the men of the
Eighth Michigan Infantry. This regiment had been raised in the extreme northern section of the
state and many of the soldiers were struck by the contrasts between this semitropical region and
their homeland. Although eager to strike a blow at the “rebel nursery” and believing that “South
Carolina ought to suffer,” some could not refrain from commenting favorably on what they saw.
Lieutenant John Buchanan described it as “a Beautiful place,” with autumn leaves “Green as
midsummer.” The regimental surgeon judged the region “one of the finest to live in on the
continent.” Another Michigander thought Hilton Head “a paradise . . . with moss covered live
oak and here and there a magnolia giving forth its fragrance, and charming in its beauty.”1
These descriptions of South Carolina’s landscape echoed those made by earlier observers.
White settlers and travelers during the colonial period often commented on the spectacular
natural beauty of the land originally called by the English “Carolana.” Many of these early
accounts described it as a semitropical paradise, an Eden in the New World. They extolled its
lush, seemingly endless forests, especially its giant live oak trees draped in Spanish moss. White
observers were equally impressed with the abundance of wild game and fish. Before colonists
introduced malaria, smallpox, typhus, and yellow fever to the region, the subtropical climate of
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South Carolina was considered salubrious; John Archdale, an early settler of Carolina, described
it as “serene and exceedingly pleasant, and very healthy in its natural Temperament.”2
South Carolina’s physical landscape is quite diverse. It is best viewed as a rough triangle
with a 190-mile-long base on the Atlantic Ocean and an apex 235 miles to the northwest on the
crest of the Blue Ridge Mountains. Encompassing a mere 31,113 square miles, South Carolina is
the smallest Deep South state. Historians have typically divided it into two regions, lowcountry
and upcountry, separated by the fall line, which runs roughly from North Augusta
northeastwardly through Columbia to the North Carolina line. The geographical distinction
between the lowcountry and upcountry was a crucial factor shaping South Carolina’s historical
development throughout the colonial and antebellum periods. The lowcountry is a coastal plain
extending from the ocean to the fall line. The upcountry is a piedmont region of gently rolling
hills extending to the mountains. During the antebellum period distinctive social geographies of
race and class came to characterize the two regions based largely on their demographic and
economic development during the colonial era.3
South Carolina was one of the most important colonies in the British empire. By 1720 it
produced more naval stores than any other colony. But the leading export throughout the
eighteenth century was rice. During the colonial era tens of thousands of Africans were shipped
to South Carolina to provide labor for the emerging plantation economy. In fact, the enslaved
population soon outnumbered the white colonists. In 1708 blacks accounted for just over 50
percent of the colony’s inhabitants; a half century later they comprised 65 percent. The majority
of South Carolina’s inhabitants during the first half of eighteenth century lived in the
2
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lowcountry. Plantations there produced and exported large quantities of rice and indigo, a source
of immense wealth not only for the planters but for the British empire as a whole. Indeed,
Charleston, the economic, political, and social hub of the colony, was the wealthiest colonial city
in British North America. Lowcountry white residents were four times wealthier, on average,
than those of the tobacco-producing Chesapeake region. By 1768, however, the demographics of
the white population had changed considerably. The nineteen lowcountry parishes contained less
than one-fourth of the colony’s white population yet accounted for 86 percent of the colony’s
taxable wealth and more than 90 percent of its slaves. Nevertheless, colonial government and
administration were confined to the coastal parishes, a fact which had important ramifications
throughout South Carolina’s early history.4
The South Carolina backcountry was slow to develop during the colonial era. The
“backcountry,” a term used during the eighteenth century to describe both a geographic and a
political unit, referred to the entire area beyond the nineteen coastal parishes. (It was not until the
1790s that South Carolinians began using the term “upcountry”.) Until 1768 the backcountry
included only one, poorly defined parish; before the American Revolution it was a region
essentially without political representation. Camden, the oldest backcountry town, was not
established until 1758. But by mid-century waves of Scots-Irish, English, and German
immigrants were traveling down the Great Wagon Road that ran from Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,
through the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia and into the piedmonts of North and South Carolina.
Thereafter whites occupied the South Carolina backcountry in appreciable numbers. By the mid1760s it contained roughly thirty-five thousand settlers and accounted for three-fourths of the
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colony’s white population. Despite this, the region in 1767 had only two representatives in the
Commons House of Assembly, from the single backcountry parish of St. Marks. In addition to
being woefully underrepresented in Charleston the backcountry was plagued by violence and
crime. Local courts, sheriffs, and jails did not exist and outlaws roamed the countryside with
little fear of punishment. In response, white settlers formed themselves into what became known
as the Regulators. The Regulators sought to make the backcountry safe for commercial activities
and demanded the creation of institutions of law and order. They won a significant victory when
the assembly in Charleston passed the Circuit Court Act of 1769, establishing a system of courts,
jails, and sheriffs in the backcountry. But the issue of representation was not addressed and
would continue to fester into the antebellum period.5
South Carolina played a prominent role in the American Revolution. Historians have
typically divided the Revolution in South Carolina into three phases. The first, from 1774 to
1776, was characterized by a struggle for control of the backcountry. In general terms this was a
conflict between Whigs and Loyalists (or Tories) and can be seen as an extension of the
Regulator movement of the 1760s. Whig forces gained control by November 1775 with the arrest
of the most active Loyalists. The second phase, between the summer of 1776 and January 1780,
was a period of relative calm, most of the Loyalists having fled and their Cherokee allies having
been defeated. The final phase began in early 1780 when British forces captured Charleston. For
the next two years the backcountry became the scene of a bitter civil war between Whigs and the
remaining Loyalists. After much violence Whig forces triumphed, and with the British
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evacuation of Charleston in December 1782 the American Revolution in South Carolina came to
a close.6
The postwar years were difficult for many South Carolinians. The fighting had resulted in
widespread physical damage and economic dislocation. Lowcountry rice planters borrowed
lavishly to replace slaves lost to the British during the war and still owed large debts to British
merchants. There was, moreover, a chronic shortage of hard currency. Planters were further hurt
by the closing of the British West Indies to American commerce, which cut off a major market
for rice. The plantation economy sustained another hard blow with the decline of indigo
cultivation, triggered by the loss of the lucrative British bounty for growing indigo, competition
from growers in the French and Spanish West Indies, and an influx of higher-quality indigo from
India. By the mid-1790s South Carolina exported almost no indigo. Thereafter lowcountry
planters focused on tidal rice and sea-island cotton cultivation.7
Meanwhile, in the backcountry many yeoman farmers and the nascent planter class were
struggling to pay their creditors. Violence again convulsed the region as debtors closed courts to
prevent foreclosures. Mobs took the law into their own hands, harassed judges, prevented
sheriff’s sales, and on one occasion set a courthouse on fire. Violence was not confined to the
backcountry. In Charleston artisans complained bitterly about the lack of punishment for those
who had been disloyal to the American cause. An Anti-Britannic Society was formed and riots,
often manifesting class conflict, were frequent in the streets of Charleston throughout 1783. The
General Assembly responded by enacting legislation on taxes, debt, and currency that mollified
the protestors.8
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The battle over ratification of the U.S. Constitution in the late 1780s was a key episode in
early South Carolina politics. The Federalists were strongest in the lowcountry, especially
Charleston. Like their counterparts in Virginia and the northeast, they were generally
conservative and cautious by nature, tended to be more fearful of excessive democracy than
concentrated financial power, and supported national policies to facilitate transatlantic
commerce. They also sought to preserve the lowcountry’s political hegemony. Antifederalists
were concentrated in the upcountry. Led by ambitious yeomen bent on rising into the planter
class, they sought to defend the interests of independent agricultural producers. They feared that
the new federal government would favor northeastern shipping interests. The Federalists carried
the day, however, and the state ratified the Constitution. Although the backcountry farmers lost
the battle over ratification, in the ensuing years they won legislative concessions that would set
the course of South Carolina’s political development until the Civil War.9
South Carolina was the first Southern colony to draft a state constitution. This 1776
document was a temporary measure drawn up in the interest of expediency. In March 1778 the
General Assembly met to draft a permanent constitution. The new document overwhelmingly
favored the lowcountry elite. The backcountry was given only 64 of the 202 seats in the House of
Representatives. The property qualification for the governorship ($41,000) excluded all but the
wealthiest men; however, the chief executive in this new framework of government was a mere
figurehead. Each parish or district was allocated one senator, with the exception of Charleston,
which received two. It was not long before the backcountry residents made known their
dissatisfaction with this constitution. The General Assembly eventually made two important
concessions. In 1785 it created counties and county courts. The districts of 1769 continued to
9

Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism, 103; Edgar, South Carolina, 250-52; Wallace, History of South Carolina, 2:
339-43. On South Carolina Federalists, see Ulrich B. Phillips, “The South Carolina Federalists,” American
Historical Review 14 (1909): 529-43, 731-90.

22

serve for the circuit courts but were divided into thirty-four counties, whose courts were to be
held quarterly. Each court was presided over by seven justices of the peace chosen by the
legislature. This had been one of the Regulators’ demands and did much to stabilize the political,
economic, and social life of the backcountry. The next year the legislature voted to move the
capital from Charleston to Columbia. But what appeared to be a decisive victory for the
backcountry was short-lived.10
With ratification of the federal Constitution South Carolina found it necessary to rewrite
its own constitution to conform to the federal document. Before adjourning, the ratification
convention resolved to hold a constitutional convention to draft a new fundamental state law.
This would be the first constitutional convention in the state’s history and a significant
development with important ramifications for South Carolina’s Civil War experience. Out of the
discussions of 1784-1790 on the need for a new state constitution the idea that the convention
was the supreme political authority of the state, embodying the highest level of sovereignty,
ultimately emerged. The notion that a convention called for a special purpose should act
according to the people’s will was thus firmly established. First put into practice in 1790, it was a
concept that South Carolina would use more than once over the next seven decades when
difficulties with the federal government arose.11
The South Carolina Constitution of 1790, amended in 1808 and 1810, would serve as the
state’s fundamental law until after the Civil War. Given the growing strength of the upcountry
one might suppose that the new Constitution would have made concessions to that part of the
state. But in fact, the lowcountry, dominated by the Federalist Party, had a decisive advantage in
the 1790 convention because of the inequitable apportionment of delegates. This inequity was
10
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replicated with regard to the House of Representatives in the new government created in 1790.
The new Constitution determined representation in the General Assembly based on forty-five
subdivisions called election districts. These comprised the lowcountry parishes and the counties
created in 1785. Yet it was becoming clear that South Carolina’s experiment with the county
system was inefficient. In the upcountry counties it was often difficult to find seven men
adequately versed in the law to serve as justices. In 1798 the county system was abolished and
twenty-five judicial districts (distinct from election districts) were created, incorporating all the
counties. Gradually over time the judicial and election districts came to be identical in name and
area. In the lowcountry the parish system, with a parish constituting both an election precinct and
a district, was retained for purposes of representation.12
Throughout the 1790s the Federalists controlled the course of South Carolina politics, but
eventually upcountry leaders, many of whom were now large planters, asserted themselves. By
1804 the Jeffersonian Republicans dominated the state government. And, too, the slave
population of the upcountry was growing rapidly; by 1800 that region was home to one third of
the state’s 141,151 slaves. These developments led to what became known as the Compromise of
1808. Passed as an amendment to the Constitution of 1790, it mandated that each election district
or parish would be allocated one senator. The House of Representatives was to be apportioned
based on white population and taxable property equally. In this new arrangement the lowcountry
controlled the Senate while the upcountry controlled the House. The amendment also called for
reapportionment every ten years. It was clear that as the upcountry became more populous and
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wealthy it would gain a greater share of power in state government. At the time both sections
seemed satisfied with the measure. However, because representation was based equally on white
population and wealth, the lowcountry continued to retain a strong presence in the House.
Nevertheless, the upcountry leaders, who now included John C. Calhoun from Abbeville District,
won another striking victory in 1810, when all property requirements for voting were abolished
by constitutional amendment, thus giving all white men the franchise.13
The South Carolina General Assembly during the antebellum period exercised
extraordinary powers. Unlike other state legislatures throughout the Union, it elected the
governor, presidential electors, and a host of other state and local officers. The governorship was
largely ceremonial; the chief executive lacked veto power and made few appointments. His
prestige and influence were, however, considerable. His ceremonial functions became
increasingly important during the late antebellum period, particularly if he was a skilled orator.
The governor’s annual message to the legislature generally set the agenda for the General
Assembly. Moreover, the governor was the commander in chief of the state militia. Militia
musters and the review of troops were festive occasions in which the governor could do much to
rally support for a particular cause or vilify his opponents. Yet formal power remained in the
legislature’s hands and it continued to be the dominant branch of government through the Civil
War.14
Through the antebellum period South Carolina continued to modify its judicial structure,
particularly in regard to appellate jurisdiction in law and equity. The Court of Errors, consisting
of all the judges in the law and equity courts combined, was the state’s highest court and decided
all constitutional matters. The South Carolina bench and bar played an important role in the
13

Edgar, South Carolina, 259-64; Klein, Unification of a Slave State, 262-68; Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism,
104-108; Wallace, History of South Carolina, 2: 345-51.
14
Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism, 303-307.

25

events leading up to secession. Many of the state’s leading politicians had been prominent
attorneys during the antebellum era and their influence on the body politic was considerable at
times. There were two judicial systems in South Carolina throughout the war years. The state
courts decided civil disputes and criminal prosecutions. Regular court terms became increasingly
difficult as the war progressed, and in some circuits they existed in name only. But state courts
were instrumental in deciding cases pertaining to the stay laws passed by the legislature to
protect Confederate soldiers and their families and resolving other matters of crucial importance
to those on the home front. The second judicial system was the federal court, known as the
Confederate States Court for the District of South Carolina. It was presided over by Judge
Andrew Gordon McGrath, who decided various cases of national importance to the
Confederacy.15
Although the high courts of the state were important, the typical citizen more often felt
the weight of local government. Of the local offices perhaps the most important was that of
sheriff, whose job it was to enforce the laws, execute warrants, manage the local jail, and
supervise elections. The sheriff worked closely with the administrators of the district or parish.
Unlike in other states in the Lower South, in South Carolina there was no single body
responsible for the operation of local government. Rather, several special commissions, chosen
by the legislature, discharged a variety of local executive, legislative, and judicial functions.
Among them were those charged with maintaining public schools, courthouses and jails, and

15

Donald Senese, “Building the Pyramid: The Growth and Development of the State Court System in Antebellum
South Carolina, 1800-1860,” South Carolina Law Review 24 (1972): 357-79; John P. Thomas, The Formation of
Judicial and Political Subdivisions in South Carolina (Columbia, SC: Bryan, 1890), 1-22; Warren Moise, Rebellion
in the Temple of Justice: The Federal and State Courts in South Carolina during the War between the States (New
York: iUniverse, 2003), xiii, 27-31, 112-17; William M. Robinson Jr., Justice in Grey: A History of the Judicial
System of the Confederate States of America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1941), 122-28; George C.
Rogers Jr., Generations of Lawyers: A History of the South Carolina Bar (Columbia: South Carolina Bar
Foundation, 1992), 11-45; John Belton O’Neall, Biographical Sketches of the Bench and Bar of South Carolina
(1859; repr., Spartanburg, SC: Reprint Company, 1975), ix-xiii.

26

roads and bridges. The commissioners of roads and bridges were particularly important. Besides
laying out and maintaining roads, constructing bridges, and establishing ferries, they were
responsible for appointing slave patrols, levying taxes, and licensing tavern-keepers and liquor
retailers. While most commissioners continued to be chosen by the legislature through the war
years, by the mid-1850s the voters in each parish or district began electing the sheriff, probate
judge, court clerks, tax collectors, and commissioners for the poor.16
As South Carolina’s governmental structure matured, so did its economy. While shortstaple cotton had been known to South Carolinians since the early colonial period, large-scale
production was impossible until the invention of the cotton gin in 1793. Thereafter it spread into
the upcountry with phenomenal speed. In 1793 the entire state produced ninety-four thousand
pounds of cotton, most of it being the long-staple cotton grown on the Sea Islands. By 1811 the
upcountry alone grew over thirty million pounds of short-staple cotton annually. This boom in
cotton production enriched many planters and small slaveholders and also created opportunities
for non-slaveholders to acquire slaves. Between 1800 and 1820 some four thousand new masters
were added to the slaveholding ranks in the upcountry.17
The first cotton boom ended abruptly with the panic of 1819 and the ensuing hard
economic times. Cotton prices rose briefly during the 1830s but the panic of 1837 provoked
another agricultural depression that lasted until the late 1840s. During this period a sizable outmigration of population occurred. Lured by the rich cotton-growing lands of Alabama and
Mississippi, many South Carolinians abandoned their fields, which had become less productive
due to soil exhaustion and erosion. Between 1830 and 1850 many districts lost white population.

16

Wooster, People in Power, 81-92; Andrews, Administrative County Government, 18-20; Taylor, Ante-Bellum
South Carolina, 85-86; Cauthen, South Carolina Goes to War, 192-93.
17
Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism, 5-15; Edgar, South Carolina, 270-71.

27

The black out-migration was nearly as large, for many white emigrants took their slaves with
them.18
Most South Carolinians stayed where they were, however, and by the late antebellum
period cotton had rebounded and a mature plantation and yeoman economy had emerged. The
brief agricultural reform period of the 1840s failed to convince most farmers to abandon their
reliance on cotton but it did bring into sharp focus the tension between their ideological
attachment to personal independence and their growing involvement in commercial agriculture.
Short-staple cotton production was the economic foundation of a community of upcountry
freeholders devoted to a “country-republican” ideology. This ideology extolled the virtues of
personal independence based on the unhindered ownership of productive property. This was seen
as the true foundation of white liberty; without it white men were vulnerable to manipulation and
exploitation and thus unfit for republican citizenship. The planters and yeomen of the upcountry,
although varying in wealth and involvement in the market economy, shared the status of white
independent freeholder, providing the basis for a stable social and political order.19
Planters and yeomen participated in the economy differently. Upcountry planters were
engaged in multiple economic networks extending beyond their region and marketed their crops
through factors in Charleston. Lines of credit were extended to planters who then purchased the
necessary supplies and machinery to operate their plantations. For example, many planters
owned cotton gins, gristmills, and sawmills that served yeomen in the neighborhood for a small
fee. Local planter-yeoman economic relationships of this sort had important social and political
implications. Planters who provided these services came to wield considerable power and
influence over local affairs. As a planter’s power increased so did his social prestige, which in
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turn legitimized his political aspirations. The interdependence between the plantation and
surrounding neighborhood helped to cement white unity.20
Planters certainly played the most conspicuous role in the upcountry economy but the
majority of white farmers were yeomen, i.e., property-owning petty producers. Non-slaveholding
farmers and slaveholding farmers owning fewer than six slaves operated over 55 percent of
farms in the upcountry. Yet the yeoman majority controlled only one third of all farm value.
Nevertheless, yeomen were active participants in the cotton economy. More than 70 percent of
non-slaveholding yeomen grew cotton either for domestic consumption or for market. The
majority practiced “safety-first” farming, allocating enough acreage to subsistence crops to
ensure self-sufficiency and then planting cotton on the land not needed for food production.21
The lowcountry, with its huge riverside rice plantations, contrasted starkly in many ways
with the cotton-growing upcountry. Blacks outnumbered whites in the lowcountry throughout the
antebellum period by a ratio of at least three or four to one. But the lowcountry was not simply a
region of great planters and their enslaved laborers. A vibrant yeomanry existed there working
toward the same ends as the upcountry yeomen. Yeomen constituted a majority of the white
population throughout the lowcountry parishes and they worked toward achieving selfsufficiency and protecting their independence as white freeholders while engaging to a limited
extent in cash-crop production for local or outside markets.22
White society in antebellum South Carolina did not consist solely of planters and
yeomen. Below them in the social hierarchy were the poor whites, those who owned no land, no
slaves, and little or no other property. Many lived on the margins of society, although some
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historians have pointed to the contemporary distinction drawn between the “respectable” poor
and the “shiftless” poor. Although poor whites accounted for a minority of the state’s white
population, they nevertheless played an important role in the economy, mostly in agriculture. It
was not uncommon for a yeoman to hire poor whites as seasonal farm laborers. Many other poor
whites eked out a living as tenant farmers; it has been estimated that between 12 and 20 percent
of all South Carolina farm operators in 1850 were tenants. Other poor whites found employment
as overseers on large plantations. Although they did not own slaves, poor whites lived in a
slaveholding society and were tied either directly or indirectly to the institution. They were, for
example, a crucial component of slave patrols. As the sectional crisis deepened and the
possibility of war drew near, many planters grew uneasy about poor whites’ commitment to
defending the Southern cause and the institution of slavery. Some poor whites resented the
advantages held by slaveowners, and some no doubt equated their own social status with that of
the slaves; after all, poor whites were landless in a society undergirded economically and
ideologically by the ownership of productive property.23
During the antebellum period white Southern women lived in a distinct social system and
political economy where the intersection of gender, class, and race relations shaped their lives.
Women of the planter class had to perform the sometimes contradictory roles of wife and
plantation mistress. They were expected to submit to their husbands and conform to the rigid
standards of womanhood while simultaneously maintaining their authority over slaves in the
household. Many elite women complained about the burdens that slavery imposed on their lives,
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yet they were keenly aware that it preserved their privileged position in society. Yeoman women
enjoyed the benefits of their household’s independent status but their domestic labor was crucial
in achieving that status. They were responsible for transforming raw materials into useable goods
and therefore contributed directly to the household economy. Poor women at the bottom of the
social strata not only worked regularly in the fields but often worked for wages. Like their
menfolk, many poor women lived on the fringes of Southern society. Class divisions sharply
divided Southern women, and there is little evidence indicating that elite women saw themselves
as “sisters” of yeoman and poor-white women. In fact, relations among women of different
classes tended to affirm social hierarchy and serve as a check on egalitarianism.24
By 1860 blacks comprised 59 percent of South Carolina’s population: 412,320 persons
out of 703,708. With 46 percent of white families owning slaves in 1860, South Carolina had the
highest proportion of slaveholders in the nation. Moreover, if applying the standard definition of
a planter as the owner of twenty or more slaves, 20 percent of South Carolina slaveholders fell
into that category, compared with 12 percent across the South. There were seven lowcountry
planters who owned over five hundred slaves and five planters living near the fall line who
owned over three hundred. Owners of more than a hundred slaves were common in most parts of
the state. In 1860 over 65 percent of slaves worked on farms with ten slaves or more. Thus, while
a preponderance of black South Carolinians resided in the lowcountry, the proportion of slaves
and slaveholders was considerable throughout the state.25
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A multitude of factors in antebellum South Carolina shaped slave life. The term “slave
life” can encompass myriad components but usually centers around work, culture, family life,
and resistance. The experience of individual slaves varied widely across the state but was
influenced especially by where the slave lived and the type of work he or she performed. In the
lowcountry the task system prevailed on both rice and sea-island cotton plantations. Once their
daily assigned individual task was complete the slaves could take time off to work their own
garden plots or engage in other activities. This gave them a degree of control over their working
day, allowed some to accumulate a little property, and fostered the development of family and
community in the slave quarters. The situation was quite different above the fall line, where
slaves produced short-staple cotton. There the gang-labor system prevailed; slaves worked the
fields in groups from dawn to dusk under the supervision of a white overseer. The daily rhythms
of life were highly regimented and closely monitored. In general the gang system was harder on
slaves than the task system and afforded them far less control over their workday. Nevertheless,
these enslaved people, too, managed to establish a vibrant family and community life in the slave
quarters.26
The rice swamps and cotton fields were not the only places where slaves worked. An
appreciable number of slaves could be found in South Carolina’s few urban centers. In 1860
some 13,909 slaves resided in Charleston alone. In several ways the lives of urban slaves
diverged sharply from the lives of rural slaves. Many were highly skilled artisans. Urban slaves
often had opportunities to earn money, and some even lived apart from their owners, dressed in
the latest fashions, ate a varied diet, and in other ways enjoyed a lifestyle that rural slaves could
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only envy. Slaves in the cities also mingled with the small minority of black South Carolinians
who were free. There were fewer than ten thousand free blacks in the state in 1860, almost a
third of whom lived in Charleston.27
Historians over the past several decades have clearly established that slaves were not
merely passive victims of a brutal institution. They resisted their plight and tried to loosen the
chains of bondage in every way they could. Resistance took many forms, including lying to or
stealing from masters, breaking tools, neglecting chores, and faking sickness. Other forms of
resistance were bolder, including outright insolence and insubordination. Some slaves resisted
with their feet by absconding temporarily; a very few did so permanently. But until the Civil
War, the institution of slavery was far too powerful to be challenged fundamentally. 28
Given the Palmetto State’s distinctive demography it is not altogether surprising that it
pursued an aberrant course of political action throughout the sectional crisis. In the early years of
the nineteenth century there was no indication this would be the case. John C. Calhoun and
Langdon Cheves were War Hawks during the War of 1812 and in the immediate postwar years
supported a strong federal government. However, in 1819 Missouri applied for admission to the
Union as a slave state. This threatened to upset the balance of United States senators representing
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the free and slave states. Congress eventually decided that Missouri would be admitted as a slave
state while Maine would join the Union as a free state, thereby maintaining the equilibrium in the
Senate. Significantly, the compromise also stipulated that slavery would be excluded in the
remainder of the Louisiana Purchase north of the 36˚ 30’ parallel. Although Calhoun did not
participate in the debates over the admission of Missouri in 1819-20, he supported the
compromise and even helped convince President James Monroe that Congress did have the
constitutional authority to regulate slavery in the territories. William Lowndes, the lowcountry’s
venerated political leader, worked hard on the compromise measure and many of his constituents
expressed their support of the final settlement. But grim forebodings were voiced by Charles
Pinckney, who had been a delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and was a respected
leader in Charleston. He warned South Carolinians about the importance of “keeping the hands
of Congress from touching the question of slavery.” Once Congress established its right to even
consider the subject there was no telling “to what length it may be carried.” The Charleston
newspapers tried to keep the issue from the public, but South Carolina, by winning a victory with
Missouri’s admission as a slave state, had implicitly accepted the principle that Congress had the
power to regulate slavery in the territories.29
South Carolinians were galvanized once again in 1822 when news of the Denmark Vesey
plot became public. Vesey, a free-black carpenter in Charleston, plotted an insurrection that may
have involved hundreds of slaves. He and his co-conspirators were betrayed, and the authorities
hanged thirty-five of them, including Vesey, and sold another thirty-seven out of the state. The
General Assembly subsequently passed the Seamen’s Act to prevent free-black sailors from
conversing with Charleston slaves by locking them up in the city jail while their ship was in port.
29
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The legislation violated a U.S. treaty with Great Britain giving sailors of the two nations open
access to each other’s ports. Federal authorities protested, but South Carolina continued to
enforce the law. This episode was a key turning point in South Carolina’s relationship with the
federal government. The Seaman’s Act in effect nullified a federal mandate. A decade later
South Carolinians would apply the same logic during the nullification crisis after the federal
government passed a protective tariff on manufactured goods.30
In 1828 John C. Calhoun drafted the South Carolina Exposition and Protest, one of the
most important works of political theory addressing the issue of sovereignty in the American
constitutional system. Drawing from the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, he affirmed
the sharing of powers between state and national governments. But for Calhoun, sovereignty
resided with the people of the states that created the Union. The Supreme Court could never be
the final arbiter of constitutional questions, he insisted, since it was itself an arm of the general
government. It was therefore the right and duty of the individual states to judge disputes between
themselves and the federal government. Thus far Calhoun had not said anything new. But he
broke with precedent when he declared that constitutionality should not be decided by the state
legislature but rather by “a convention especially called for the purpose.” If the convention
determined a certain federal law to be unconstitutional, then it had the duty to veto it. This was
precisely what occurred in November 1832 when delegates sitting in special convention in
Columbia declared the federal tariffs of 1828 and 1832 to be unconstitutional and therefore null
and void in the state of South Carolina. The episode reveals much about South Carolina’s
conception of the Union. Many Palmetto State politicians did not believe that the Constitution
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granted Congress the power to tax in order to promote manufactures or interfere with the internal
exchanges between individuals. The judicial nationalism of Supreme Court justice John Marshall
only intensified fears of a powerful government. After the convention nullified the tariff, many
South Carolinians congratulated themselves on defying federal authority and affirming the
doctrine that ultimate political sovereignty resided in state conventions called for special
purposes. What they could not know, however, was that the theory giving state conventions
sovereignty over domestic affairs would surface thirty years later in the midst of a civil war and
produce a bitter debate over where sovereignty resided in the state itself.31
The nullification controversy created much division among South Carolina politicians.
Not only were there some who were still fiercely committed to preserving the Union and
disagreed with the radical course of action taken by the convention, but the nullifiers were split
into conservative and radical wings over the issue of secession. Some wanted to set the issue
aside entirely while others demanded a resolution declaring that the state would secede if the
federal government used coercion to enforce the tariff. The latter option was eventually adopted,
much to the dismay of the Unionists. Additionally, the Unionists were deeply offended when it
was decided that the nullification ordinance would include a provision requiring a test oath that
put loyalty to South Carolina above loyalty to the United States. Any citizen who refused to take
the oath could not hold public office in the state. When the South Carolina Court of Appeals
declared the test oath unconstitutional in 1834, the legislature, under control of former nullifiers,
abolished the court. The failure of the South Carolina Unionists during the controversy prevented
the formation of a viable political opposition to the separatism championed by the nullifiers.
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Indeed, it was the nullification debates which put South Carolina decisively outside the
mainstream of Southern politics and launched the state on its own course.32
Another factor shaping that peculiar course was the absence of political parties in South
Carolina. When the Whig Party began to attract a following in South Carolina, as it did in the
presidential election of 1840, John C. Calhoun effectively strangled it before it matured. The
platform of the Whigs, advocating using the federal government to promote economic
development, was rejected by most planters and yeomen. Nevertheless, although most South
Carolinians were Democrats, their allegiance to the national party was tenuous at best. The
absence of a strong party structure in the state should not be taken to imply that Jacksonian
democracy completely bypassed the state. Indeed, local elections were often vigorously
contested and politicians had to court the favor of their constituents. But South Carolina’s unique
political system, which gave disproportionate power to the legislature, ran against the grain of
Jacksonian democracy. Because the legislature elected the presidential electors most campaigns
revolved around legislative and congressional races. South Carolina had a healthy dose of
democracy but without the constraints of the second party system. This was an excellent formula
for radicalism.33
Nullification was an impetus for Southern nationalism. The war with Mexico and the
subsequent debates over organizing the acquired territories helped crystalize the concept of
Southern nationalism. Yet the concept by this point had moved far from the earlier formal
constitutional and political arguments to embrace the vindication of slavery. As the proslavery
argument was elaborated it became the ideological foundation of Southern nationalism. The
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Wilmot Proviso, a proposed congressional measure that would prohibit slavery in any territory
acquired from Mexico, was condemned at public gatherings across the state. Even Benjamin F.
Perry, an outspoken Unionist and moderate, vowed to resist passage of the proviso and warned
that any federal interference with slave property would cause “an immediate dissolution of this
great and hitherto glorious Union.” In 1849 a Central Committee of Vigilance and Safety began
to operate in Columbia to advise the governor. By this time citizens in nearly every district of the
state had endorsed resolutions pledging to resist further attacks on slavery. Although the proviso
never became law, it altered the political struggle over slavery.34
Inflaming the situation further were the fierce debates in Congress over how the
territories acquired from Mexico were to be organized. The debate hinged on California’s
admission to the Union. By this time the long-standing sectional equilibrium had largely
disappeared. The South, outnumbered in population and long since outnumbered in the House of
Representatives, could rely only on the balance in the Senate. But President Zachary Taylor was
pressing hard for the admission of California, whose residents had drafted a constitution that
barred slavery. A compromise was reached whereby California would be admitted as a free state
in return for a stronger federal fugitive slave law. There were other minor concessions to the
South included in the compromise, but the balance of power was tipped decisively in favor of the
Northern states. Many South Carolinians were enraged by the so-called compromise that seemed
to favor the antislavery movement. When the Compromise of 1850 became law, Edward B.
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Bryan of St. John’s Colleton Parish reversed the famous revolutionary cry, demanding “Give us
Slavery or give us death.”35
Amid the debates over the Compromise of 1850, South Carolina politicians split loosely
into three factions over how to defend slavery. The radical faction advocated immediate
secession and the formation of a Southern nation. The men composing this group were prepared
to take South Carolina out of the Union with or without the support of other Southern states. The
second faction feared that such a rash measure would alienate Southerners outside of South
Carolina and sought to keep their state in the Southern mainstream. The third faction, the
Unionists, earnestly sought to defend slavery but thought it was best protected inside the Union.
Calhoun was criticized by all three, but it was he who held the political center together and kept
the radicals in check. After he died on 31 March 1850, the issues surrounding the Compromise of
1850 generated an internal debate in South Carolina that threatened to take the state out of the
Union. South Carolina thus entered the 1850s in a state of political bewilderment without the
benefit of party loyalties to restrain radical actions. The result was the first secession crisis,
which created the most energetic and alienating political campaigns since the nullification crisis.
It demonstrates how even tactical and strategic disputes over Southern rights could threaten to
tear South Carolina’s unity apart.36
The Nashville Convention of 1850, designed to foster Southern unity in the wake of the
compromise, and the first full-fledged secession movement in South Carolina, arising after the
legislature called a state convention in 1852 to debate taking the state out of the Union, were two
important milestones on the road to civil war. By this time the idea of secession was gaining
strength in South Carolina. Robert Barnwell Rhett declared at the convention in Nashville that
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there was only “one course left, for the peace and salvation of the South,––a dissolution of the
Union.” But at this point few politicians outside of South Carolina agreed. Indeed, many
respected leaders in South Carolina were still reluctant to embrace secession. Nevertheless, the
radicals succeeded in calling a state convention to debate the issue. The 1852 convention debates
crystalized the positions of the three factions. These factions persisted in state politics until late
1860. In fact, they never entirely disappeared with secession and their influence would be felt
into the war years. The radicals, also known as “fire-eaters” or “separate state actionists,”
included Robert Barnwell Rhett and Maxcy Gregg; they were willing to secede from the Union
alone if necessary. The “cooperationists,” led by James L. Orr and Robert W. Barnwell, were
reluctant to take radical measures without the support of other Southern states. The Unionists
(“submissionists” to their opponents) were led by Benjamin F. Perry, Louis L. Petigru, and John
B. O’Neall; they rejected secession except as a last, desperate resort. Regardless of their
differences, however, the three factions agreed that preserving slavery was their fundamental
aim.37
Conservativism prevailed when the state convention met in April 1852. The
cooperationists and Unionists defeated the radicals by a substantial majority. Although the first
secession crisis thus ended without South Carolina taking any rash action, five years of bitter
debate had left the state politically divided. Efforts in the 1850s by some in the upcountry to
adjust the method of legislative apportionment and to institute popular election of the governor
and presidential electors further divided members of the legislature. The only change in
representation that resulted was the division of Pendleton District into Anderson and Pickens
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districts. The legislature retained control of electing the governor and presidential electors.
Adding to the sectional divide in the state were a host of tensions that centered on railroad
development and banking. Thus, at the very time that South Carolina was divided over how to
best defend slavery in a national context, it was also divided between lowcountry and upcountry
over internal financial issues.38
Events on the national stage seemed to move quickly following the first secession
movement. By 1852 the idea of building a railroad to California had gained sufficient
momentum that Congress could no longer ignore the issue. But the question remained as to
where the railroad would be built. Southerners naturally preferred a southern route, one that
would run through the already organized territory of New Mexico with New Orleans as its
eastern terminus. Many settlers and land speculators, however, pushed for a northern route
through the remaining unorganized territory of the Louisiana Purchase. Situated north of 36˚ 30’,
the proposed northern route alarmed Southerners because it meant that slavery would be
excluded there by terms of the Missouri Compromise, thereby closing off settlement to
slaveholding Southerners. After much political jockeying to appease Southern interests, Senator
Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois introduced the Kansas-Nebraska bill of 1854 which explicitly
repealed the ban on slavery north of 36˚ 30’. The Kansas and Nebraska territories would be
organized on the basis of popular sovereignty, a vague formula that allowed the settlers to decide
for themselves whether to have slavery but did not specify when voters would decide the matter.
It was not long before pro- and antislavery settlers began pouring into the region; widespread
violence and murder soon convulsed the Kansas territory. Hundreds of South Carolinians
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volunteered to head west and thousands of dollars were raised across the state to assist the
proslavery settlers in Kansas.39
While “Bleeding Kansas” was stirring up a storm across the nation, Senator Charles
Sumner of Massachusetts was left bleeding on the Senate floor after giving a speech denouncing
the proslavery settlers and then being ruthlessly beaten with a cane by Congressman Preston
Brooks of South Carolina. Brooks subsequently resigned his seat in Congress but was reelected
to it unanimously. Many Northerners saw Sumner as a martyr; Brooks became a hero to many in
the South. The bloodshed that erupted in Kansas over the destiny of slavery in the West
destroyed the Whig Party and gave birth to the Republican Party, a purely sectional Northern
party that pledged to halt the expansion of slavery into the territories. The Kansas-Nebraska Act
of 1854 was a key event that pushed the nation toward civil war.40
In 1857 the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Scott v. Sanford. Dred Scott, an
enslaved man living in Missouri, had been taken by his owner John Sanford to Illinois and then
the Wisconsin Territory, where they lived for a number of years before returning to Missouri.
After Sanford died Scott sued for his freedom on the grounds that his residence in Illinois and the
Wisconsin Territory, where slavery was barred, made him free. In a seven to two decision the
Supreme Court disagreed. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney held that
blacks, whether free or enslaved, could not be United States citizens and therefore had no legal
standing to sue in federal court. Taney went on to declare that the federal government had no
power to regulate slavery in the territories and therefore the Missouri Compromise was
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unconstitutional. The Dred Scott decision elated many in South Carolina, but this victory for
Southern rights was soon tempered by events in Kansas. That same year the territorial legislature
convened a rump convention in Lecompton to write a proslavery constitution after a series of
referendums marked by fraudulent voting. The Lecompton Constitution was submitted to
Congress and Democratic president James Buchanan, needing the support of the South, urged its
approval. But Stephen Douglas, a Democrat who had previously championed popular
sovereignty, now argued that the voting irregularities had turned the concept into a sham. Facing
the hostility of his constituents if he supported the proslavery document, Douglas broke ranks
with his Southern Democratic colleagues and came out against the Lecompton Constitution. The
South Carolina radicals cited this as proof that Northern Democrats could not be trusted to
protect the slaveholding interests of the South.41
By this time many South Carolina politicians had become disillusioned with the entire
political process. Scandals in Washington during the Buchanan administration rekindled old
fears about corruption and the abuse of political power. To many Southern politicians it seemed
that the only way to avoid such moral pollution was to secede from the Union. This need became
all the more urgent after Northern abolitionist John Brown and his followers raided the federal
arsenal in Harpers Ferry, Virginia, in October 1859 in an effort to incite a slave insurrection. It
appeared to white South Carolinians that their ability to control the black race was being
violently challenged by their Yankee enemies. This shock brought their simmering fears about
internal security boiling to the surface.42
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Life in South Carolina was decidedly different after Brown’s raid. Hysteria convulsed the
state and vigilance committees appeared in almost every community. The fear of abolitionist
subversion gripped nearly all whites. Physical assaults on suspected abolitionists became
common and the enforcement of public orthodoxy on the issue of slavery reached a feverish
pitch. Newspapers across the state publicized alleged atrocities by slaves. This panic exposed an
important contradiction in the Southern white mind. On the one hand, whites claimed that blacks
were inherently docile, obedient, and faithful to their masters; on the other hand, they denounced
them as bestial and potentially dangerous. Many whites explained away this contradiction by
claiming that abolitionists were tampering with their slaves, turning them against their masters.
White South Carolinians united to suppress dissent on racial issues and to reassert control over
the slave population. Fear of the black race and of the prospect of emancipation now dictated the
state’s political course.43
Yet explaining South Carolina’s eventual secession is not that easy. Undoubtedly a
multiplicity of factors was at work. Certainly South Carolina had a greater stake in slavery than
her sister states in the Deep South, but the proportion of slaves in the state’s population was only
slightly greater than that in Mississippi and Louisiana, and slavery was just as fundamental to the
production of staple crops in those two states and the rest of the Deep South. Moreover, there
was no one man in South Carolina capable alone of swaying the masses. Nor was there a tightly
organized political machine capable of doing so. There was, however, a great deal of political
literature circulating throughout the state that advocated secession. In Charleston secessionists
organized the “1860 Association” to distribute such literature. The association’s Tract No. 4, for
example, titled The Doom of Slavery in the Union: Its Safety out of It, argued that one wing of
the Republican Party was determined to abolish slavery through violence while the other would
43
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seek to do it constitutionally. Such pamphlets did much to unify South Carolina whites and
marginalize the few who counseled caution. Secession in South Carolina was a widely popular
movement, not a conspiracy of a few powerful politicians. Regardless of what factor one chooses
to emphasize, however, there can be no question that the election of 1860 was responsible for
turning ideas and words into action.44
The Democratic Party, already torn by the events in Kansas, held its national convention
in April 1860 in Charleston. It was probably doomed from the start. Irreconcilable differences
between the Northern and Southern wings of the party over slavery fractured the convention. The
Charleston Mercury thundered that “if the National Democratic Party cannot stand the test of
principle, matters on which the destiny of the South depends, let us have a sectional party that
can. Let the Convention break up.” And so it did. Following defeat of the proposed Southern
platform, which demanded resolutions that Congress had a duty to protect slavery and that
neither Congress nor a territorial legislature had the authority to abolish slavery, South
Carolina’s delegates followed those of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana out of the
convention hall. After another failed attempt to hold a unified convention, the party’s Northern
wing nominated Stephen A. Douglas for president and the Southern wing nominated John C.
Breckenridge of Kentucky. John Bell of Tennessee offered himself as the candidate of
conservative Southerners under the banner of the hastily-formed Constitutional Union Party. The
Republicans nominated Abraham Lincoln of Illinois.45
In South Carolina the growing consensus on secession was reflected in the October 1860
legislative elections. The winning candidates were almost all committed to calling a convention
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to consider secession in the event Lincoln was elected, but when the legislature convened on 5
November the cooperationists were in control, to the disgust of the radicals. However, a message
arrived from Governor Joseph Brown of Georgia stating that his recommendation to call a
convention in that state had wide support. This encouraged South Carolinians to take the lead.
When the news that Lincoln had been elected reached South Carolina, the legislature called for
elections to a state convention to meet in Columbia on 17 December. On 6 December South
Carolinians elected delegates to the convention. Almost all those elected were committed to
immediate secession.46
Prior to the convention the legislature went about choosing the next governor. The
Charleston Daily Courier endorsed James Chestnut Jr., who had resigned his seat in the United
States Senate after Lincoln’s election. The Charleston Mercury supported Robert Barnwell
Rhett. The Edgefield Advertiser nominated favorite son of the upcountry Francis W. Pickens,
who had recently returned from serving as minister to Russia. During the 1850s Pickens had
been associated with the moderate National Democratic faction, but when he addressed the
General Assembly after the presidential election he adopted a more radical position–––not so
radical, however, as to offend the cooperationists. The Unionist faction, soundly defeated
throughout the state during the election for convention delegates, had by now all but disappeared
as a political force. Pickens, straddling the radical and cooperationist factions, was elected
governor on the seventh ballot. With the election of Pickens the legislature broke a sixteen-yearold tradition of alternating the office between the upcountry and lowcountry. Unfortunately his
personality was ill-suited to the task ahead. Many of South Carolina’s leading families disliked
him. He had a reputation as overbearing and arrogant and lacked the ability to draw men close to
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him. He also struck many people as too hesitant to be an effective leader, yet at the same time he
was capable of acting impulsively, even rashly.47
The convention that assembled in Columbia in December was dominated by wealthy
planters; more than 90 percent of the 169 delegates owned slaves, and the median number of
slaves held was thirty-seven. Before proceeding to business the delegates considered a resolution
to adjourn and move the convention to Charleston because of a smallpox outbreak in Columbia.
The resolution passed and the convention resumed its work in Charleston’s Saint Andrews Hall.
On 20 December the committee designated to devise an ordinance of secession reported and the
convention passed, by a vote of 169 to 0, the ordinance dissolving South Carolina’s compact
with the Union. The convention then moved to Institute Hall, where the governor and both
houses of the legislature were in attendance, for the ceremonial signing of the ordinance. A
crowd of three thousand cheered the members of the convention as they walked into Institute
Hall. The next day the Charleston Mercury proclaimed the advent of “an epoch in the history of
the human race.” South Carolina was now an independent republic.48
The convention produced two other important documents. The first, drafted by
Christopher Memminger, was the “Declaration of Immediate Causes which Induce and Justify
the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union.” It boldly placed slavery at the heart of
the argument for secession. This was of concern to some members of the convention, but
Laurence Keitt reminded those with reservations that the protection of slavery “is the great
central point from which we are now proceeding.” The second document, drafted by Rhett, was
“The Address of the People of South Carolina, Assembled in Convention, to the People of the
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Slaveholding States of the United States.” It condemned the North for perpetrating “the one great
evil, from which all other evils have flowed,” i.e., “the overthrow of the Constitution of the
United States.” He went on to argue that the North and South constituted two different peoples
and that “slaveholding States cannot be safe in subjection to non-slaveholding States.” The
address concluded with an invitation to the rest of the South to “join us in forming a Confederacy
of Slaveholding States.”49
With South Carolina now independent, the convention delegates considered changes to
the state Constitution, particularly the powers delegated to the governor. They passed an
amendment empowering the governor to conduct foreign relations, make diplomatic
appointments and treaties subject to confirmation by two-thirds of the Senate, and convene the
Senate whenever deemed necessary. The amendment also expanded the governor’s appointive
powers and created a council composed of the lieutenant governor and four other persons to be
named with the advice and consent of the convention. Significantly, the convention passed
another amendment concerning citizenship. It explicitly extended the state citizenship of a man
to his wife and of a single woman to her children, thereby implicitly confirming that all white
women were part of South Carolina’s body politic. Finally, the convention ordained “That in no
case shall citizenship extend to any person who is not a free white person.” With that, a majority
of South Carolinians were denied citizenship.50
Meanwhile, Governor Pickens’s leadership was put to the test by events in Charleston
harbor. On the night of 26 December 1860 U.S. Army major Robert Anderson moved his
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garrison force from Fort Moultrie on Sullivan’s Island to Fort Sumter in the center of the harbor.
To many South Carolinians the occupation of Fort Sumter by a “foreign nation” was an affront to
the sovereignty of their republic. The convention appointed three commissioners to go to
Washington to discuss the issue with President Buchanan. Pickens, who was already coming
under criticism both from those demanding more aggressive action and those urging caution,
pursued a policy of “wait and see,” for he knew South Carolina was unprepared to enforce a
demand for surrender. The situation was complicated by events taking place in Montgomery,
Alabama, where delegates were busy forming a Southern Confederacy. By 1 February 1861 the
six other states of the Deep South had answered South Carolina’s call to secede and all seven
states had sent delegates to Montgomery to create a new nation.51
The South Carolina delegation at the Montgomery convention was, with the exception of
Rhett and Keitt, composed of men who had favored cooperation in 1852. Moderation prevailed
among the Montgomery delegates as a whole because the primary objective was to preserve the
Southern lifestyle as Southerners then lived it. The fundamental goal was to preserve the status
quo rather than create something new. Nevertheless, the South Carolina delegation expressed
opposition to certain provisions in the new Confederate Constitution that were favored by the
delegates as a whole. The South Carolinians were in fact quite divided among themselves. Future
vice president of the Confederacy Alexander Stephens said of the delegation, “No two of them
agree. They are all jealous of each other . . . there is no harmony or cordiality among them.” The
Provisional Constitution adopted in Montgomery on 11 March 1861 was sharply criticized by
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many in South Carolina, for it seemed insufficiently rigorous on the key issue of slavery. The
South Carolina delegation wanted to include provisions that guaranteed the right of secession,
forbade appeals from state courts to Confederate courts, counted each slave as a full person for
purposes of congressional representation, stipulated that presidential electors would be chosen by
legislatures, limited the Confederacy’s body politic to slaveholding states, and kept alive the
possibility of reopening the international slave trade. With the exception of limiting the terms of
president to six years, prohibiting protective duties, and changing the amendment process, every
proposal by the South Carolina delegation was defeated. One member of the delegation, L. W.
Spratt, infuriated by what he considered a lack of enthusiasm in the convention for explicitly
protecting slavery, declared that “our whole movement is defeated” and thought “another
revolution may be necessary.”52
It is tempting to overstate South Carolina’s opposition to the Constitution. Certainly the
debate over ratification was fierce and there was no little disagreement about its imperfections.
Yet opposition from a few South Carolina ideologues such as Spratt and Rhett should not be
taken to mean that the displeasure was universal. The Charleston Evening News thought that
“every one seems pleased” and hoped those with grievances “will not wage a wicked and
suicidal opposition to any of [the Constitution’s] provisions.” The article went on to claim that
the new document was “the best Constitution yet formed for the government of man.” But the
difference of opinion is significant because it reveals that the Palmetto State’s political
factionalism would not be set aside merely for the sake of unity. South Carolina was the only
state that seriously debated the merits of the Confederate Constitution. Across the South other
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state conventions avoided procedural delay and ratified the document with little debate. It was
not until 3 April 1861 that the South Carolina convention finally ratified the Constitution; there
were twenty-one dissenting votes.53
In early March the Confederate government had assumed responsibility for the operations
at Charleston harbor. About that same time, President Lincoln pledged in his inaugural address to
“hold, occupy and possess the property and places belonging to the government.” On 4 April he
gave the order to resupply Fort Sumter, and thereafter events moved rapidly toward war.
Negotiations between the Confederate authorities and Major Anderson failed to secure the fort’s
surrender.54
Early in the morning of 12 April 1861 Confederate artillery opened fire on the fort.
Anderson surrendered on 14 April after thirty-four hours of bombardment. The next day
President Lincoln called on the loyal states of the Union to provide troops to put down the
Southern “rebellion.” The Confederacy was now at war. Governor Pickens proudly exclaimed
that the flag of the United States was humbled before “the glorious little state of South Carolina”
and vowed that “we will conquer or perish.”55
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Chapter Two
“The Fate Which Is upon Us”:
Security and Society in the Early War Period
On the morning of 7 November 1861 the largest amphibious expedition mounted by the
United States in the nineteenth century attacked Forts Beauregard and Walker guarding the
entrance of Port Royal Sound near Beaufort. For the past six months state and Confederate
engineers had been busy strengthening these defenses. Both Brigadier General Roswell S.
Ripley, commanding South Carolina’s coastal forces, and Brigadier General Thomas F. Drayton,
in command at Port Royal, were confident that the fortifications would prevent the enemy from
capturing the Sea Islands. Major Francis D. Lee, who oversaw Fort Walker’s construction, had
proudly proclaimed that “God Almighty himself couldn’t take it.” But less than five hours after
Federal guns opened fire the Confederate defenders abandoned the forts and fled to the
mainland. The attempt to stop the enemy invaders thus ended in disaster. Union forces now
occupied a portion of the wealthiest region of South Carolina.1
Following this debacle the Charleston Mercury decried “the wretched policy which has
induced the invasion of the State.” There was no excuse for it, the editor insisted: “For more than
six months the editorial columns of this journal have teemed with exhortations to our authorities
and people, to prepare for the enemy, by proper defences of the coast.” These warnings were
scoffed at by those “who sweetly hinted to the good public that we had military men and
engineers enough, to whom the matter could be safely entrusted.” Now the only option was to
fight until the last man was left standing, for it was “better for South Carolina to be the cemetery
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of freemen, than the home of slaves.” Since all efforts “to shield South Carolina from invasion
have failed, we meet, with cheerfulness, the fate which is upon us.”2
The grim situation that South Carolina found itself in that November had not been
anticipated by the state’s leaders immediately after the Union surrender of Fort Sumter. On the
contrary, in April 1861 they expressed prodigious confidence in the security of their state and its
people’s ability to wage war. Citizens were repeatedly assured of their military prowess and the
durability of their social fabric. When Governor Pickens stood outside the Charleston Hotel on
the evening of 13 April and predicted to a cheering crowd that taking Fort Sumter would achieve
“our independence as it did in the memorable days of the Revolution,” his view was accepted
and echoed by a multitude of other leaders and ordinary citizens. Indeed, the victory at Fort
Sumter electrified South Carolinians. As one Yorkville inhabitant put it, the victory “was like the
uplifting of a mountain of lead from our hearts.” While torchlight parades commenced in
Charleston and around the district courthouses, influential voices affirmed the inevitability of
victory. The Mercury boasted that “as in the Revolution, it will be seen how superior is patriotic
valor to hireling skill, and that brave men, fighting on their own soil, for their dearest rights, are
invincible.” The young men of South Carolina were reminded that “We are by nature and habits
a martial people. As soon as we leave the nursery we are put on horseback, and the robins and
sparrows are lost in wonder at seeing such little boys carrying guns.” There could be no doubt
that “the universal world, including Yankeedom, everywhere recognizes the superiority of the
Southerner” and that Southern troops “on equal terms are invincible.” Lincoln’s call for seventy-
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five thousand troops to suppress the rebellion would only unify the South, and “United together,
the South is invincible.”3
While white South Carolinians were repeatedly reminded of their martial superiority in
the weeks and months following Anderson’s surrender, many were convinced that there would
be no real war. It was conceded that there might be a blockade of the coast and perhaps some
shelling at Fort Pickens near Pensacola, but it was confidently asserted that “a war of invasion
for conquest, by the North against the South, we do not expect to see.” No doubt “Old Abe”
merely “wants to scare us with the idea of seventy-five thousand volunteers.” Those who did
entertain the possibility of war disparaged the enemy as “a herd of ragamuffins picked up in the
gambling saloons of Northern cities” and thus no match for Southern soldiers. If actual fighting
did break out then it would be “A short War and a Merry One.” One man in Union District wrote
to the editor of the New York Herald offering to bet his “plantation and 100 negroes that
Washington city will be in the hands of the Confederate States in less than ninety days after the
commencement of hostilities.”4
There were others, however, who reflected more soberly on what lay ahead. Before
secession was an accomplished fact Governor William H. Gist warned the legislature in
November 1860 that “We cannot penetrate the dark future; it may be filled with ashes, tears, and
blood.” In the extreme corner of the upcountry, where secessionism was more subdued, it
seemed to some that “the future is dark, mysterious and uncertain.” The botanist Henry William
Ravenel agreed that “we cannot conjecture what the future has in store.” J. W. Reid, serving in
the Fourth South Carolina Infantry, perceptively noted that “the taking of Fort Sumter is not
3
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exactly taking or whipping into submission the Yankee nation, or Yankee army. That thing
remains to be done hereafter, if at all. It will not be done in a day.” As men left their homes to go
off to war those left behind wondered how long their loved ones would be gone, or if they would
ever see them again. Twenty-two-year-old Emma Holmes feared that “probably but few of that
gallant band will ever return.” As spring turned to summer the tone of the newspapers changed.
While still affirming Southern superiority, some began to warn that the North should not be
underestimated, pointing out that it had the advantage in numbers and many soldiers “as brave as
any in the world” who are now “armed with the best weapons” and being trained “under the
instruction of competent officers.” In stark contrast to the notion that the war would be short and
merry––if indeed it was fought at all––South Carolinians were now told that “the contest will be
bloody beyond anything known in the annals of this country.”5
Underlying the growing concern about the future was a clear sense of what was at stake
in the contest: nothing less than the preservation of the Southern social fabric. This war was not
going to be waged solely over abstract political principles; it was in truth a war for survival. The
fundamental cause was not, the Southern Guardian declared, that “The Southern people desired,
under the old Federal Union, simply to be let alone.” The issue was more tangible: a dire threat
to the South’s “system of labor.” Nor was the cause, as the Mercury argued, “merely the
maintenance of our rights and liberties,” but “our institutions, which are the basis of our
existence.” Just one day before the Confederates fired on Fort Sumter the Charleston Daily
Courier reminded its readers that the sectional crisis had been provoked by “the success at the
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North of an increasing fanatical party, whose every principle looked to the undermining and final
destruction of the social institutions of the South.” This challenge could not be met with “cool
indifference,” for it “involved the very existence of our Southern society.”6
It was not only newspaper editors who diagnosed the conflict’s cause. Other leading
public figures seconded them. The novelist and historian William Gilmore Simms declared
frankly that “The South is bound together by the cohesive bond of African Slavery!”; there were
other commonalities among white Southerners, but the “one grand cohesive institution of
slavery” was what welded them together. General W. E. Martin of South Carolina, while en
route to Virginia, addressed a regiment of Georgia volunteers, assuring them that Southerners
“are drawn together by the bond of a common destiny, one involving not only our whole social
system but our existence. . . . [W]e have one interest, one social system, one destiny.” James
Henry Hammond proclaimed that “The peoples of the North and South, owing to marked
diversity in their pursuits, are two peoples, who may live in amity if separated, but never again
under one government.” The main point of contention between the two, he affirmed, was the
question of “African Slavery.” In his inaugural address Governor Pickens made it clear that in
the South there were “two entirely distinct and separate races,” and anything undermining the
“subordination between the races, not only endangers the peace, but the very existence of our
security.”7
As these pronouncements suggest, a profound racial anxiety gripped South Carolina’s
white society in the early stages of the war. Central to these anxieties were the contradictions
inherent in a slave society. The fear that abolitionist emissaries would be at work “inciting the
6
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negroes in every direction” was countered with the reassurance that “these dear, dark friends of
ours” were “arrant cowards.” Nevertheless, it was crucial to arm the state in order to “keep the
negroes in check.” Although a law passed at the last session of the legislature before the war
broke out prescribed the form of permits for slaves to leave their owner’s premises, one citizen in
Edgefield District complained about the continued “custom of quartering negroes to themselves
on isolated farms without white surveillance.” This might be overlooked in ordinary
circumstances but in “times like the present, it is both imprudent and unjust to the
neighborhood.” It did not matter “what confidence the owners feel in the negroes they thus set
apart, the public only look to the fact as being prejudicial to good order.” At the heart of these
inherent contradictions was the question of exactly where the slave fit into society. In June, when
President Davis decreed a day of national humiliation and prayer, one South Carolinian
wondered why it did not extend to slaves. Since they were “members of our household” the
proclamation should “equally apply to our dependents in town and country.” It struck this citizen
as “inconsistent that our slaves should have no fellowship with us in our days of public
thanksgiving and humiliation, as though we did not recognize them as persons in a moral and
religious point of view.”8
Recognizing slaves as brothers and sisters in Christ and members of the family and
community might temper harshness of the institution to a degree. But legally, of course, slaves
were deemed not persons but chattel. However much affection or conscience might ameliorate
slavery, it was first and foremost a system of brutal exploitation of black people. These
ambiguities of the slave system in which slaves were rational and moral beings yet also property
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that could be bought and sold, compounded the dilemmas of living in a biracial society. The
most immediate concern of whites during the first year of war was the question of slave loyalty.
Henry William Ravenel felt assured that “Our negroes are contented and loyal.” In Yorkville
there was “great confidence in the faithfulness in the great mass of our slaves.” A citizen in
Laurens District praised the “devotion and sacrifice to our cause” made by the slaves. Numerous
articles in the state’s newspapers affirmed the loyalty and docility of slaves.9
Some whites, however, were not so sanguine. Keziah Brevard, a widow and plantation
mistress living near Columbia, nervously complained about the behavior of her slaves. Though it
was her “constant desire to make my negroes happy,” she was certain “that they hate me” and
were guilty of “deception.” Brevard warned that “My Southern sisters and brothers who think
their slaves would be on our side in a civil war, will, I fear, find they have been artfully taken
in.” She suspected, too, that “our negroes are far more knowing than many will acknowledge”
about the great events transpiring. Henry William Ravenel, having praised the slaves’
contentment and loyalty, was soon writing to the Mercury to call attention to the necessity for
vigilance and to applaud the formation of “Home Guards” in his neighborhood. The growing
possibility of a Union naval attack on South Carolina’s coast in the fall heightened white fears
about the loyalty of the slave population.10
The debates in the legislature from November 1860 through January 1861 betrayed
similar fears. That there was doubt about the loyalty of slaves was evident in a bill proposing “to
increase the compensation for taking up runaway slaves.” Representative John Read from the
9
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tidewater parish of Prince George Winyah defended the bill, noting the great number of petitions
lately complaining about the expense of capturing runaway slaves and transporting them to
district jails. Read pointed out that the current law “allows only the miserable compensation of
two dollars and a half, whereas it has frequently put parties to an expense of fifteen or twenty
dollars.” Read’s concerns were valid. Newton Bramlett, a constable from Greenville District,
sent a petition asking compensation for arresting and transporting two slaves named Ben and
Berry to the Greenville jail. Bramlett had traveled over a hundred miles round trip and with
tavern expenses thought he was entitled to at least ten dollars in compensation. Read told the
members that “it amounts to a very great nuisance that there should be a very large number of
these slaves running at large in the Districts . . . hovering around a neighborhood, going out at
night, probably stealing and doing other injury.” It was the duty of the legislature to induce
parties to capture them and return them to jail “where they can no longer do any injury.” The
legislature refused to pass the bill, apparently out of fiscal concerns, but the extent to which it
was defended demonstrated undeniable concern among lawmakers over the loyalty of slaves and
thus the internal security of the state in the potentially turbulent days ahead.11
Another legislative measure betraying concern about the slave population was a bill
(proposed just days before the state seceded) establishing a “Coast Police.” Stephen Elliot from
St. Helena Parish, a member of the Committee on the Military, reported that the committee
“considers the establishment of a Coast Police second to none of the measures now before the
General Assembly.” While the vessels provided for in the bill would be useful for giving
advance warning of a Union fleet, Elliot explained, they would also act “as a safeguard against
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marauders” who might raid coastal plantations “and remove thousands of dollars worth of
property.” If this were to happen, “who can calculate the disastrous effects” on the state? Planters
would be forced to “immediately remove their negroes to the interior.” Citing the latest
comptroller’s report, the committee pointed out that the lowcountry’s surplus cotton and rice
production was valued at over $5,900,000 a year. There were more than 144,000 slaves
inhabiting the region, worth over $100,000,000. “Is this a community to be left entirely
unprotected?” Moreover, the $313,546 in taxes paid by lowcountry residents was more than
three times the appropriation asked for in the bill. Understandably the committee recommended
that the bill be passed at once.12
Given these striking statistics one might assume there would have been little
disagreement over passing the bill. Yet there emerged in this debate some indications that the
unity of South Carolina was not as complete as many in the state hoped. Andrew Thomson of
Union District in the upcountry scorned the idea of a coast police clearly designed solely to
protect the interests of the lowcountry. He deemed the bill unnecessary because “there was no
danger. The people of the North are not going to trouble us in these troublesome times.” But
Joseph Pope, representing Charleston, challenged Thomson’s arguments. He resented his
colleague’s insouciant attitude regarding the security of the coast. The state’s lawmakers have
“an obligation to protect our people,” he declared, and if we “are not equal to that duty we have
begun the contest before we are prepared to carry it on.” There was no question, he concluded,
that “this House owes it to the people having so large an amount of property exposed, to give
them this security, or sense of security.”13
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Sectionalism had long characterized South Carolina politics. But many hoped that the
diverging interests of the lowcountry and upcountry would be forgotten as the state prepared for
war. The bill establishing a coast police eventually did pass but not without some opposition
from members representing the upcountry. More importantly, Joseph Pope’s speech strongly
upheld the principle that the legislature was not only obliged to protect its citizens from physical
harm but also to safeguard their slave property. Evident in the debates over the bill to increase
compensation for retrieving runaway slaves and the establishment of a coast police was a deep
fear that South Carolina’s social fabric could be torn asunder, particularly if a Union force were
to invade the lowcountry.14
If white South Carolinians were of two minds concerning the loyalty of their slaves and
the potential for disruption in their society, their attitude toward free blacks was equally
inconsistent. In one breath the free people were praised for their loyalty and in the next
condemned for insufficient patriotism. Free blacks in the South had always occupied an
anomalous position in society. Defined primarily by their skin color, they enjoyed some rights
while being denied others. But the tenuous liberty free blacks enjoyed in the antebellum period
eroded during the Civil War. The Mayor of Charleston, Charles Macbeth, initiated a crackdown
on slaves and free blacks alike, bolstering surveillance and requiring free blacks to carry a badge
if they could not otherwise prove their freedom. The 3,237 free blacks living in Charleston in
1860 engaged in no fewer than sixty-five different occupations, including many skilled trades.
The door of opportunity for employment in these skilled positions, however, was slamming shut.
The legislature’s Committee on the Colored Population recommended in 1860 that free blacks be
excluded from the mechanical trades. Governor Gist declared in his annual message to the
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legislature that year that “it must be distinctly and universally understood that the white is the
governing race, without an exception, and without regard to disparity of intellect, merit or
acquirements.”15
Under intensifying white scrutiny, South Carolina’s free-black community did its utmost
to demonstrate loyalty and shelter itself from suspicion. Throughout 1861 there were numerous
instances of free blacks donating money to support the war effort and offering their services to
the Confederacy. In September a meeting of free blacks in Charleston collected $450 to assist
sick and wounded soldiers. Free blacks sent memorials to the mayor of Columbia and to
Governor Pickens pledging their allegiance and willingness to “offer up our lives, and all that is
dear to us” in the defense of the state. Whites flaunted these avowals as evidence of the essential
stability of their biracial society. Spartanburg citizens praised “the devotion manifested by the
free people of color to the cause of the Confederate States . . . and particularly in the city of
Charleston, they have proved themselves a diligent, faithful and loyal people.” Some of these
professions of loyalty were no doubt genuine, but many were exaggerations and some pure
inventions. Mostly they were intended to ensure the free people’s safety and dispel whites’
suspicion.16
Those suspicions were never wholly dispelled, however. As had occurred during previous
times of heightened sectional tension, South Carolina legislators in 1861 considered
strengthening the laws governing free blacks. Bills were introduced proposing to prohibit them
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from carrying firearms, denying them the right to ride in carriages or become merchants, and
forbidding them from entering into contracts. Others would have required them to move out of
South Carolina. One bill would have forced free blacks into slavery. In almost every case these
bills were introduced at the behest of upcountry planters, and all met with defeat in the
legislature due to the influence of Charleston’s delegation. Nevertheless, it was clear in the
months after Fort Sumter that the patience of many white South Carolinians was wearing thin. A
citizen of Abbeville cited a law recently passed by the Virginia legislature forcing free blacks to
perform sixty days of military labor. Why, this citizen wondered, was such a law not passed in
South Carolina? Was it right that free blacks were “exempt while white men who cannot afford
to be absent from home, are called away for months [of militia duty] to toil and sweat?” Free
blacks ought to be made “An Arm of the State” and “should be required to do something for the
defence of their homes as well as other people.” In Laurens District over eighty citizens
petitioned the legislature to pass a law conscripting free men of color between the ages of sixteen
and sixty into military service as cooks or other support personnel. Under these circumstances,
free blacks in South Carolina faced a precarious future. None could predict what would happen if
the state should find itself in a dire military emergency. For the present the free people simply
tried to live the best they could, always under the watchful eye of an alarmed and increasingly
volatile white populace.17
Slaves and free blacks were not the only perceived internal threats to South Carolina’s
security. The loyalty of some whites was also questioned. A wave of paranoia gripped the state
in late 1860 and early 1861. South Carolina turned into an armed camp as vigilante groups were
revived and informal patrols moved swiftly in nearly every district to round up suspect persons.
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The Mercury was frank: “They that are not with us are against us.” One man, referring to himself
simply as “A Native Born Carolinian,” advised fellow citizens to do away with “sickly
sentimentality and change the order of things, by the law of vigilance and manly action,” and
“arrest those whom we suspect as spies.” Many whites found themselves victims of mob
violence. In the upcountry town of Anderson a dentist suspected of being an abolitionist
sympathizer was taken to the outskirts of town, where a kangaroo court quickly pronounced his
guilt. On account of his having a wife and two children it was decided that he would be allowed
to leave “with his neck unbroken, although the righteous indignation of the people generally
pronounced in favor of his being suspended to the nearest tree.” After “twenty stripes were
administered in approved style” and his scalp was shaved, he and his family were driven out of
town. In Columbia a stonemason named Powell, working on the state capitol, indiscreetly
expressed his views on slavery, which were determined to be abolitionist in nature. He was
carried to the neighborhood of Fisher’s Pond, where according to a witness his clothes were
removed “and he was well smeared with tar, then a pillow-case was opened and he was
feathered.” In Camden, Mary Boykin Chesnut learned of the harassment of a French music
teacher accused of treason. “He’ll be hung,” she was told by the townsfolk. Chesnut was struck
by “the red-hot state our public mind is in,” which allowed “short shrift for spies.” After the war
a Confederate veteran from the village of Cheraw described the atmosphere in South Carolina at
this time. The state was like a “seething caldron” where everyone “without exception” was on
the alert for treachery. It was dangerous for “one of uncertain appearance to show himself at this
time. There is hardly any doubt but that some who were innocent were either hung or severely
dealt with.” Emissaries of John Brown were presumed to be all around “and when any one was
caught concerning whom this impression was strong, summary justice was meted out to him.”18
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Extralegal activities of this sort prompted Governor Gist to urge the legislature to enact a
law “punishing summarily and severely, if not with death, any person that circulates incendiary
documents, avows himself an abolitionist, or in any way attempts to create insubordination or
insurrection among the slaves.” Gist worried that the public would be “goaded to madness by the
frequent attempts to disturb their quiet and destroy their property and lives.” If a law of this kind
were not passed, the people might not be “very careful in measuring the punishment they inflict,
and it is to be feared that the innocent may suffer with the guilty.” In offering this
recommendation intended to maintain domestic order, Gist did not foresee the Pandora’s Box he
was opening. The legislature began debating the merits of such a law in January 1861 after the
Committee on the Colored Population introduced legislation under the nebulous title of “A Bill
to Provide for the Peace and Security of the State.” A measure designed simply to discourage
“lynch law and illegal executions” would soon expose deep fissures, or at least the fear of them,
in South Carolina’s white society. The debates in the House over this bill laid bare trepidations
about the potentially conflicting interests of slaveholders and non-slaveholders.19
The bill contrasted significantly with a similar one passed in December 1859 under the
same title. Enacted in the aftermath of John Brown’s raid, it was designed to prevent abolitionists
from distributing literature or preaching to blacks. Fines and imprisonment awaited those whose
actions were calculated to “incite any insurrection or disturbance” among the servile population.
The law was squarely aimed at abolitionists, free blacks, and slaves. The language in the new bill
under consideration was strikingly different. Heavy fines could be imposed on any person for
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simply possessing literature that questioned the benefits of slavery. Plowden Weston, a
substantial rice planter and future lieutenant governor from Georgetown, objected to the measure
because it “would expose every man in the State to a constant system of surveillance and
information.” Indeed, Weston fulminated, “If the archive of the ancient Inquisition were
searched it might almost appear that this Bill was taken from that Inquisition.” It would “prevent
us from taking English and French papers and pamphlets, or anything, from the North.” Weston
wryly pointed out that he could not afford to pay the potential fines, for he “had several hundred
pamphlets in his library upon this subject.” Denouncing the proposed law as “the most
extraordinary Bill that had ever come before this House,” Weston unsuccessfully moved to lay it
on the table.20
The bill was extraordinary not only because it laid a blanket prohibition on the possession
of supposedly dangerous literature but also because it specifically expressed concern about nonslaveholders possessing it. Georgetown representative John Read explained that this was
necessary because the previous law failed to address “those who undertake to incite the minds of
those who are not slaveholders against those who are.” The nefarious abolitionists at work in the
state were endeavoring to drive a wedge between the two classes by inducing “those who are not
slaveholders to believe that they have no object or interest in the preservation of slavery.” But
Plowden Weston replied that the bill would have unwanted consequences. The law of 1859, he
said, was designed “to prevent our slaves being tampered with” by abolitionists. This was
“eminently proper,” since “the narrow, uneducated and easily excited minds of the negro should
be kept from such contaminating influences.” But this bill was vastly different because it was
meant not just for blacks “but for [white] South Carolinians; the very men who govern at the
20
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ballot box, the very men who put us here to govern the country.” The language of the bill
distinguishing between slaveholders and non-slaveholders “would establish the very worst
precedent we could set,” for it would give the impression that their interests are different.
Moreover, “This Bill, if passed, becomes a matter of history.” Since “history is often written in
the Statute Books of a nation,” anyone consulting the bill to write history “would immediately
say there was a very great difference of opinion on the subject matter embraced therein.” Such a
canard, Weston warned, “should not be written on a single page of South Carolina’s History.”21
In response, Read reminded Weston that legislators had a responsibility to act on the
wishes of their constituents, many of whom had petitioned the legislature for a law punishing the
“many persons disposed to foster and increase the feeling of alienation between the two classes.”
There was no doubt, Read argued, that “such a state of things does exist in many parts of the
State.” It was well known that “in the upper portion of the State there is a large portion of the
population who have no negroes and no interest in them; there it might be necessary that such a
law should be passed.” But Weston was unconvinced. He had confidence in the nonslaveholders’ commitment to slavery and thought it wrong to close the door on free discussion.
Believing slavery to be “one of the most easily advocated institutions in the world,” he had “no
objection to any argument whatever against slavery being laid before” non-slaveholders. Weston
thought that if this class “are not to hold their own opinions, they ought not to have access to the
ballot box.” He wanted to see “the whole question argued” publicly, feeling certain that “Men
who have no slaves [will be] ready to defend a revolution based very much upon the right of
property in slaves.” Weston’s arguments prevailed: the bill was ultimately tabled.22
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The social distinctions and clashing interests between slaveholders and non-slaveholders
exposed in the debate did not necessarily represent fundamental class conflict. Weston was
correct in asserting that men with no slaves would defend a movement based on the right to hold
property in slaves. The existence of a slave caste tended to unify whites rather than divide them.
As the Laurensville Herald put it, “our peculiar institution (slavery) makes us all equals. Every
man in the South is accustomed to have dominion over an inferior race, and this instinctive love
of power and dominion which is early implanted in his breast, gives him a feeling of superiority
which never can be subdued.” Nevertheless, the debate suggested that white South Carolinians
might not be a wholly united people.23
That there was a measure of anxiety over class divisions is evident also in a letter written
to the Edgefield Advertiser in November 1860 pointing out that a minority of whites owned the
majority of slaves. Although the writer did not want to “discriminate between our classes of
white population for the purpose of making an invidious distinction,” human nature, he argued,
dictated that their interests must be different. To unite them he suggested that “all slaveholders,
in proportion to the quantity owned, say one out of every ten, sell to your neighbor non-slave
holder, one slave if no more . . . at least one.” Doing this “might make interest supply the
deficiency of patriotism” among non-slaveholders. Clearly some South Carolina elites were
concerned about the loyalty of non-slaveholders and the cohesion of the social order. South
Carolina’s society was by no means on the precipice of disintegration at this point, but it was an
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inauspicious beginning for a society about to embark on a war that would presumably require the
unswerving loyalty and full commitment of all citizens.24
Interestingly, in the weeks following the outbreak of war the state witnessed something of
a return to normalcy, or so it appeared. To many South Carolinians the war seemed far away.
One militia officer observed in May that there was “such profound calm that it was difficult to
realize the existence of revolution.” Many of the state’s youth who rushed off to enlist
subsequently found themselves rather idle. On her plantation in St. Paul’s Parish, Meta Morris
Grimball felt sorry for the soldiers who “have been all the winter in a state of great expectation
and generally disappointed. I wish they may get something to do, and feel more quiet.” Tally
Simpson, a twenty-two-year-old lieutenant from the upcountry village of Pendleton, wrote to his
mother from Camp Ruffin in Columbia assuring her that “We are having a rich time at present––
going down town in company this morning.” Some young women were also enjoying life after
the war began. In Charleston Emma Holmes noted with delight that a “great many parties have
been given . . . often two or three on the same night.” She had never imagined that the city
“would be so gay when war is impending.” At home in Camden, Mary Chesnut described the
atmosphere astutely that summer when she reflected that “The war is making us all tenderly
sentimental. No casualties yet, no real mourning, nobody hurt. So it is all parade, fife, and fine
feathers.”25
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For most South Carolinians the daily rhythms of life continued as usual through the
spring, summer, and early fall of 1861. Nevertheless, the state was mobilizing for war to some
extent. On the eve of secession South Carolina had few industries. Compared to Virginia’s
manufacturing firms, which in 1860 had a combined $27,000,000 in capitalization, South
Carolina’s had only $7,000,000. The few factories in the state employed about seven thousand
workers, a thousand of whom were women and children. Clearly the state would have to do more
for the war effort. On the last day before adjourning the legislature took a step toward this end by
incorporating the Shoe and Leather Manufacturing Company, authorizing it to raise by
subscription $300,000 in capital. Other industrial pursuits were encouraged by the newspapers,
the Courier boasting that “we have in our own work shops resources for supplying every want,”
and prophesying that factories of all sorts “will spring into existence as it were by magic.” Henry
William Ravenel noted in May that “Many branches of manufactures have already sprung up
from the very necessities” of the Union blockade and are “doing us an essential service.” By the
end of June an iron works was operating in Spartanburg with the capacity to produce six to eight
hundred tons annually; it employed 150 people, including seventeen slaves. Operations at
William Gregg’s factory in Graniteville were greatly expanded in 1861.26
Concern about the impending Union naval blockade helped spur the industrialization
movement. It also spurred changes in the state’s agriculture during 1861. The Confederate
Congress prohibited trade with the United States and strongly encouraged withholding cotton
from the European markets. The aim was to pressure European nations to side with the
Confederacy against the United States. “The cards are in our hands,” said the Mercury, “and we
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intend to play them out to the bankruptcy of every cotton factor in Great Britain and France, or
the acknowledgement of our independence.” Throughout the summer South Carolina planters
were urged to hold onto their cotton until the blockade was lifted. At the same time they were
encouraged to grow grain. More cereals and less cotton, said a man in Laurens District, was “the
true policy of the farmer,” since “war cannot be carried on without bread, any more than it can
without powder.” Although many planters had counted on reaping a profit from last year’s cotton
crop and had anticipated producing more cotton in the coming season, with impressive unanimity
they heeded these calls.27
The uncertain state of affairs also affected financial matters. At the time of secession the
banks of the state were in sound condition. The state-owned Bank of the State of South Carolina,
in particular, was strong and in a position to advance funds for emergency state expenditures and
render aid to fiscal operations. No matter how healthy the banks, however, they could do little to
forestall the threat of inflation due to scarcity of key goods. Only a few days after the Union
surrender at Fort Sumter, Henry William Ravenel expressed concern about the “prospect now of
provisions of all kinds going up to high prices.” In May that prospect became a reality. Prior to
the war large amounts of butter had been shipped to Southern cities from the North, thus giving
Charleston a plentiful supply. But now Emma Holmes observed that “The effect of war is
already shown here by the small quantities of goods imported from the North and the increased
prices. . . . [F]resh butter has also risen to fifty cents in consequence of the high price of hay.”
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Meta Morris Grimball complained that “The Market, is high and I pay nearly $2 each day for
dinner.”28
Another problem was a dire shortage of specie. In November 1860 the legislature passed
a bill allowing the banks to suspend specie payments without penalty. This legislation along with
the Fort Sumter crisis in April encouraged hoarding of whatever specie was still in circulation
and consequently coins practically disappeared. Citizens complained that “The great scarcity of
small change is becoming a serious matter.” Some thought greedy speculators were to blame:
“[S]ilver is hoarded in order produce its scarcity,” one citizen commented, and the “chief
sufferers by these petty extortions are our laboring classes, who often cannot get a bill changed at
the grocer’s without either purchasing more than they desire or submitting to a loss of 5 or 10
cents in [sic] the dollar.” Why, some demanded, “cannot our Banks do something to relieve the
community of the great dearth of small change?” The town council of Georgetown petitioned
the legislature for authority to issue small-denomination notes “because of the disappearance of
silver coins and the failure of the bank of the state to issue small bills.” The legislature took
action on this issue in the fall and the bank came to the rescue, issuing paper currency in
denominations of five to seventy-five cents. By the end of the war more than $736,000 of this
scrip had been placed in circulation.29
In other ways, too, the home front felt the impact of uncertainty and war in 1861. It was
not long before for the civil and military authorities began calling on planters to provide slave
28
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labor to build coastal fortifications. In the first months of 1861 the planters were generally
compliant, even enthusiastic. Henry William Ravenel noted that “Thousands of negroes have
been offered and have been accepted, and their services used in throwing up breastworks and
strengthening the fortifications in the harbor and along the sea coast.” In May the Courier was
pleased to report that the military authorities “found the planters every where eagerly willing to
give the labor of their servants.” As late as August the Mercury assured its readers that “all the
labor that is necessary has been furnished by the planters.” There was, to be sure, some
opposition. One planter refused to “give a cent, or send a hand” because he was convinced that
the Yankees would never attempt an invasion of the coast. But for the better part of 1861 there
seems to have been little trouble in procuring slave labor and coercion was unnecessary because
planters, anxious to aid the cause of Southern independence, voluntarily complied with the
official requests. Thus slaves were employed in the early months of the war without express
legislative authorization.30
The price inflation, the shortage of specie, and the calls for slave labor were
inconveniences, to be sure, but they did not fundamentally disrupt the daily rhythms of life.
Much more noticeable and consequential were the large number of men leaving farms, villages,
and towns across the state to enter military service. If there was any doubt that South Carolina
was now a society at war this mass enlistment put that doubt to rest. The details of South
Carolina’s military organization have been thoroughly described elsewhere. It suffices here to
say that at the time of secession the state was unprepared for war. The militia was in dire need of
reorganization and as late as 5 January 1861 not a single gun had been brought to bear on Fort
Sumter. Both the legislature and the convention took steps to create the rudiments of a state army
30
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and supply it with arms and ammunition. But the legislature failed to act on Governor Gist’s
request to reorganize the militia, an oversight that would create much frustration and confusion
in the coming months. Nevertheless, by the time President Davis called on South Carolina to
provide eight thousand men for the provisional army of the Confederacy the state was in a
position to respond.31
There was some reluctance among the volunteers to go north to serve in Virginia. Meta
Morris Grimball believed that “There is not a great desire to fly to her aid” because it was widely
felt “we are all to be subjugated and must first secure our [homes].” Governor Pickens
endeavored to persuade the volunteers to go by arguing that to defend Virginia “is to defend
South Carolina.” With this assurance and under the impression that the war would be short,
many South Carolinians responded enthusiastically to the call for volunteers. Indeed, so many
signed up that one Edgefield citizen wondered if it “is not to be feared that in the ardor of
patriotism, many in joining the army to march to the border have overlooked the vast interests
which require protection at home?” He argued that “there is as much glory and patriotism in
taking care of the women and children” as enlisting in the army.32
The Edgefield citizen spoke to a fundamental predicament on the home front. The
departure of men left the most important institution of society––the family––susceptible to all
kinds of disruptions. The patriarchal ideal of family life was suddenly imperiled, for women
would by necessity have to assume roles traditionally reserved for the male head of the
household. Prior to the war the responsibility for supervising non-household slaves was almost
31
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always borne by white men, but now many women would have to forsake customary domesticity
by taking on this task. In areas of the lowcountry where the proportion of blacks to whites
reached up to twenty to one this could be a daunting challenge. One Edgefield woman hoped that
those of her gender would rise to that challenge. Women are “quite too helpless and timid,” she
wrote; “they have very little independence, less energy, and not a particle of courage.” All too
frequently they “are frightened almost to death if left without male protection for a few days at a
time.” But in times like the present South Carolina needed “brave hearted energetic women,
equal to any emergency.” Women should “know how to handle fire arms, how to load a gun or
pistol properly and fire it fearlessly.” It was a duty owed not only to themselves and their
children but to their men. The women of the state should not “let them feel that they are leaving
behind them weak, helpless, inefficient women.” Such arguments sometimes struck a chord. One
afternoon in August Emma Holmes was taught by her brother-in-law “how to shoot pistols” and
after some weeks of practice she proudly noted that her aim was getting “tolerably good.”33
South Carolina’s white women were called on not only to assume unfamiliar
responsibilities but also to succor and encourage the soldiers. In various ways they came to play
a conspicuous role in the war effort. Some did their part by shaming men into enlisting. One
group of women called a meeting “for the purpose of forming themselves into a Home Guard,
for the protection of those young men who will not volunteer for their country’s cause.” One
woman in Marlboro District who learned that her brother was disinclined to serve in Virginia
went to his camp and “insisted upon his performing [his duty], and warned him that if he failed,
33
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she would disown his relationship, and discard him forever.” Often invoking memories of
women’s sacrifices during the American Revolution, the state’s newspapers portrayed women as
the embodiment of virtue and patriotism and reminded them of their key role in encouraging
their men to fight and sustaining their morale.34
Central to this duty of bolstering morale was to refrain from writing any letters indicating
domestic difficulties. Newspaper editors cautioned women that “No vain regrets [should] escape
[their] lips” and advised them to encourage their men “to leave the endearments of home and
march to the field of carnage.” Moreover, women were urged––though they needed no urging––
to help provide for the soldiers’ material comfort. The state government was doing all it could
“to aid in this holy and patriotic cause,” but because its resources were limited “it belongs
essentially to woman, to understand those thousand little wants upon which the comfort of life
depends.” Women should become “angels of mercy,” taking “pleasure in sacrifices,” and be
“willing to suffer and eager to cooperate.” One way they could do so was by manufacturing all
the clothing that their households and the soldiers would require. By way of their efforts “the
hum of the spinning wheel mingles with the roar of cannon,” and South Carolina “will have two
armies working out the complete and eternal independence of the South.”35
Before the smoke cleared over Fort Sumter women began devoting themselves to
supplementing the supply of clothing and other necessities for soldiers. It soon became apparent
that cooperative efforts would greatly increase the effectiveness of such endeavors, and there
emerged in every corner of the state soldiers’ aid societies. Typically these began as informal
gatherings of women in private homes, but eventually each society had an official name, a
constitution, elected officers, and written rules of procedure. The societies raised money by
34
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individual solicitation and by sponsoring concerts and other entertainments. In July Meta Morris
Grimball observed that “The ladies are all as busy as possible forming themselves into relief
societies for the wounded soldiers, and also to prepare clothing for them in the winter.” By
August the city of Charleston was “divided into societies for the Relief of the Wounded and
Clothing for the troops.” In Spartanburg Mary Legge wrote that “For the last few weeks we have
been quite busy preparing for a concert for the relief of the soldiers,” and noted with pride that
$125 was raised. Caroline Howard Gilman of Charleston commented that “You see every where
ladies knitting stockings for the soldiers. Yesterday I saw one, dressed richly, in a handsome
carriage knitting diligently as a German house-wife.” For some women such as Emma Holmes,
who had known only a life of privilege, these were uncustomary and sometimes onerous
activities. One day she “Spent the morning learning to work the [sewing] machine and made
nearly a whole flannel shirt. Both being my particular dislike, it needed all my patriotism to bring
me to ‘the sticking point.’”36
The work of the local soldiers’ aid societies soon attracted the attention of state officials.
Governor Pickens decided to assist them by establishing two central relief agencies. The Aid and
Relief Association of Charleston would serve as the hub for the lowcountry while the
Association of Columbia would perform that function for the upcountry. Supplies were
channeled from the local societies through these central agencies to army quartermasters. These
measures greatly improved the efficiency of the supply efforts. But there remained a nagging
problem. In early September the State Executive Committee of the Aid and Relief Associations
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met in Charleston and adopted a statement to be published in all the state’s newspapers. It
addressed the problem of rising prices for necessities. But the point to underscore in this
statement is not that prices were rising but how the committee invoked the power of the state to
take control of the situation if necessary, and thus indicated a changing relationship between
state and citizen.37
The executive committee warned the citizenry that hoarding for the purpose of
speculation would not be tolerated. “All private property, whether real or personal, is held
subject to the supreme and sovereign power of the State.” The long-established principle of
eminent domain “gives to every Government the control of private property for public uses,” for
“the rights of property are subservient to the public welfare, and . . . the interest of the public is
deemed paramount to that of any private individual.” It followed, then, that if necessary the state
may “seize, with the strong hand, whatever is required for the subsistence of her soldiers or her
citizens––subject only to the obligation of making compensation at a fair valuation.” Heretofore
the state had invoked eminent domain only to acquire rights-of-way for railroads and other
internal improvements or lots for public buildings. What is apparent in this address is a forceful
rationale for a far more expansive assertion of state power over the individual.38
This stern warning notwithstanding, the strong hand of the state had not yet made its
presence felt when it came to aiding soldiers or their families. This would begin to change when
the legislature met in November but at this point the government in Columbia was content to
leave those initiatives to private citizens. State officials initially regarded the plight of soldiers’
families as a community problem and were reluctant to address it. And steps were being taken at
the local level. As men departed it became clear that some families left behind needed support.
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As the Mercury and several upcountry newspapers pointed out in the summer of 1861, many
soldiers “are not men of property, but are dependent with their families upon their daily labor.
Their families are left, many of them we know, in deprivation.” Since the soldiers were “fighting
our battles––risking their lives, and sacrificing their business prospects in our defence,” the men
at the front “feel that they have claims upon the monied men at home.” These convictions led
local communities to begin devising ways to support soldiers’ families. The citizens in York
District came together “for the purpose of devising some effective plan for the relief and support
of the families” entirely dependent on charity for their subsistence. It was suggested that the
Commissioners of the Poor could “properly and legitimately, perform a most important service”
by looking into the matter. Supposing the board found it “necessary to increase their assessment
upon our general tax 10, or even 20 per cent, who would complain?” Inhabitants of neighboring
Lancaster District concurred, declaring that if any family with a member in active service was
indigent “it is unquestionably the duty of the District to provide for them.” The Commissioners
of the Poor should levy a tax because “Every man would then be compelled to aid in proportion
to his means, when if left to voluntary contribution, a few would incur the expense which all
should share.” The following week the district tax was increased by nearly 13 percent to support
soldiers’ families. This was direct public assistance on a much greater scale than ever known in
the antebellum period and it speaks to the centrality of the family in society and the
determination to protect it in this time of crisis.39
Concern over providing for soldiers and their families was also evidenced when the
legislature in January 1861 began debating a bill to relieve debtors. Although the war had not yet
39
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begun, the state was girding itself to defend secession and many men were being mustered into
service. With the future so uncertain, the bill generated heated arguments reflecting state
sectionalism and class divisions between creditors and debtors. The initial bill before the
legislature would merely have barred any state officer from collecting debts until 1 December
1861. Immediately, however, upcountry representative William C. Black introduced an
amendment directing judges in the Court of Common Pleas to suspend all executions for final
process. Additionally the amendment stated that “no judgement shall be taken, signed, or
entered” by any clerks of the court until 1 December. Black explained that the amendment was a
response to “the urgent solicitation of the people of the up country,” who now found themselves
“without any fault of their own . . . placed in a position where they cannot use their means for the
purpose of meeting obligations without a ruinous sacrifice.” Michael O’Connor of Charleston
unsuccessfully moved to lay the amendment on the table, stating that he did not think “the House
should legislate to prevent the obtaining of judgement.” Instead of simply restricting judgments,
the amendment was “tantamount to prohibiting the commencement of a suit at all” and would
“prevent the creditor from putting his claim in such a condition as to give him a lien upon the
property of the debtor.”40
Representative Christian Suber from Newberry District in the upcountry brushed off such
concerns. Believing his obligation was to obey the will of his constituents and protect South
Carolina’s soldiers, he insisted that “those who fought the battles of the country, and whose
property might be resting under judgements and execution, should have some rest.” He told his
business-minded colleague from Charleston that since “the House had invited the Banks to
suspend payment of coin for paper circulation” it was only just “that individuals should also have
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some relief.” But Wilmot DeSaussure, representing the lowcountry commercial community,
declared that the bill “struck at the root of commercial honor, and destroyed the remedies which
the law provided to sustain commerce in her contracts.” It would, he thundered, place South
Carolina “in a position of degradation and dishonor.”41
In a state that prided itself on its internal harmony and singleness of purpose, the rifts laid
bare by the debt relief bill were troublesome, especially considering that the war had not yet
begun. It was a clear sign that overcoming state sectionalism and class conflicts would be a
challenge in the coming months and years. In the end, neither side in the January 1861 debate
could claim victory. As finally passed, the bill repealed a section of an older act requiring
punishment for persons failing to appear in court but said nothing about preventing judgments or
prohibiting the execution of final process for the collection of claims. More substantive
legislation on debtor relief would have to wait until the legislature convened in November.42
Amid much hope and optimism after Fort Sumter the state authorities confronted serious
military problems. For one thing, the militia was poorly disciplined and trained. Moreover, the
rush of men enlisting in volunteer units left the militia in disarray. Militia units were organized
by geographic areas known as beats. The beat companies were required to assemble once every
three months at their respective parade grounds to drill, as one Edgefield resident put it, “under
officers in many cases wholly incapable and inefficient.” The whole process not only was
inefficient but also gave rise “to not a few of the assault and battery cases, drunken rows and all
the evils resulting therefrom.” When the muster was concluded the men left “as ignorant of the
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fundamental principles of military formation as when they were formed into ranks.” Complaints
of this sort were common in early 1861; by the summer they were ubiquitous.43
As volunteers left for the front it became apparent that the structure of the militia had
collapsed. “Every one knows that the militia system has been completely broken up,” wrote a
Columbia man. “The regiments, battalions and beats no longer exist except in name.” Most of
the officers were now in Virginia and the few remaining “have given up in despair of doing
anything with their useless commands.” The state authorities had no idea how many militiamen
were left or who was in any given company. If South Carolina was invaded “and the militia were
called out for a week’s service,” asked one observer, “how many regiments would there be in
which anything like order would exist? It will not be too bold to answer, none!” Governor
Pickens was urged to call the legislature into special session to deal with the problem. When he
did take steps to repair the system by ordering new elections for officers to fill vacancies
occasioned by resignations, one citizen remarked that “his order does not go far enough,” and
another scoffed that the governor “contented himself with issuing ‘proclamations’” with no
substance. By September some citizens were muttering that Pickens “must either attend to his
demands on him or abdicate.”44
The governor also had to worry about coastal defense. This was overseen by Confederate
military authorities, relying heavily on South Carolina volunteer regiments and batteries. So
many of these went off to Virginia, however, that few were left for coastal duty. Moreover,
enlistments dropped off after the initial rush of enthusiasm and after it was decreed in July that
43
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the army would accept no more twelve-month enlistees; all must now sign up “for the war.” One
officer stated in June that “there are many thousand men in Charleston capable of bearing arms,
who are not connected with any military organization. Many of these have never borne arms, and
unless compelled, never intend to do so.” A Charlestonian agreed, expressing disgust that there
was “in our community, too great a disposition to shirk active duty. At every turn can be seen
healthy, vigorous men, under forty-five years of age, who are taking no part in the defence of
their own honor and interests.” The Mercury warned that the Yankee army and navy “are making
vast preparations for the fall campaign upon the coast” and intended “to devastate the whole line
of our coast, burn our crops, lay waste our properties, carry off our slaves . . . and drive us across
the mountains.” Nevertheless, “The country is literally swarming with men who are absolutely
doing nothing towards the safety of the State.”45
Throughout the summer the Mercury warned again and again about the threat to the
coast, but little progress was made on defenses. Milton Maxcy Leverett, serving as an
artilleryman at Fort Beauregard guarding Port Royal Sound, noted in late July that the fort had
only four guns “that can do any effective firing and I am not so certain that they can compete
with those of the [Union] squadron. . . . We do not expect any attack until Fall but we are
miserably prepared to resist any such attack. . . . We have a little more than 200 men [posted
here] while we ought to have at least 2000.” Charlestonian Robert N. Gourdin, now a military
aide-de-camp in Beaufort, called attention in mid-August to the dearth of cannons to protect Port
Royal Sound, pointing out that the Confederate defensive plan “embraced twelve ten inch
Columbiads and we have recd. but two.” Alluding to the fiasco at Cape Hatteras in North
Carolina, where nearly seven hundred Confederate defenders were captured in late August, one
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indignant citizen in Laurens District demanded to know who was to blame for the poor condition
of Carolina’s coastal defenses. They should be “hunted up and made to answer to an outraged
people,” he declared. “We have been disposed to trust those in authority . . . but if we are to be
met right at the threshold with such mistakes, such cases of imbecility, we shall commence a war
at home that shall not cease until matters are amended or we are crushed out.” Governor Pickens
was concerned enough to write the Confederate Secretary of War on 1 September requesting the
return of South Carolina troops from Virginia in order to strengthen the coastal defenses,
warning that “the season is just approaching when an invasion may be anticipated.” This was all
the more urgent, Pickens added, “after our recent disasters on the defenseless coast of North
Carolina.” The next day however, Pickens changed his mind. Preferring to leave the matter
“entirely to your own judgment,” he withdrew the request, confessing to the secretary that “You
know the general plans and our resources, and I do not.” Pickens, under pressure from all
quarters, was clearly handicapped by indecisiveness.46
Gradually improvements were made. In mid-September Henry William Ravenel observed
that “Very active preparations are now going on all over our state, and more especially along the
Sea coast and in Charleston to resist invasion in the winter.” The number of troops on the coast,
he added, has greatly “been increased.” Governor Pickens inspected the coastal fortifications that
month and also ordered that a state census be taken to ascertain how many men ages of sixteen to
sixty were available for local defense. These measures eased the fears of many South
Carolinians; indeed, some became overconfident. By the end of October Ravenel was positive
46
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that “our coast defences have been made so complete, and our effective force in the state, so
thoroughly drilled and prepared,” that any invasion would certainly be repulsed. The Courier
assured its readers that month that “further anxiety is in a great measure relieved, and great
confidence is felt in our ability to repel any attack that the enemy can make on us.” A few weeks
later the Mercury predicted sure defeat for any Yankee invaders, no matter how great their
numbers: “[L]et them employ their force as they may, we have not a doubt of their being
vanquished, and expelled from our coast.”47
These avowals of confidence notwithstanding, the approach of the federal fleet worried
white South Carolinians. Their preconceived notions about the depraved character of Northerners
evoked visions of armed Yankees desecrating South Carolina’s soil, raping its women, and
inciting its slaves to butchery. To planters and their families in the lowcountry, especially, a
Union invasion meant possible catastrophe. The prospect of invasion also stirred the imagination
of slaves, but in a very different way, for it held the promise of challenging the system that held
them in shackles.48
Disturbing incidents of physical violence between master and slave in the fall
exacerbated white fears. On 4 October in Chester District, two slaves, Catawba and Selina, were
convicted of the murder of Sarah Robinson. Although “The greater part of the evidence was
circumstantial,” according to a newspaper report, it was of such a nature “that no doubt was left
in the minds of the Jury nor the community, but that [the slaves] were the guilty parties.” Three
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other slaves were implicated. The following week Spartanburg residents read of “three different
enormous crimes by negroes, for which they will all suffer immediate death by hanging.” The
first was the murder of a white woman in Lancaster District, supposedly committed by two slave
women. The second was a “conspiracy to poison” a Mrs. Cohen of Charleston, for which offense
two slaves “will certainly be hung, and perhaps others.” The third was another case in Lancaster
District, in which a slave “was convicted of burglary and an attempt to violate a white lady. He
of course will also be hung by the neck until he is dead, dead, dead.” As if readers needed any
reminding, they were advised that this was “no time for laxity in the discharge of patrol duty.” In
Charleston a slave named Peter was arrested by a policeman for carrying a bag containing ladies’
apparel. While being taken to the guardhouse he drew a pistol and fired at the officer, narrowly
missing him. Peter then rushed at the officer “with a dirk and inflicted a very severe wound in
the left shoulder, after which he succeeded in making his escape.” Toward the end of October
four slaves were convicted and executed for the murder of Elizabeth Witherspoon in Darlington
District. Mary Chesnut, a cousin of Witherspoon, was deeply shaken by this event. “I am sure,”
she wrote, that “I will never sleep again without this nightmare of horror haunting me.” The
reality was, she admitted, that if slaves “want to kill us, they can do it when they please––they
are noiseless as panthers.”49
The heated atmosphere of the Palmetto State was about to become superheated. Already
there were reports “that many of the negroes on the islands are running away and going to the
blockading fleet.” On 4 November General Roswell Ripley reported that an enemy fleet was
concentrating between Tybee Island, Georgia, and Port Royal Sound. The next day he confirmed
the presence of “Forty-one vessels . . . off Beaufort. Attack imminent.” In fact, there were
49
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seventeen federal warships and sixty smaller vessels transporting over twelve thousand soldiers
and marines poised to descend on the region around Beaufort. Three days later the invaders set
foot on South Carolina soil. “Well,” commented a Laurens District citizen when the news
reached him, “after six months of anxiety and excitement about the war in Virginia, we have it
now at home.”50
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Chapter Three
“We Are Obliged to Submit to His Hateful Presence”:
Invasion, Dislocation, and Legislation, November 1861-January 1862
Christmas day of 1861 brought beautiful weather to Charleston, warm enough for
residents to stroll in comfort along the Battery. This day was considerably less joyful than past
Christmases in Charleston, however, for much of the city lay in ruins. Emma Holmes mournfully
described the scene: “[E]verything is so transformed by the work of a single night that it seems
as if we were carried centuries back and stood among the ruins of some ancient city. How
desolate seemed the few solitary houses still standing. . . . Nothing but ruins on every side; it is
more dreary than living by a cemetery.”1
The Great Fire of Charleston had struck on the evening of 11 December, destroying many
homes and businesses. But the fire was not the only reason for gloom this season. Seven weeks
earlier the Confederacy had suffered an embarrassing defeat at the Battle of Port Royal. The
Union invasion of their state in November shocked South Carolinians and brought turmoil to
much of the lowcountry. Those who read the Charleston Daily Courier this Christmas were
reminded that “A crafty and bloody foe holds possession of one of our ports.” Numerous citizens
have been “driven [into] exile from their homesteads which have been rifled and polluted by the
hireling soldiery of a vulgar despot.” Unfortunately, all one could do was wipe away the “warm
tear that trickled down our cheek,” for South Carolina lacked the means to drive off the enemy
and “we are obliged to submit to his hateful presence.”2
On the morning of 7 November 1861 Commodore Samuel F. DuPont, commanding the
USS Wabash, weighed anchor and gave the signal to get under way. As the Union armada
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approached Port Royal Sound the defenders in Forts Walker and Beauregard opened fire. The
Confederate guns were accurate but outranged and overpowered by the guns of the Union fleet.
The attackers steamed past the two forts and then circled back around, concentrating their
firepower on Fort Walker. It took only two passes to disable twenty of the fort’s twenty-three
guns. General Drayton hastily rode off to confer with General Ripley. They agreed that their
position was now untenable and ordered the evacuation of the fort. The heavy guns were spiked
and the garrison retreated to the mainland. The troops in Fort Beauregard, their situation likewise
hopeless, fell back to St. Helena. By nightfall, 12,653 Union soldiers were safely ashore at Hilton
Head. The “Day of the Big Gun Shoot,” as the local blacks called the Battle of Port Royal, was
over.3
The Union invasion of South Carolina was a key event in the Civil War. DuPont’s
expedition demonstrated the superiority of naval power over fortifications and revealed that the
Confederacy was vulnerable to amphibious operations. The capture of Port Royal provided the
Union with the largest deep-water harbor between Cape Hatteras and Florida, an ideal coaling
and provisioning station that would allow the Union to tighten its coastal blockade, launch
further expeditions to the north and south, and perhaps even sever communications between
Charleston and Savannah. Furthermore, the presence of Union troops on the South Carolina
coast dealt a heavy blow to the state’s plantation system and set many slaves on the road to
freedom.4
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Among the immediate effects of the invasion was panic in Beaufort and the surrounding
region. White residents rushed to gather possessions before scurrying to the mainland. The
exodus was so swift that many left their valuables behind. Meta Morris Grimball learned that
“The poor Beaufort people fled in every direction”; the women especially “were seized with a
perfect panic.” A newspaper correspondent saw the road to Hardeeville “filled with a
heterogeneous throng of fugitives of all conditions, carriages, carts and conveyances of every
description. . . . [T]he spectacle was a sad one.” A slave named Tina on St. Helena recalled how
her owners were “just sitting down to dinner when the news came that everyone was flying.
They sprang up, left the silver on the table, the dinner untasted, packed a few clothes for the
children, and were gone, never to come back.” Another witness described Beaufort as “deserted
by all who can possibly get away and given up to plunder and waste,” with “whole families
leaving their hitherto peaceful and plentiful homes,” some carrying “scarcely a change of
clothing. Delicate, high bred ladies, helpless children––all the same. That the war is on the soil of
South Carolina has been first crushingly realized by the inhabitants of Beaufort and St. Helena.”5
White residents abandoned the islands of Hilton Head, St. Helena, Ladies, and Port
Royal. The planter families who fled were among the wealthiest in the South, some of them
owning several hundred slaves. As the planters departed they left behind some ten thousand
slaves. Over the next several months the Union grip on the Sea Islands expanded. Federal forces
captured Edisto Island to the north and launched raids to the south along the Georgia and Florida
coast. Despite these advances the Federal presence in South Carolina did not extend much
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beyond Port Royal and the adjacent islands. Most of the coastal plain between Georgetown and
Savannah remained under Confederate control. Although the Union occupation was confined to
a small portion of the coast, the psychological damage it inflicted on lowcountry planters was
immense. In the aftermath of the invasion planters abandoned the entire coast from the North
Edisto River, south of Charleston, to Ossabaw Sound, south of Savannah. When Union troops
entered Beaufort they found only one white man, “an infirm old Yankee shoemaker.” Fully as
shocking to the planters as the abrupt appearance of the dreaded Yankees was the behavior of the
slaves. Many resisted when their masters tried to remove them to the interior, reasoning that it
was better to take their chances with the Yankee strangers than remain with their owners.
General Thomas W. Sherman, commanding the Union army forces, addressed the people of
South Carolina in a proclamation pledging not to “destroy your property, or interfere with any of
your lawful rights or your social and local institutions.” But however conservative the Union
policy on slavery was at this early stage of the war, slaves had their own ideas on the subject.6
Many slaves in the invaded lowcountry districts simply declined to leave. A week after
the fall of Port Royal Confederate Colonel E. M. Seabrook reported that “large gangs of negroes
on the islands have refused to leave the plantations and on Edisto there are still about 6,000 that
have remained. They are unwilling to leave their homes, and moreover have been told [by the
Yankees] that no harm would come to them if they stayed.” The Mercury reported that “The
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negros were flocking into and out of the town” of Beaufort despite having “been entrusted with
saving their masters’ property.” When the first Union boat came ashore, “the negros ran to the
wharf to see the Yankees.” Whenever feasible, slaves in outlying areas sought protection within
Union lines. A U.S. government agent on the Sea Islands reported that the number of slaves
deserting their plantations “is rapidly increasing. This week forty-eight escaped from a single
plantation” thirty miles west of Beaufort and the “accessions at Edisto are in larger number.”
Whites were appalled by such evidence of black “disloyalty.” A former Beaufort resident wrote
to her mother several weeks after the invasion, warning that “the darkies all, think this is a crisis
in their lives that must be taken advantage of and about burying your valuables . . . who have you
trusted? because I think for $10 any of them would tell the Yankees. Times and slaves have
changed since the revolution.”7
Governor Pickens was concerned enough to request General Drayton’s opinion “of the
present attitude and behavior of the negros” on the mainland who were not under Union control.
Drayton replied from Camp Lee near Hardeeville, some twenty miles northwest of Hilton Head,
that slaves “have shown a spirit of insubordination by refusing to move higher up the country,
when ordered to do so by their owners.” He mistakenly attributed this “disobedience” to a feeling
of “dismay and utter helplessness at being left alone and unprotected by the precipate
abandonment by their masters of their plantations,” rather than from “any organized plan of
7
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resistance.” Drayton assured the governor that “the negros are fast recovering from their fright,
are coming forth from their hiding places.” But he advised that all planters not in military service
immediately return to their neighborhoods in order to “prevent a recurrence of that excitement
among their people.” Unfortunately for the planters and state authorities, little could be done to
restore slavery in the vicinity of Beaufort. Soon after the invasion, William Gilmore Simms
suggested to James Henry Hammond that “our negroes should, especially just now, be taught to
feel that their owners are their best friends.” But it was too late; many masters helplessly
watched as their slaves took advantage of the confusion, made their escape, and made new
friends in blue uniforms.8
Planters in the Beaufort area witnessed the foundation of their social system crumble in a
matter of hours. Prominent planter-statesman William Henry Trescot, for example, whose home
was on Barnwell Island, just twelve miles from where the Union fleet attacked, saw every one of
his adult male slaves desert him in two days. For the planters the cost of this disaster was
enormous. Millions of dollars of property was lost or destroyed. Less than a week after the
invasion Trescot lost forty-three slave men valued at $33,000, ninety bales of Sea Island cotton
worth $10,000, and $19,000 of various provisions. This meant instant bankruptcy with little or
no hope of recovery. The Beaufort-area planters, including Trescot, became refugees. The few
families who were able to remove their slaves were now scattered across the state. As Henry
William Ravenel remarked, “Many who were wealthy men a week ago, are now reduced to
poverty, leaving home with only their clothes.”9
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The panic sparked by the invasion was not confined to the islands in immediate danger. It
quickly spread to Charleston as rumors circulated that the enemy was only fifteen miles from the
city. One nervous slaveholder wrote to Mayor Macbeth recommending that “some further
restrictions upon our slave population at this time would not be amiss.” Perhaps too, he added,
“the negro churches should be closely scrutinized, in fact closed for the present.” Another
Charlestonian noted the “many families leaving and sending off valuables, military movements
going on all the time, and everything indicating the greatest excitement.” Emma Holmes learned
of “numbers of persons [who] are moving into the interior or making preparations to move by
packing up and sending off their silver and other valuables.” Among them was an eighty-fiveyear-old woman who had not left her home in fourteen years but now was “running from the
Yankees and dreadfully scared.” Just days after the invasion Henry William Ravenel was
informed by a relative in Charleston that there were “Thousands of rumors of traitors among our
people, the enemy marching on to burn the city, rail road bridges destroyed.” The once bustling
city became a place of “deserted streets and closed stores.”10
The loss of the Sea Islands was a bitter pill for Confederate patriots to swallow. The
disorderly retreat from Fort Walker was particularly shameful. Commodore DuPont reported that
“The defeat of the enemy terminated in utter rout and confusion. The quarters and encampments
were abandoned without an attempt to carry away either public or private property.” As one
member of the fort’s garrison put it, the retreat was “a proceeding in practical military
experience, which, for one, I never bargained for, and which experiment I trust never to see tried
again.” By the time the men of his company reached Hardeeville they had “lost nearly everything
they had in the Hilton Head experiment.” Confederate and state authorities were roundly
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criticized by the citizenry. William Gilmore Simms damned “the incompetence” of the army
engineers who designed the fort. Emma Holmes criticized General Drayton, who “has fully
proved his utter incompetency for his high position.” Criticism was also directed at the white Sea
Islanders. James Henry Hammond received a letter from his son castigating the men of Beaufort
who “fled like sheep leaving all their property in the hands of the enemy, many without even a
change of clothes. No man had the courage to burn his cotton or his house before he left––and
with one or two exceptions scarcely a negro has been saved.” Another citizen demanded to know
whether it “must be written in our history that we faltered on the threshold of our new endeavor
under the influence of avarice––that we were short sighted politicians?” The Beaufort planters
“were among the warmest of the Secessionists,” but “Why, then, remains the almost entire
Cotton crop, amounting to near half a million of dollars, undestroyed?” Another South
Carolinian agreed, condemning “The rich planters [who] leave their estates” and give orders to
the overseer rather than burn their cotton immediately. There are “only two classes” of citizens
on the coast, this man fumed, “those who burn their cotton” and “those who postpone it.”11
Accusations of this sort angered many lowcountry citizens. One resentful planter from
Port Royal wrote a lengthy defense of his fellows against the “unjust and uncharitable
aspersions,” explaining that the planters “were unhappily the victims of misguided confidence,
and sacrificed by the indifference or luke-warmness” of those who could have assisted but failed
to act. Moreover, burning cotton “was rendered doubly arduous by the unwillingness displayed
by some of the negros, who shrunk from executing the order from fear, and in many instances
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secreted themselves at the appointed time.” Worse still, “no definite plan of action, either for
separate commands or for concert, had been devised or adopted by our military commanders.”
The Mercury also defended the planters, pointing out that “It can never be expected that every
body will agree as to the policy to be pursued, where their property is to be destroyed.” Some
planters might reasonably hesitate unless compelled to do so. It was “absurd to expect that
people will resolve unanimously to burn up their houses. It is equally unreasonable to expect that
all planters will burn up their cotton.” With respect to removing slaves, “Some have not the
means to remove their slaves and support them afterwards.” The planters who resided near the
Union fleet were clearly in a difficult position. In many instances they did not know whether
their property was in imminent danger. It did not help that the state authorities provided little
direction in the matter.12
Burning cotton and removing slaves to keep them out of enemy hands were critically
important matters, but to be effective they would have to be accomplished thoroughly and
systematically. Leaving these decisions to civilians was obviously not the answer. One citizen
under the signature of “Moscow” explained the dilemma and offered a solution. It was easy to
imagine situations where patriotic planters wishing to meet the expectations of their fellow
citizens “may find themselves powerless by the want of means, information, opportunity or
time.” In many cases there were agents and executors of absentees who “may be thrown into the
utmost embarrassment, and find themselves halting between the law of patriotism and the law of
the land.” This is why the issue should be addressed “by the Legislature, that the destruction of
property be legalized, so that a systematic plan may be devised and carried into execution by
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officers appointed for the purpose.” When the war was over the lost property could “be paid for
by the State,” and then “from the seaboard to the mountains one fate will be ours.”13
Three days before the Union invasion the legislature assembled for a special session.
Governor Pickens had issued the call in July for the purpose of choosing presidential electors,
but added that “in all probability, considering the peculiar state of the country, other important
matters will be acted on at the same session of the Legislature.” The regular session was set to
convene in late November and some members hoped that this called session would continue until
then, by which time they might have a better sense of what was transpiring on the coast. The
legislature began its special session on 4 November and the next day the governor communicated
his message.14
The message addressed the unprecedented challenges now confronting the state. At the
top of the list was “the present state of our military organization.” Because so many men had
gone into service, the remaining population fit for military duty was “in a state of comparative
disorganization.” Pickens detailed the number of volunteer regiments already raised and
reviewed the prior legislation and convention resolutions establishing them. Since there was a
“pressing emergency,” he recommended the creation of “a new military organization throughout
the State” in order to redraw the militia’s regimental lines and fill vacancies. It was also
necessary to secure the reenlistment of the twelve-month volunteers in Confederate service. The
previous military measures of the legislature were now inadequate because “at the time, many
did not anticipate [that the war] would be so extensive as it has turned out to be.” The state was
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now facing “extraordinary demands for expenditures, such as have never been experienced
before.”15
As the war grew in scale so too did the demands of the Confederate government.
Accordingly, the governor asked the legislature to address the act of Congress imposing a direct
tax of fifty cents on every hundred dollars’ worth of real and personal property and requiring the
states to collect it. The only individuals exempted were those having property worth less than
five hundred dollars. This issue “requires your immediate attention,” said Pickens, but first it was
necessary that “there shall be a change in your system of taxation.” South Carolina’s property tax
system had long been a source of complaint. The main objection was over taxing agricultural
land at a fixed value while city and town property was taxed ad valorem. In other words, the
state taxed city lots and improvements on an annually increasing value while in the country the
value was set by law. Pickens pointed out that the assessed value of rural land was based on
conditions in 1808 that no longer existed. It was crucial for the legislature to modify the system
by creating “a true and just valuation of land.” The first step was to abolish the upper and lower
treasuries and consolidate them into one office. If this was done, the governor said, it would
“simplify all accounts very much, and enable you to give system to the whole.”16
There were other issues emanating from the exigencies of war for the legislature to
consider. Pickens suggested that the military academies in Columbia and Charleston be
consolidated into one institution and relocated to Fort Moultrie on Sullivan’s Island. This new
academy should admit cadets from other states and “No expense should deter us from placing [it]
on the highest footing.” The operation of the South Carolina College was also a matter of
concern. Although there were objections to keeping it going during the war, Pickens urged the
15
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legislature to fund the college because it fostered “high feelings of public devotion to the
country” and was crucial in binding young men with “stronger and more exclusive ties of first
allegiance to the State.” The legislature also had a duty, said the governor, to provide financial
relief for the families of soldiers. A new law was now required to supplement the local efforts
made over the summer and ensure that no soldier’s wife or children were without sustenance.
The soldiers in the field and the people left at home also needed financial protection from
creditors. Pickens asked that “every aid and facility” be given to protect citizens who were
unable to pay their debts. “[S]ome stay of execution or levy upon their property should be
directed by law,” he opined, but added that the legislature should proceed “with great caution” in
this matter because there was “no power so dangerous, and generally so unjust” as a government
interfering with contracts. Pickens concluded his message by urging the legislature to “increase
the power and dignity of the State” but also to “adhere firmly to all the conservative principles of
our Constitution.” How these two ends were compatible, the governor did not say. Nevertheless,
he assured the members that although “war is a great calamity” it would prove to be “in the end,
a public blessing” because South Carolinians would “come out of our trials a wiser and better
people.”17
The newspapers across the state generally approved of the governor’s message, although
some expressed regret that valuable time was wasted over the past year. The Southern Guardian
thought Pickens “presented a very satisfactory exposition of all the matters embraced in the
sphere of his executive duties.” The Camden Confederate praised the “many excellent
suggestions” but thought the militia organizations “should have been efficient and made ready
for active service long ago.” There had been “sad neglect in this respect” and the legislators
should “see to it” that “everywhere our citizen soldiers be put on a war footing, ready for any
17
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emergency.” Given the expanding scope of the war it is not remarkable that the governor
outlined an array of issues for the legislature to address. What is perplexing is how little was
accomplished during the special session. Although the attack on Port Royal had not begun, there
were plenty of reasons to believe that the approaching Union fleet could cause trouble. This was
why Pickens urged the legislature to reorganize the militia before adjourning.18
The following day, 6 November, Pickens sent a second message to the House and Senate.
It called on the legislature to immediately provide $300,000 for “the circumstances by which we
are surrounded.” If the militia were not reorganized during the special session the “safety of our
coast batteries may be endangered.” “In the midst of revolution and great changes,” the governor
declared, “there are high duties devolving on the Legislature, that may be as important as any
that may be required in the field.”19
The legislature failed to perform the high duties recommended by Pickens during the
special session. Indeed, it sat for only three days before adjourning. It did appropriate the
additional $300,000, and the House concurred with a Senate resolution authorizing the governor
“in the event of invasion of the State, or if, in his judgement, the State shall be in imminent
danger of invasion,” to call for companies of volunteers for local defense. However, this hardly
amounted to the thorough revamping of the militia that Pickens urged. Consideration of most of
the governor’s recommendations was postponed until the regular session. This included
“Resolutions in relation to the defence of the State,” which the legislature decided to take up “at
the regular session at the stage at which the same shall be left upon the adjournment.”
Representative Richard Yeadon of Charleston moved to extend the called session but his motion
was narrowly defeated. Governor Pickens had specifically advised the legislators not to adjourn
18
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before placing the “military organization on the strongest footing,” yet invoking personal
considerations during the special session is precisely what happened. A debate in the House over
adjournment reveals gross negligence in this respect and demonstrates how the anticipated Union
invasion crippled the legislature’s ability to act decisively.20
In the early afternoon of 6 November, after the legislature had chosen presidential
electors, Representative Charles Simonton of Charleston moved to send a message to the Senate
proposing to adjourn the special session. But Simonton’s colleague from Charleston, Joseph
Pope, objected, pointing out that “There were certainly more important matters to be taken up . . .
than merely coming here to register a vote for electors of President and Vice-President.” He
reminded Simonton that there were matters specified in the governor’s message demanding
immediate action. In fact, resolutions in relation to the governor’s message “had not yet been
even referred to the appropriate Committees,” nor did anyone “really know what is the financial
condition of the State.” Should we adjourn now, Pope asked, when the “enemy’s fleet is upon
our shores and when the Governor wants the means to organize the force to repel him?” His
answer was no: the legislature should stay in session at least until the Military Committee could
report what forces were available and how best to reorganize the militia, and the Committee of
Ways and Means could report the amount of money available to the state. “[L]et some thing be
done before going home,” he pleaded, “so that after assembling here at vast expense to the State,
we shall at least have the gratification of knowing that we have not left the State unprovided for.”
Indeed, he warned, “at this very hour, the fairest portion of the State may be desolated by the
enemy––families may be driven away and the torch applied to their homes.”21
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Representative John Read from Georgetown then rose to reply, arguing that the specter of
Yankee invasion invoked by Pope “is of itself the very best argument why this General
Assembly should adjourn.” “Can we, as citizens of South Carolina,” Read asked, “stand here to
deliberate and debate upon matters which may require our remaining here for weeks, nay, for
months? No sir.” It seemed to him that “our business is to go home, where we can be within a
short distance of the place where we may be wanted at any moment.” The matter of raising funds
for mobilization could safely be postponed, he insisted, because “This revolution will have to be
fought, not by means that we are to raise by legislation; it is to be fought by the strong arms and
patriotism of the people––by men who will willingly go forward without the expectation of
pay.”22
Charles Simonton replied to Pope, too, pointing out that the Committee on the Military
lacked a quorum at present and the chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means was
attending to military duties; Pope was thus calling on the legislature to act “without a report,
without the action of a single committee, without knowing how much money is in the Treasury.”
Under these circumstances, Simonton wondered, “How can we legislate?”23
Pope rose once more, to respond to his critics. Was there any reason to believe, he asked,
“that three weeks hence at the regular session” the committees will be ready to act more
efficiently than now? He then declared that Simonton was “mistaken when he supposes the
Treasurer’s Report is not before the Legislature.” If he would pay closer attention to the
governor’s message, “it will be seen that the Report is here, and that the Committee of Ways and
Means can find out what the embarrassments of the State are.” Postponing the consideration of
pressing issues was a mistake, Pope added, because “We all know what the course of business is
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at the regular session––that matters of the most important kind are postponed until the conclusion
of the session.” He closed his remarks by stating that the governor obviously intended for the
called session to sit longer, otherwise “What is the object of sending that message[?]” The
legislature’s duty was to act on the governor’s recommendations “and to do it at once.”24
Pope failed to persuade the other members to take action on the military situation before
adjourning. The session accomplished little of substance, and eighteen crucial days were lost
between its close on 6 November and the beginning of the regular session on 25 November. It
was during this period that the Union amphibious invasion took place, triggering turmoil on the
coast. The debates over adjournment are significant because they demonstrate the division of
members over the proper course of action and the difficulty of legislating during a time of social
and military crisis. The legislators were certainly aware that the Union fleet off Port Royal
represented an imminent danger to the plantations on the Sea Islands. It was precisely that
awareness and the uncertainty of the consequences that paralyzed the legislature. The anticipated
invasion disrupted the General Assembly and stymied Governor Pickens.25
Into this tumultuous situation came General Robert E. Lee, commanding the new
Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and East Florida. He arrived at General Ripley’s
headquarters at Coosawhatchie on the evening of 7 November and learned that the enemy had
“complete possession of the water and inland navigation, commands all the islands on this coast,
and threatens both Savannah and Charleston.” Moreover, “We have no guns that can resist their
batteries, and have no resource but to prepare to meet them in the field,” but Lee feared “there
are but few State troops ready.” Unable to defend the many smaller islands around Port Royal,
Lee decided to abandon them and concentrate on defending the Charleston and Savannah
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Railroad. The Confederacy never again held Port Royal and Hilton Head islands and they
became the scene of missionary and educational experiments with the former slaves.26
On 11 November Governor Pickens attempted to meet the crisis by calling for volunteers.
These troops were to serve as a reserve force authorized by a legislative resolution passed during
the special session. Unfortunately, the governor could “promise no arms” and was obliged to
state that “None need to present themselves unless they have arms.” He conferred with Lee, who
then appointed Lieutenant Colonel John S. Preston to receive the troops. The results were
disheartening. Preston complained on 25 November about “an awful lack” of men coming
forward. Where, he asked bitterly, were “The deep-mouthed vengeance––the oath, the cry, the
rush to arms, when the sacred soil of Carolina is invaded––well, they ain’t here.” As late as 3
December, Lee reported that “the recruiting is very languid; for the war not one company has yet
offered, and not one new regiment will be organized in three months.” He wrote to Preston
stating that he was “much disappointed” by the lack of progress. It was essential that volunteers
come forward because “There are no means of defending the State except with her own troops,
and if they do not come forward, and that immediately, I fear her suffering will be greatly
aggravated.”27
While Lee was attempting to shore up the state’s defenses the legislature convened on 25
November for its regular session. The governor again addressed the members, calling on them to
immediately consider the measures that he had urged at the special session, especially
reorganizing the militia. Since that session adjourned, the state had been invaded and now the

26

Wallace, History of South Carolina, 3: 171; OR, Series One, 6: 312-13; Wise, Rowland, and Spieler, Rebellion,
Reconstruction, and Redemption, 3-6; Rose, Rehearsal for Reconstruction, 32-62.
27
Senate Journal (1861), 34; Charleston Mercury, 12 November 1861; Woodward, Mary Chesnut’s Civil War, 242;
OR, Series One, 6: 335, 53: 193; Cauthen, South Carolina Goes to War, 137-38; Marli F. Weiner, ed., A Heritage of
Woe: The Civil War Diary of Grace Brown Elmore, 1861-1868 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997), 21;
Emory M. Thomas, Robert E. Lee: A Biography (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995), 212.

104

Union had control over “about six thousand negroes” and perhaps “four thousand bales of
cotton.” It was no time for personal considerations; all citizens “from highest to lowest” should
unite with “one universal, stern, fixed resolve, to make the State a vast mausoleum for the bones
of freemen, rather than hold it as an inheritance for living bondsmen.”28
Pickens expressed great concern about the plantations close to the islands held by the
enemy. The slaves there were growing insubordinate and the legislature must aid the planters.
This would require appointing provost marshals to “take command of the overseers on all
plantations in the District or Parish, and organize a system of local police, with strict
accountability.” The provost marshals should have extraordinary powers, including “summary
jurisdiction over all slaves and suspected persons,” because “In most instances, the owners of
slaves are in the ranks” and cannot “exercise the ordinary jurisdiction with their overseers.”
Moreover, “The patrol system has likewise been deranged” and the provost marshals would
provide a substitute. The governor insisted that the legislature address this matter “as soon as
possible, for on the islands of our sea-coast there is, at present, much confusion, and great
necessity for a strong police in some shape or form.”29
The remainder of the governor’s message reiterated points made at the special session.
The $300,000 already advanced was now inadequate, he said, and he asked for an additional $1.5
million for military purposes. He also asked for measures to secure small arms and cannons
because so many had been taken out of the state. He once again urged changing the tax system
and advocated a stay of execution for debtors. “Perhaps for the present,” he added, “all civil
process ought to be suspended.” It was also imperative for the legislature to extend relief to the
families of soldiers. Although he could not have known it at the time, the most consequential
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suggestion Pickens made was to renew the authority given by the convention allowing him to
appoint a council to assist in the discharge of his duties. Because of the “complicated and
increased business of this office,” he declared, “it is impossible for me to attend to all duties
required of me.”30
The legislature could not afford to waste time, for it was coming under increasing
scrutiny. One Charlestonian thought that the governor’s recommendations if “rightly used and
applied ten months ago” would have done much good. A Camden resident voiced his concern
that “There are a great many subjects of importance demanding the attention of the Assembly”
and hoped that it would “not let the whole session pass without doing something for the relief of
our poor.” A worried Yorkville inhabitant agreed, wondering, “What is to become of the
destitute families of the Volunteers of York District[?]” Another anxious citizen, alarmed at the
large number of whiskey distillers, thought it proper to “earnestly call the attention of our
Legislature to the subject.” A distressed resident in Spartanburg, concerned about the rising price
and scarcity of salt, thought the legislature should intercede; if it had not been for the charity of a
wealthy citizen, “we would not have had a single sack in our town.”31
From across the state pleas were voiced for the legislature to pass a stronger stay law for
debtors. “Your duties, as Legislators,” one constituent from Greenville reminded the members,
“is to enact laws for the benefit of the people of your District and State.” There is no law “more
urgently demanded for the benefit of the people at large, than a Stay Law.” In Columbia “An Old
Nullifier” concurred, arguing the “propriety of throwing some shield over the unfortunate debtor
in times like these.” When one voter was told that there were too many lawyers in the legislature
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to permit the passage of a stay law, he threatened that “there will not be so many of the
profession in the next Legislature to mar or obstruct the known wishes of their constituency.”32
The legislature clearly had a lot of work to do. Immediately it addressed the governor’s
recommendations on the militia, passing an act that made all free white men between eighteen
and forty-five years of age liable to serve for twelve months (instead of three under the old law)
in South Carolina or any of the other Confederate states. The governor could call these troops up
at any time and could resort to a draft provided the companies had had the opportunity to
volunteer. Company muster and drill were required at least once every two weeks rather than
quarterly. Any citizen failing to respond when summoned into service was liable to such
punishment “short of death” as may be imposed by a court martial. New elections were ordered
for all militia officers, and beat companies were reorganized. The state quartermaster general and
commissary general were given additional assistants “for the efficient administration of their
departments.”33
The legislature also complied with the governor’s request to appropriate $1.5 million for
military defenses. To raise this enormous sum the legislature passed an additional act authorizing
the Bank of the State of South Carolina to sell stock and float a loan to the government. The bank
was indemnified and the faith of the state pledged for the redemption of the stock by paying
annual installments of $100,000 from 1867 to 1884. Furthermore, the act passed in January
creating a military establishment for the Confederate army was amended: all enlistees under the
January act and all those reenlisting were to serve for three years or for the duration of the war.
An additional regiment of artillery and squadron of cavalry were also authorized. Although the
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legislature failed to unite the state’s two military academies and relocate the new institution to
Fort Moultrie as Pickens had asked, in most instances the members bowed to the governor’s
wishes in relation to reforming the military force of the state and they provided the financial
resources to sustain it.34
Another pressing issue was assisting the wives and children of soldiers. During the
summer of 1861, many of the districts instructed the Commissioners of the Poor to levy a tax to
aid military families. In most cases, this tax was not to exceed 15 percent of the general state tax
and the method of distribution was left to the districts. There were complaints that these
measures were now insufficient. In December the legislature took control of the matter and
passed a law providing direct aid from the state. The new law created a “Soldiers’ Board of
Relief” in each district, which was to continue meeting until the termination of the war. The
boards were empowered to levy a tax on all property taxed by the state provided it did not exceed
40 percent of the general state tax. This new program of relief was thus far more expansive than
the local initiatives taken over the summer.35
The boards had considerable discretion “to ascertain whether the applicants for aid and
relief are proper recipients.” If the boards decided in their favor, they could dispense monthly or
quarterly monetary aid to the families or purchase provisions to be dispensed. Each board was to
make returns of its receipts to the Court of Common Pleas. Although numerous petitions
complaining of high prices and scarcity of provisions reached the legislature, it was reluctant at
this point to impose price controls and interfere with the law of supply and demand. This
reluctance hampered the effectiveness of the law because the poorer districts needed the most
assistance, precisely the locations where there were insufficient sources of revenue.
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Nevertheless, the legislature acted on the wishes of its constituents and put the rudiments of a
program together to provide for the needs of soldiers’ families.36
More controversial was the propriety of enacting a stay law. In January 1861 the
legislature had passed a bill protecting soldiers and civilians from punishment for failing to
appear in court in cases of debt. Some citizens thought that law inadequate. One Columbia
resident remarked that although “In ordinary times it would certainly be hazardous” to impair
contracts, citizens now found themselves “thrown upon such perilous times as the oldest have
never before witnessed.” Under these circumstances “It is useless to say that a merciless or
vindictive creditor will be deterred by public indignation” from seizing the property of the
unfortunate debtor because “In some men the love of money will overlap all the stings of
conscience.” He could not believe “that the Legislature will prove so imbecile and recreant to the
general welfare as to give this matter the ‘go-by’ during the present session.” Other South
Carolinians apparently agreed. From nine districts grand jury presentments and petitions reached
the legislature requesting relief for debtors. The petitioners explained that the current economic
derangement in the state has been induced “by no incautious speculations” among the citizens
“but is the natural consequences of the action of the State in the defence of her rights.” Under the
strains of war honest citizens could not “realize from the proceeds of their labor, funds with
which to pay their debts.” A large number of these debts were “now obtained and lodged with
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the Sheriff for collection.” Unless “the legislature interferes for their protection,” there was no
doubt “pecuniary unrest” would result.37
Representative William C. Black of York District introduced a new stay law on 26
November and it was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary for consideration. A week later
the committee reported that “not a single instance has been cited” of “a relentless creditor
[trying] to enrich himself by the sacrifice of the property of his debtor.” Indeed, the committee
found that South Carolinians had exercised “a spirit of justice and moderation [in the matter of
debt collection] of which the State may well be proud.” The good will had been so general that
“Your committee would ask to be discharged from the consideration of the whole subject, if a
due respect to the presentments and petitions referred did not seem to require . . . that legislation
should second what they have so generously begun.” The committee therefore recommended that
the legislature pass a stronger law staying all final processes against debtors, but also urged a
provision to protect creditors so that “the lien to which they may be entitled, cannot be
prejudiced.” Wanting to avoid any constitutional objections, the committee stopped short of
suggesting suspension of the privilege of initiating a lawsuit.38
In accordance with the committee’s recommendations the legislature passed a law that
protected the property of debtors from being seized. It made it unlawful for state officers to
execute any final process for the collection of debt until the expiration of the first session of the
next General Assembly. Public sales of property belonging to debtors that were previously
authorized were stayed until renewed by the judge who had made the decree. The majority of the
bill’s provisions, however, protected creditors by giving them a legal recourse if the debtor
absconded or sought to remove his property from the state or dispose of it fraudulently. These
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provisions were meant to conciliate those who might oppose the bill on the constitutional
grounds that it abrogated the sanctity of contracts. They did not succeed in doing so. 39
In the Senate an outraged Henry D. Lesesne of Charleston was “unwilling to vote in
silence” on a measure involving the honor of South Carolina. Although the idea of a soldier or
patriotic citizen losing their property “under the Sheriff’s hammer” was repugnant, Lesesne was
convinced that this new law was unnecessary. He urged his colleagues to keep in mind that “we
are enacting history!” He did not want to give posterity the impression that South Carolina “was
infested by hyenas in human form, whom it was necessary to hold back from prostrate debtors by
such extraordinary legislation.” The senator correctly pointed out that the Judiciary Committee
had stated that this legislation was unnecessary, and yet “the Report recommends it, and
recommends it on the ground of deferring to the wishes of the people! Sir, I deny that we have a
right to say the people wish it.” Of the state’s thirty-one districts only nine had presented
petitions and the committee “have not heard of a single public meeting, nor of any petition
numerously signed calling upon us for such a measure as this.” Lesesne and eight others inserted
a formal protest in the Senate journal explaining their opposition to a law that “practically
destroyed” the legal remedies for enforcing contracts and was in blatant violation of the
Confederate and state constitutions.40
While the necessity of a stay law was highly debatable, there was little disagreement on
the need to tighten the grip on the slave population in close proximity to the enemy. Given the
turbulent situation in and around Beaufort, this was the most pressing issue facing the legislature.
Some citizens were urging their representatives to create a state police, insisting that slave
insubordination was not confined to the coast. One resident of Edgefield believed that “a
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network of police and espionage should cover our whole interior. . . . [T]he very honor and lives
of our wives and daughters demand it.” This citizen was certain that the future of slavery was at
stake: “our peculiar domestic establishment is undergoing the trial of fire.” The merits of a slave
society were now “before the world in judgement, and the turning point of its destiny is at hand.”
Thus it would be “criminal negligence in our authorities to fail in using every means to check
and dissipate the absurd visions” of freedom being embraced by the servile class.41
The Committee on the Colored Population had been considering this issue since the
governor had delivered his annual message in November. On 10 December Representative John
Read reported for the committee. “[T]he enemy has spared no pains to demoralize the negros
engaged in labor,” he said, and many slaves on plantations near the occupied islands were now
under “a pernicious influence.” Because so many planters were now in military service, “it is
almost impossible to convene the Court of Freeholders required” to prosecute cases of slave
insubordination. Moreover, “new offences, not accurately described by law, are committed, and
old offences assume a graver character.” Thus, “a more absolute and summary jurisdiction is
needed,” vesting power in provost marshals to determine the character of offences and decree the
punishment. The committee recommended that the legislature appoint as provost marshals “men
having large slave property, understanding fully the negro character,” and warned that the
legislature must act now to protect against further “attacks upon our domestic security” and to
safeguard “that institution which underlies our entire social existence.”42
The legislature quickly complied and passed a bill strengthening the police regulations in
the coastal districts. The law created provost marshals who were to act as a police court that
would continue to operate as long as the enemy held any part of South Carolina’s coast.
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Jurisdiction extended to all matters regarding the regulation of slaves and free blacks. The court
could impose any punishment that the “exigencies of the time require” and its decisions were
“final and without appeal.” Moreover, the provost marshals were given power to arrest any white
person considered “dangerous to the community.” Indeed, the bill made the provost marshals de
facto magistrates. Finally, to placate the citizens residing in the interior, the final section of the
bill declared that these provisions could be extended to any district in the state by executive
proclamation.43
Thus the legislature responded to the problem of keeping order on plantations in the wake
of invasion. South Carolina had not been out of the Union for a year when military necessity
forced the state to invent new solutions to preserve domestic tranquility. This legislation violated
the customary rights of citizens, and would create conflict between civilians and state authorities
in the future. At the beginning of the war President Davis had reminded the Confederate
Congress that the purpose of their new nation was to preserve and defend the liberties threatened
by Abraham Lincoln. Yet some South Carolinians were now learning that their state authorities,
too, could trample on liberties––perhaps even more destructively, since ultimate sovereignty
rested with the state. Ironically, this source of conflict was in many instances brought on by the
planters who demanded that the legislature do something to quell the disorder. Civil-military
relations came under intense strain due to the necessity of the times.44
Just when it seemed that conditions in the lowcountry could not be any worse, Charleston
experienced a calamity of epic proportions. On the evening of 11 December Robert E. Lee was
dining at the Mills House when he heard cries of “fire.” At the foot of Hasell and East Bay
streets, a number of slaves were cooking dinner when a small fire broke out. The wind suddenly
43
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picked up and the fire spread to Cameron’s Foundry next door. A few minutes later the
Charleston Gas Works exploded and the conflagration swept down Meeting Street, destroying
Institute Hall, where a year earlier delegates had signed the ordinance of secession. According to
Caroline Howard Gilman, it did not take long before “the wind assumed the form of a tornado.”
As the flames raged more fiercely Emma Holmes observed that “the heavens illuminated as if it
were an Aurora Borealis.” One newspaper correspondent mournfully reported that thousands “of
poor and bewildered families, driven suddenly from their homes, destitute even of their scanty
effects,” ran from the flames. By the next day the fire had burned itself out but not before
consuming over 540 acres and destroying 575 homes. Property losses were upwards of $8
million and three of the four insurance companies in the city were financially ruined.
Astonishingly there were no fatalities, but many residents were now destitute and homeless.
Pleas went out to help the sufferers. Citizens quickly formed a relief committee, but their efforts
were inadequate because, as one Charlestonian who pleaded to the upcountry residents for
assistance put it, “Even our wealthy citizens are now unable to do much to relieve the general
distress.”45
Governor Pickens ordered additional troops to Charleston and directed the commissary
general to dispense rations to the needy. On 13 December he informed the legislature that
Charleston was in ruins and “your action entirely out of the usual and customary state of things”
was required. President Davis addressed Congress the same day, stating that South Carolina’s
“resources are now taxed to the utmost in resisting the invasion of her soil,” limiting the state’s
ability to assist victims of the fire. “The magnitude of the calamity,” Davis said, demanded aid
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from the Confederate government. Congress quickly advanced $250,000 to South Carolina. The
next day the state legislature instructed the Committee of Ways and Means to study the problem
of rebuilding Charleston. The committee advised that the loan from the Confederacy would be
inadequate; a great deal of state aid would be needed.46
The subsequent legislation for rebuilding Charleston entailed another substantial loan
from the Bank of South Carolina. The bill authorized the governor to issue bonds or stock to be
sold for an amount not exceeding $1 million, to fund the rebuilding of the burned district. One
half of the certified value of each destroyed structure was to be loaned to the applicant and after
expenditure a second and third loan could be granted. These loans were secured by a mortgage
on the real estate, on the condition that the principal sum be repaid in ten annual instalments
beginning in four years. The city council passed an ordinance indemnifying the state against loss
and the legislature chartered three new insurance companies.47
The Union invasion was depressing enough for most citizens, but the fire in Charleston
pushed some politicians over the edge. This included David F. Jamison, president of the
convention. In the final days of its second session in April 1861, a disagreement had arisen over
whether the convention should adjourn sine die. Some members held that the convention’s work
was complete with the ratification of the Confederate Constitution and therefore the convention
should dissolve. Others, however, thought the convention should adjourn subject to the call of its
president in case a future emergency should arise. The members reached an agreement that if
“the public exigencies shall require” the convention to reconvene, Jamison could issue the call to
do so at any time before 1 January 1862. If the convention did not reassemble by that date its
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existence would end. This stipulation, hardly noticed at the time, had significant consequences
for the state government. It was under this resolution that Jamison issued a call on 14 December
for the convention to reconvene the day after Christmas for its third session.48
Why the convention reconvened demands explanation. The legislature adjourned its
regular session on 23 December, having accomplished a great deal. One correspondent reported
near the close of the session that “The Legislature is working in good earnest, and has been doing
so from the first day of the session.” To be sure, it fell short in some areas. It failed to alter the
tax system despite pleas for an overhaul that would render it fairer and more efficient. Nor were
the upper and lower treasuries consolidated as Pickens requested. No action was taken to ban the
distillation of whiskey as some citizens had hoped. The military academies in Columbia and
Charleston were not united and relocated to Sullivan’s Island despite Pickens’ insistence that
doing so would strengthen the state’s military establishment. But these omissions aside, the
legislature diligently addressed the most critical issues outlined by the governor.49
During the regular session the militia was reorganized and liberal appropriations were
made for its support. Moreover, the state now gave direct aid to families of soldiers and a new
stay law protected debtors from losing their property. The expansion of the salt supply was
encouraged by the chartering of joint-stock companies for that purpose. A bold initiative
strengthening slave control on the coast was put into effect by establishing provost marshals.
Finally, after the fire devastated Charleston, the legislature quickly enacted a plan for rebuilding
the city. Considering the extent of this legislation, one can only conclude that the members
performed reasonably well under the circumstances. Nevertheless, in the wake of the Charleston
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fire another wave of panic swept across the state, weakening the citizenry’s confidence in the
regular state government.50
The convention convened for its third session on 26 December under distressing
conditions. President Jamison addressed the delegates and explained his reasons for calling them
back together. That confidence in the regular government was faltering is apparent in Jamison’s
remarks. Although remedial measures taken by the legislature in response to the current
“difficulties and perils” were well intended, he said, the problems could be resolved only by
delegates of the convention, who had been “selected for their supposed qualifications for a time
of revolution.” The convention was a unique body, Jamison argued, for it “could exercise
supreme power” and “possessed the entire confidence of the people of South Carolina.” When
the convention had adjourned last April there was great danger facing the state, yet “The perils
which now threaten the State”––Yankee invasion and slave discontent on the coast––“are of a far
graver character than they seemed to any of us at the period of your last adjournment.” Jamison
was therefore “unwilling to assume the responsibility of permitting you to be dissolved” before
reconsidering these threats. He did not say that Governor Pickens’s actions as commander in
chief were questionable, but many members and ordinary citizens thought this was the case. A
few weeks earlier Henry William Ravenel had expressed the opinion that Pickens “would not
probably get a vote if the election were held now.”51
Convinced that the regular government was incapable of handling the crisis, the
convention took drastic action. Most of its proceedings were held in secret session and public
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access to its records was limited. On the first day, the convention created five “Special
Committees” to address the problems provoked by the invasion. Special Committee One was
charged with devising a plan to deal with the slaves in the possession or under the influence of
the enemy. Committee Two was to advise on the proper response if further portions of the state
fell into Union possession. The third committee was to consider how best to aid Confederate
authorities. The fourth was required to develop a plan for strengthening coast and harbor
defenses. The convention instructed Committee Five to make recommendations on the creation
of an administrative cabinet to aid the governor. The convention then called on the governor for
a detailed report of the current number of South Carolina troops in Confederate and state service
along with their locations and terms of enlistment, and an account of all military supplies under
his direct control over the last year.52
Governor Pickens responded to convention’s requests the next day. He had, he
acknowledged, sent many arms and other military supplies out of the state; but he had done so
only because the Confederate government had led him to believe “that by cold weather this fall,
there would be plenty of arms brought in to supply what might be needed in the State.”
Unfortunately, he was “grievously disappointed in this calculation.” Pickens furthermore
accounted for all troops in the field and referred the convention to the report of the adjutant and
inspector general for the details of their terms of enlistment. Pickens then used the occasion to
defend himself from the growing criticism. He wanted it understood that the Confederate
government had taken charge of the military since March and insisted that “it would be doing
great wrong to me, and injustice to the State, to hold any of the State authorities strictly or
entirely responsible for the conduct of the war.” The Confederate authorities “had made no
calculation as to the present extent of the war” and did not appreciate that “The resources of the
52
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enemy on sea are almost boundless.” The public was holding him responsible for military
misjudgments “when, in fact, I have no real power.” Indeed, he declared, “the country is under
absolute [Confederate] military control.” He concluded by urging the convention not to take any
action that “would only distract and divide us”; it was essential now to put aside differences and
“act with unanimity and patriotic zeal” for the public interest.53
A majority of the members thought the public interest required a radical change in the
executive department. The first order of business, however, was to address the concerns on the
coast. Special Committee One made its report on 31 December. The chairman, Robert W.
Barnwell, recommended that the convention pass an ordinance requiring state authorities to
remove slaves and other valuable commodities from areas of the state vulnerable to enemy
attack. This was intended to supplement the bill passed by the legislature providing stronger
police regulation in the coastal districts. The convention did approve the ordinance, but this was
a delicate matter never intended for public consumption. It was the only ordinance passed at this
session that did not have the injunction of secrecy removed after adjournment. The document
was sealed and sent to the secretary of state’s office for safekeeping.54
The plan devised for the removal of slaves was hopelessly complex. The ordinance put
the state authorities in control of the entire servile population on the South Carolina seaboard. A
commission of three citizens in each coastal district was to be appointed by the convention to
determine when removal was necessary and to notify the slaveowners. If any owner refused to
comply with a removal order, the commission was to remove his slaves by force. Planters who
had prepared a place of safety in advance were to be assisted in removing their slaves to that
location. In cases where no advance preparations had been made, the commission was to decide
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on the place of removal; indeed, the commission was obligated to provide a suitable location.
Moreover, the commission was to purchase and transport supplies to these locations, which
would then serve as public storehouses for owners unable to provide for their slaves. The state
authorities would maintain control over the slaves until forced removal was accomplished, after
which the slaves would be returned to their owners’ control.55
Further complicating the matter was the problem of putting the removed slaves to work.
The commissioners were obligated to find work for the slaves in the public service of the state or
in any other tasks that would defray the cost of their removal. Whenever the state expended
money for removal a lien was put on the slaves and the owner was required to cover the cost. If
the owner defaulted, the state could seize and sell the slaves. Until these payments were made the
commissioner could draw freely on the state treasury to execute the ordinance. An additional
ordinance exempted overseers from militia duty, to facilitate the removal program. In a final
demonstration of state power, all corporations and ferries used in removing slaves were
prohibited from charging more than half of the current rates for their services.56
The ordinance providing for the removal of slaves greatly increased the power of the state
over the private affairs of citizens. As the state came to assume a greater role in the management
of slaves, the owners found their own authority proportionately diminished. Moreover, Governor
Pickens found his own authority not only diminished but abrogated. The convention was taking
firm control of the state’s conduct of the war. Just a few weeks earlier, the House had considered
creating an executive council to assist the governor, but had tabled the bill. During the Fort
Sumter crisis the governor had had an executive council but it was merely an advisory board
responsible to the governor, who “shall in all cases, decide upon his own action.” The convention
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abolished that council during the second session; but now it reconsidered the matter. This time
the convention had something very different in mind when it came to assisting the executive.
During the constitutional convention in Montgomery, South Carolina delegate Laurence M. Keitt
declared that in creating the Confederate government, “we have made no experiment in political
science, and we have adopted no novel theory.” Ironically, the convention was about to
undertake a radical experiment in government based on a novel theory.57
The final version of the ordinance “For strengthening the Executive Department during
the exigencies of the present War” passed on 7 January 1862. By any calculation, it was an
extraordinary measure that fundamentally departed from South Carolina’s long tradition of
limited executive power. The ordinance created an executive council with the governor as a
member but without the ability to act independently. It stated that “the Governor shall be
assisted” in the exercise of his powers by the lieutenant governor and three other persons chosen
by the convention. However, the convention did not intend for this council to merely assist the
governor. The lieutenant governor and two other members were sufficient to constitute a quorum
and exercise full power, and a majority vote of the councilmen present was sufficient to take
executive actions. In other words, Pickens was now simply one of five co-equal members of the
executive branch, not its chief. He did have access to the council records and could request
reports from the department heads, but they were responsible to the council as a whole rather
than to the governor. There was little opposition to the ordinance; it passed by a vote of ninetysix to twenty-three.58
The ordinance gave the executive council blanket authority to declare martial law in any
part of the state if it deemed that necessary. The council could also order the arrest and detention
57
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of anyone suspected of disloyalty to the Confederate cause and could seize any private property
deemed necessary for public use. In fact, “whatever else may be required” to defend the state
was within the power of the council. For these purposes it could draw funds from the state
treasury without legislative authorization. The council as a whole, rather than the governor alone,
would hereafter make all nominations and appointments. The convention required the council to
keep a record of its proceedings and to justify every arrest made under its authority. All
proceedings were subject to convention review and repeal, although Jamison was not required to
reconvene the convention unless requested to do so in writing by twenty members. Finally, each
member of the council was granted the privilege of filing “his dissent from [its] action in any
matter.”59
Governor Pickens did not wait for the council to act before expressing his dissent. The
day after the ordinance passed he addressed the convention delegates. Noting that the executive
department had been transformed by the creation of the council, Pickens thought it was his duty
to the legislature, which had elected him, to warn the convention that its ordinance will “greatly
weaken the Executive as created by the Constitution.” No appointment “even of the humblest
kind” could be made without a majority vote of the council. These restrictions, he feared, would
lead to “great imbecility,” especially in performing the duties of commander in chief of the state
military. He wondered aloud if the convention fully understood the implications of diffusing
military authority in this way. (One suspects that the convention delegates, dissatisfied with
Pickens’s military leadership, knew exactly what they were doing.) Pickens reluctantly pledged
to accept the new arrangement since it was decreed by the “highest and most unlimited power” in
the state. But he cautioned that the exercise of “Any unusual or arbitrary power” could perturb
the citizenry. The council should not exercise its extraordinary powers, he advised, unless it was
59
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“obviously necessary” that the “usual authorities cannot act.” It was, of course, perfectly obvious
to the convention delegates that the usual authorities could not act efficiently under the
circumstances, hence the need to radically transform the executive department and strengthen
executive power. The convention immediately ordered the governor’s communication to be laid
on the table without consideration. It then dispensed with its remaining business and adjourned.60
The executive council met for the first time on 9 January 1862. On motion of James
Chesnut Jr., the council created administrative departments. Lieutenant Governor Harllee and
former governor William H. Gist became heads of the departments of Treasury and Finance,
respectively. Attorney General Isaac W. Hayne was the new Chief of Justice and Police
Department. A few months later the council established a Construction and Manufacture
Department with Gist as its head. The most important administrator, however, was the head of
the Military Department. This position went to Chesnut and he was given such powers as to
wholly displace Pickens as commander in chief. From this point on Chesnut would be making
the military decisions. The creation of the executive council was in effect a nonviolent coup that
removed the constitutionally elected governor from power. South Carolina now had a dual
government: a governor and legislature elected under the Constitution and an executive council
created and appointed by the convention. The council would function as an arm of the
convention and assume executive, legislative, and even judicial responsibilities, thereby blurring
the separation of powers. It was a sweeping overhaul of the state government and a clear sign
that radical politics were deemed necessary for revolutionary times.61
A few days after the victory at Fort Sumter, the Mercury had argued that South Carolina
had seceded because “the United States Government has steadily usurped powers not granted.”
60
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Shall the South submit, the editor asked, to a government “with no restraints on [its] lawless will,
no checks on [its] omnivorous rapacity?” Beginning in January 1862, many South Carolinians
would be asking these questions about their own government, the executive council. As the
convention reconvened in December the Mercury had reminded its readers that “unlimited power
inevitably corrupts.” If the restraints imposed by law are taken away and the people are “swollen
by unlimited obedience,” despotism is the natural result. South Carolina’s executive council had
the potential to bring about what the editor feared. On 2 December William Gilmore Simms had
expressed concern about “the politicians who are endeavoring to get the Convention called
together.” He worried that they might “enact some positively mischievous thing if they once get
together.”62
Whether the executive council was a piece of mischief remained to be seen; it was
unquestionably, however, a radical departure. The Union invasion created the conditions for a
revolutionary experiment in government. In the eyes of the majority of convention delegates, the
regular government was incapable of dealing with the dangers confronting South Carolina and
they sought a solution to arrest the downward spiral of events. The answer they settled on was an
ordinance that temporarily overthrew the state Constitution. However, there were concerns
among state legislators that the convention and council might perpetuate themselves indefinitely.
Less than a month after the convention adjourned, Representative Alfred P. Aldrich of Barnwell
stood in front of the district courthouse and informed his constituents about “a great power which
has been erected over you without your knowledge.” He explained the details of the ordinance
creating “a Council with dictatorial powers in actual operation,” and then laid before the crowd
two questions that would vex politicians and their constituents for the next year: what was the
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purpose of calling the convention together in December 1860 and what legitimate powers did it
possess? Aldrich did not wish to alarm his constituents but felt it his duty to express a “fervent
disapproval of this great irregularity, this singular violation of the Constitution by those who
were called to defend and maintain constitutional rights.” He desired “to give you something to
think about, and to produce a sound, conservative, healthful public opinion in this time of
innovation and revolution.”63
As 1862 dawned, white South Carolinians had plenty to think about. Over the past two
months they had witnessed thousands of their slaves fall into enemy hands. Numerous planters
saw their homes destroyed and became refugees. Much of the city of Charleston was in ashes.
And if these calamities were not enough to occupy the public mind, citizens now lived under the
control of a new state authority that was untested and theoretically unlimited in power.64
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Chapter Four
“The World Is Disturbed around Us”:
The Executive Council and the War Effort, 1862
New Year’s Day 1862 opened with a good omen. In Charleston it was warm and sunny;
Emma Holmes described it as “pleasant as a spring day.” The Charleston Daily Courier also
noted the delightful weather but cautioned its readers that “these rejoicing rays do not penetrate
the morrow, and to know what is in the future we must await the revealments of the days.”
Southern independence would certainly be achieved in due time, but patience was necessary:
“We must be content to abide the events, prepared to suffer in meek submission if woe befalls
us.”1
Woe had undeniably befallen Charleston. Much of the city was in ruins from the fire in
December and suspicions lingered that slave arsonists were responsible for it. The fidelity of the
city’s slave population was questioned and apprehension over the future grew as the hope for a
short war evaporated. A year earlier Charleston had been a bustling, orderly city, but in early
1862 many stores were closed, prostitution and gambling were on the rise, and the city jail was
crowded with men arrested for disorderly conduct. A young Charleston woman never imagined
her city would be home to such a “vulgar set of men” or a “dreadful fast set of girls.” Even more
disconcerting were the long lines of homeless men, women, and children who gathered at the
two soup kitchens that had opened in the city. For several months the Fire Relief Committee
distributed food and provided shelter for the destitute. Although state, city, and private aid
poured in generously, there were many problems channeling that aid directly to the fire victims.
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The committee reported in October that it had received 1,102 applications for monetary aid,
amounting to $1,526,670, yet only $261,253 had been distributed.2
The insurance companies made no payments on approved claims until April. The
logistical problems in dispensing aid to fire victims and soldiers’ families inspired, in late
February, the idea of creating a “free market” in the city. Richard Yeadon, editor of the Courier,
took the lead in implementing the idea, basing it on a similar plan instituted in New Orleans,
which supplied provisions free of charge to the needy. Yeadon worked tirelessly to get the
market operational. As to how it would be funded, he called for donations from “the wealthy and
all who are able.” In early April collection committees were organized and began work. By the
end of the summer nearly two thousand persons were receiving food daily at a cost of $8,000 per
month.3
While Charlestonians struggled to find food and shelter, the planters along the coast had
troubles of their own. On 1 January Union forces attempted to land on the mainland in Beaufort
District. At that time the convention ordinance providing for slave removal was still in the
planning stages. When finally put into operation, the evacuation program got off to a rough start
and proved unworkable. Chief of Justice and Police Isaac Hayne, responsible for overseeing the
local commissions in charge of removal, found his task nearly impossible. On 11 January two
men attempting to evacuate slaves to the interior at gunpoint were attacked by the slaves, who
seized the guns, shot the men, and absconded to the Union fleet. The Confederate commander in
Coosawhatchie was unable to get the Beaufort commission to comply with removal orders and
was forced to drive slaves off several plantations and incarcerate some. In March, Hayne
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reported that “these Commissions had not had any [general] meeting of consultation”; indeed,
some “had never met among themselves.” Frustrated that so little had been accomplished by this
late date, Hayne met with the various commissions. After urging on them the importance of
prompt and energetic action, he was at last gratified that “some impression seemed to be made.”4
To expedite removal Hayne also met with the president of the Charleston and Savannah
Railroad, who informed him that transportation was “very limited, and . . . further embarrassed
by the irregular calls of the military.” The executive council passed a resolution imposing a tendollar fine per slave on owners who ignored removal orders, but this availed little. In the
Beaufort District, between 24 January and 19 March, only 280 slaves were removed to the
interior under the convention ordinance. The commission for Colleton District, just north of
Beaufort, had more success, removing some eight hundred. But these figures represented only a
small proportion of slaves in the area. It quickly became apparent to Hayne that “no general
exodus could be effected.” William Henry Trescot, head of the Colleton District commission,
agreed, estimating that some twenty thousand to thirty thousand slaves remained on the
plantations in Beaufort and Colleton Districts alone. Complete removal, Trescot declared, “is
impossible . . . simply impossible.”5
While the executive council struggled to implement the convention ordinance on forced
removal, planters who chose to remove their slaves voluntarily faced daunting challenges.
Between February and June, Langdon Cheves attempted to remove his slaves and other property
from his plantation on the Savannah River. He planned to charter the steamer Manassas to take
250 of the slaves to Augusta and then to Abbeville while keeping sixty on the plantation until the
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furniture and other valuables were packed and ready to be moved. This was an enormous
undertaking, Cheves wrote, its success dependent “upon so many contingencies”; he worried
about “the thousand circumstances that may make it impracticable or inconvenient.” The
Manassas made slow progress, and during the journey one of the slave men, Cheves learned,
“walked right overboard.” After arriving in Augusta the captain of the Manassas left the slaves
on the wharf in a heavy rain without shelter or supervision until an overseer could be hired.
Finally arriving in Abbeville, the slaves were housed in fifteen run-down cabins and put to work
on 150 acres of rented land. But this plot was too small to provide work for all 250 slaves, and
the horses and mules needed for plowing could not be procured locally in sufficient numbers.
Since the slaves were not doing much work the overseer cut back on their rations. By early May
the farm’s store of provisions was nearly exhausted and local food supplies were running short.
Several slaves contracted measles and later died of pneumonia, while others began to disappear
into the woods, intending to shirk work or perhaps get away permanently. As Cheves’s
predicament demonstrates, removing slaves from the coast to the interior was a logistical
nightmare, not to mention a hardship for those removed.6
Cheves’s situation was hardly unique. Many South Carolina planters faced the difficult
decision of whether to evacuate their slaves or keep them on the plantation. The convention
ordinance mandated removal when a local commission ordered it, but the commissions were
inefficient and enforcement was spotty. Colleton District planter John Berkley Grimball traveled
to Charleston to consult with the military authorities and inquire whether removal was required,
but he received no definite answer and thus had to make the decision himself. “To move or to
stay,” he complained, “seems to be equally ruinous to my prospects. I have never been more
6
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harassed and perplexed in my life––the future for me black as night––nothing visible but
impending poverty.” Eventually he decided to seek refuge in the upcountry. When his slaves
learned they were to be removed, his overseer reported, almost all of them ran away overnight.
Exasperated, Grimball sent his son to the upstate villages of Pickens and Anderson in search of a
plantation to rent or purchase but “found it impossible to procure a suitable place.” Even when
planters were able to remove their slaves to the interior they often faced a backlash from the
local population. Harriott Middleton in Flat Rock, North Carolina, wrote that “The country
people here objected to Mr. Johnston’s bringing up his negroes from the plantation saying it
would raise the price of provisions.” White refugees, too, encountered hostility, or at least a less
than warm reception. Middleton criticized Columbia as a “mean little town”: “the extortions
which are practiced upon the low-country refugees, by the so-called ‘best people of Columbia’
are enough to disgrace the place forever.” The refugees, she said sarcastically, would have
received a friendlier welcome in “the heart of Connecticut.”7
While planter families dealt with the difficulties of refugee life, the executive council
confronted, among its many problems, the particularly troublesome one of internal security. As
slaves made their way to Union lines or remained on the plantations after their owners had fled,
they often provided valuable military intelligence to the enemy––or at least whites became
convinced that they did so. The Mercury pointed out that many of these plantations were located
at important strategic points and the Yankees cultivated the slaves’ acquaintance “by purchasing
their hogs and poultry, and, in this way, learn many things which they ought not to know.” This
information was often used effectively by the Union forces. Demands for enhanced security grew
even louder after a slave named Robert Smalls piloted the steamer Planter out of Charleston
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harbor on 13 May and turned it over to the Yankees. This “shameful proceeding” and the
“criminal absence” of security were deplored by the press. On 15 May a regiment of Union
troops surprised Confederate pickets on the Ashepoo River near Edisto Island by using
information supposedly obtained from runaway slaves. Two days later Emma Holmes heard that
a slave had been caught near Charleston “with a complete diagram of the city and fortifications
and all necessary information attached” to give the Yankees vital military intelligence. Near the
end of the summer the Courier reported that the coastal town of Bluffton was being shelled
effectively because “the negros in this neighborhood have had communication with the enemy
through some runaways, all acting in concert together.” Prominent planter Louis Manigault
summed up whites’ concerns after learning that his most trusted slave had been caught stealing
shot and powder with the intention of carrying them to the Yankees: “This war has taught us the
perfect impossibility of placing the least confidence in any Negro. In too numerous instances
those we esteemed the most have been the first to desert us.”8
Military intelligence getting into the wrong hands was bad enough; even more disturbing
were the outright acts of violence reportedly committed by some slaves. John Berkley Grimball
was shocked when he heard in January of “Some thirty negroes, fully armed with bright
muskets,” who attacked Confederate pickets at Aiken’s Bridge near Edisto Island. Confederate
authorities dispatched a squad of infantry and cavalry “to deal summarily with these rascals.” In
March the provost court of Charleston tried five “mounted and variously armed” slaves for
attacking Colonel James Orr’s regiment and hanged a slave named Billy for conspiracy. Later
that summer a police officer at the Charleston market had his club wrenched from his hand by a
slave who struck the officer on the head several times and then struck his own master; he was
8
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subdued after “stubbornly and desperately” resisting. By that time Beaufort planter William
Elliott was convinced that every able-bodied male slave who fled a plantation was “armed to cut
the throat of his former master.”9
As lowcountry refugees made their way into the interior, security concerns spread inland
from the coast. On 6 March Justice and Police chief Hayne met with the mayor and city council
of Columbia to discuss requiring passports for all persons exiting the city and monitoring all
strangers who entered. Stronger security measures like these were demanded by some citizens in
the early part of 1862 as a perceived breakdown of law and order plagued several towns. A
Camden resident decried the “depredations and robberies that are almost nightly committed in
this town and its surroundings.” Indeed, “Scarcely a night passes that some one does not lose
either his hogs, his poultry, his meat or his corn.” Fed up with the “utter inefficiency of the
present patrol system,” this citizen thought “Even martial law would be more desirable than the
present disorder and confusion.” In Abbeville, Louis Manigault felt compelled to sell half a
dozen of his finest cows “through fear of their being all stolen some night by our Negroes.”
William Elliott’s sister complained that her slaves pilfered vegetables so often that she had to
lock the produce up in storage rooms. A Spartanburg slave named Benjamin was convicted in
April for stealing clothing and was sentenced to fifty lashes. In another incident, a small white
boy was observed in Camden opening the post office box of the executive council with the key.
After removing the contents the boy took off running and tore up the papers before being caught.
When questioned, he said that the key was given to him by a local slave; the slave was arrested.
Such occurrences prompted the executive council to authorize the creation of rural police units,
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including the “Combahee Rangers.” In the town of Aiken, Henry William Ravenel was glad to
see the council taking action but feared that the refugee slaves “will give trouble next summer.”10
As Hayne grappled with the problems of slave removal and internal security, Military
Department chief James Chesnut set about reorganizing and augmenting South Carolina’s
military force. Putting the state on a solid war footing was the primary reason for creating the
council in the first place and Chesnut wasted no time before taking action. The council’s most
important task was raising troops for the Confederate army. On 2 February President Davis
called on South Carolina to furnish its quota of 18,000 troops for the war. The state had by then
furnished 7,111 men for the war and another 20,251 for shorter periods. To fill the quota Chesnut
determined that five new regiments must be raised, and he urged a “radical and important
change” in the mode of raising troops. On 5 March the council made this change by calling for
5,000 volunteers to come forward at once, with the proviso that if this number was not met by 20
March a state conscription would commence to provide the balance. The council also decreed
that field officers would henceforth be appointed by the council rather than elected by the
volunteers. Meanwhile, Chesnut made a rousing appeal to the twelve-month troops in Virginia,
urging them to reenlist for the war and “Tarnish not the bright crown which now gleams on your
brow, by leaving the field with the enemy in your sight.”11
Chesnut’s appeal was generally heeded by the twelve-month men in Virginia, and the
threat of a draft proved effective in spurring enlistments in most parts of the state. However,
there was considerable difficulty in obtaining volunteers in Charleston, where the adjutant
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general “encountered every species of harassment and delay.” The lack of enthusiasm for
volunteering in Charleston was confirmed by a multitude of private citizens, particularly women.
In early February one indignant woman complained about the large number of men “lounging
about the corners and [the newspaper] bulletin boards” and threatened that if they did not
volunteer “some of them may receive, on Valentine’s Day, a doll baby, or a hoop skirt.” Later
that month “A Warning Voice” appeared in the Mercury urging women to “take the matter in
hand” by turning a cold shoulder to the men on the streets and making them “uncomfortable by
torments of feminine eloquence,” and thus “shame, rebuke, drive [them] into enlistment.” An
angry volunteer demanded that Charlestonians either “be men for once in your lives” or go to the
swamps. Such appeals apparently had some effect. By the end of April the state had not only met
its Confederate quota but exceeded it by four thousand.12
On 16 April, just as Chesnut completed his conscription rolls and the organization of
volunteers, the Confederate Congress passed its first conscription act. The council resented this
infringement on states’ rights but was induced to waive for the present “all objections to the
measure and give it a cheerful and energetic support upon the grounds of imperious public
necessity.” But Chesnut reported that the new law “threw our militia and conscript reserves again
into confusion; in fact, entirely destroyed the latter organization.” The lack of preparation during
the Port Royal fiasco the previous November was, thought Chesnut, “a lesson which we would
be criminal to forget.” Accordingly, while devising a plan that conformed to the Confederate
law, he obtained the council’s approval to create two corps of reserves for state defense: one,
composed of men thirty-five to fifty, would do active duty in the field; the other, comprising men
sixteen to eighteen and fifty to sixty-five, would perform police and patrol duties. When
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Congress passed its second conscription act on 27 September, extending the draft age, the
council had to revise this reserve system and make new arrangements for state defense. Chesnut
performed his duties with considerable energy and skill, handling well the challenges posed by
conforming to Confederate regulations while maintaining adequate forces for state defense. His
efforts did much to remedy the deficiencies that had plagued the state’s military organization in
1861. This was precisely the convention’s intention when it passed the ordinance creating the
council, and Chesnut’s job was made easier by the proviso in the ordinance stating “That no part
of the militia law shall stand in the way” of the council. Unfortunately for Chesnut, some citizens
liable for militia duty had a different view.13
The authority of the council was first tested in March, when Union forces advanced
against Georgetown, in the heart of the leading rice-producing region in the state. The council
considered it essential to defend Georgetown at all costs. In February, after Confederate disasters
in Tennessee and North Carolina, South Carolina was in danger of being cut off from foodstuffs.
Moreover, by early 1862 the price of provisions was rising and there was concern that the state’s
most important food-producing region was vulnerable to attack. Chesnut instructed the
commissary general to purchase three thousand casks of rice and remove them to the interior. A
temporary commission was created to survey the rivers around Georgetown for the purpose of
erecting obstructions. Chesnut appointed Colonel A. M. Manigault to impress slaves and soon
began blocking the mouth of Winyah Bay. Fortifications were erected around the town, and
former governor R. F. W. Allston met with President Davis and succeeded in obtaining several
large pieces of ordnance to be placed there. But just when these defenses were complete, General
John C. Pemberton, the new commanding officer of the Department of South Carolina, having
13
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reconsidered the strategic situation, ordered his forces to abandon the Georgetown forts and
remove the guns to Charleston lest they fall into enemy hands.14
Chesnut believed that the fortifications around Georgetown were more than adequate to
repel any Union attack if manned by state troops. But the executive council protested that the
withdrawal of the heavy guns and Confederate troops would “throw open all that valuable region
to the invasion and ravages of a ruthless enemy.” Lieutenant Governor Harllee was sent to meet
with Pemberton and voice the council’s opposition, but the general refused to rescind the order.
As the Union navy approached, the residents of Georgetown were thrown into a panic.
According to George A. Prentiss, captain of the USS Albatross, the citizens were “very much
frightened, and are leaving their plantations in every direction, driving their slaves before them to
the pine woods.” Frustrated with what appeared to be Pemberton’s disregard for Georgetown’s
safety, the council made a call for five hundred men to be drawn from the fourth division of the
militia and Harllee was appointed to take command. Harllee was ordered to assemble the men
but very few reported for duty. It was at this point, Mary Chesnut noted, that the council’s
authority first came to be questioned and a “Regular rebellion against state authority” first
developed. Harllee soon found himself dealing with persons “charged with disaffection and other
crimes against the State.”15
In his report to the convention James Chesnut explained the problems surrounding the
subsequent loss of Georgetown. Sufficient ordnance was there to defend the place, he said,
despite the removal of the heavy guns; and quartermaster and commissary supplies were also
14
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adequate. Chesnut concluded “with pain” that “Nothing was wanting but men.” There were
plenty of men in the vicinity, but “the spirit was wanting.” Very few of the men subject to militia
duty reported when ordered to assemble and it was necessary for the council to force men into
the ranks. Unfortunately, “Even this was eluded, to a great extent” by men rushing into
Confederate service after Harllee summoned them. Many of the men who were rounded up
refused to obey Harllee’s orders, while other men went into hiding and “stood in open defiance
of the law.” Several turned outlaw and threatened the council with violence while engaging in
robbery around Stone’s Island on the Pee Dee River. Chesnut ordered these bandits to be seized
and jailed and had other absentees summoned for court martial. Regrettably, “the court itself
seemed to have been inadequate to the conception or performance of its duty, and the defaulters
escaped.”16
Chesnut attributed this “unhappy and disgraceful state of affairs” partly to the fact that
the call was made at a busy time for farmers and perhaps to concerns that Georgetown was
unhealthy in early spring. Still, Chesnut believed these objections would have been overcome
had it not been for the influence of some leading men who were “disaffected to the existing
Government of the State” and endeavored “to poison the minds of the people” by spreading the
idea that the executive council, from which the orders emanated, “was unconstitutional––that the
Convention of the people of South Carolina was without lawful existence, and without power.”
Indeed, the disaffected men were “stimulated and supplied with noxious pabulum, through the
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channels of an uninformed press.” Under these influences, the resisters unwittingly became
“coadjutors of Lincoln and all the hosts of abolition myrmidons.”17
The Georgetown affair was a bellwether; there would follow more and more instances
when the council’s legitimacy would be questioned by South Carolinians. The affair also
demonstrated a problem in the relations between the council and Confederate authorities.
Throughout the spring and summer of 1862 the council’s relationship with General Pemberton
was characterized by constant friction and frustration. So too was the relationship between
Pemberton and his subordinate, General Roswell Ripley, who commanded the second military
district of South Carolina. In many instances the council, Pemberton, and Ripley disagreed over
military policy. These disagreements became all the more serious in early spring as the Union
undertook its first and only campaign to capture Charleston by land.18
In early 1862 Yankee forces captured Edisto and Johns Islands, after General Lee
determined them to be untenable and ordered them evacuated. Pemberton followed Lee’s policy
of abandoning the less strategic islands and concentrating Confederate forces near Charleston.
On 27 March, without consulting the executive council, Pemberton ordered General Ripley to
withdraw the batteries on Cole’s Island, which controlled the entrance to the Stono River; this
exposed James Island, directly across the Ashley River from Charleston, to enemy attack. Prior
to Pemberton’s order, the council had expended considerable resources fortifying Cole’s Island.
The council immediately protested the order and telegraphed Lee, now posted in Richmond,
asking that it be countermanded. Lee flatly replied that these matters “can only be decided by the
17
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officer in command of the Department,” but he did suggest to Pemberton that in the future, “in
order to preserve harmony between the State and Confederate authorities,” he should notify the
governor before abandoning any defenses near Charleston. Pemberton’s decision threw
Charlestonians into a panic and he was roundly criticized. Charleston-area planter William John
Grayson concluded that this was “another example of weakness and vacillation in our military
rulers; one erects a fortification at enormous expense and another destroys it. Our waggon has a
team hitched to each end and they draw in opposite directions––what will become of the
waggon?”19
As the Union forces inched closer to Charleston, citizens began packing their belongings
for evacuation. On 1 May the Courier urged that martial law be imposed. The next day Emma
Holmes observed that everybody in Charleston “has a face ‘two miles long.’” Exercising the
powers conferred on it by the convention, the council declared that martial law would be
established in Charleston, and beyond it for ten miles, beginning 5 May. Many Charlestonians
were uncertain whether they should stay or leave. The press repeatedly reminded them that “The
Up-Country towns of our own State are already crowded” and urged those who left to move to
Georgia. The number of interior towns offering assistance to Charlestonians was conspicuously
few. Emma Holmes found her mother “in a most unsettled state” and completely “undecided
whether to go or stay.” John Grimball said there was “great confusion” in the city and estimated
that fifteen thousand persons were in the process of leaving. The uncertainty was not confined to
questions of evacuation. Some citizens were ready to torch the city rather than let it fall to the
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enemy. A Charleston woman declared that she was “willing to lay all in ashes and retire to the
woods, and eat acorns for my daily food, sooner than surrender.” The Mercury summed up the
dilemma: “There is no unwillingness to do: the difficulty is that the citizens do not know what
they should do.” The public confusion and anxiety continued through the first weeks of martial
law. Harriott Middleton, who evacuated on 4 May, told of the “great panic in town” and
lamented that “Charleston was in a very sad state when I left.”20
The council’s proclamation of martial law brought fundamental changes to the lives of
Charlestonians. Squads of the provost marshal’s troops patrolled the city day and night. The
Mercury noted how “The quiet precincts of the City Hall were suddenly converted into a
veritable camp.” In some instances the large influx of military personnel resulted in the
breakdown of decorum. Less than two weeks after martial law went into effect there were reports
that “ladies have been rudely accosted and insulted by soldiers,” and in some cases “outrages of
the most flagrant character have been committed, with perfect impunity.” The authorities were
called on to enforce “sobriety and good behaviour.” Colonel Johnson Hagood was appointed
provost marshal with orders to organize a military police for the specific purpose of closing
down all groggeries. This was easier said than done, however, as the police found out when they
raided a small store on Anson Street near the market and attempted to seize whiskey and other
spirits. As the police entered, they were “resisted in a most determined manner by a female, who
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exercised all her powers to prevent them from examining the premises.” Unable to stop them, the
woman “rushed to the store window, smashed the glass with her hands,” and exited through the
window. She then went to the market “and procured a pistol, with which she returned to protect
her property.” After another struggle, she was finally arrested.21
Martial law subjected Charlestonians to other inconveniences. No one was allowed to
leave the city without a passport issued by the provost marshal. William John Grayson described
how an “immense crowd assembled at the Provost’s office” to obtain passports. Unhappily, the
office was open only between the hours of 11:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m., and “not one in ten was
able to obtain a passport. Requests from the multitude to prolong the time were made in vain;
petitions and complaints were treated with contempt.” Martial law had accomplished nothing,
Grayson insisted, “except to annoy the citizens.” The Courier denounced the “unreasonable and
tyrannical” passport decree and demanded that it be revoked. Similar complaints followed. The
passport office eventually extended its hours, and permitted women and children to leave the city
within seven days without a passport. Nevertheless, complaints about the passport system
continued well into the summer. Chaplain W. W. Gwin was horrified when he discovered large
numbers of sick soldiers forced to “lie about on boats or wharves like dogs all night” simply “to
get passports to go to the hospitals at Columbia.”22
The enlarged military presence and the passport system exasperated Charlestonians, but
these problems paled in comparison to those that plagued the planters throughout the state. The
defense of Charleston was essential, but as the Courier observed, “In order to accomplish this
Herculean effort, Herculean labor is requisite.” The effort to obtain sufficient slave labor for the
coast burdened the executive council and provoked much of the increasing opposition to its
21
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authority. With Union forces threatening Charleston in early spring the need for labor became
urgent. Before the legislature adjourned in December 1861 it foresaw the probable necessity of
impressing slaves for erecting defensive works. However, it did not foresee the magnitude of the
need. Instead of devising a comprehensive plan to acquire labor, the legislature merely passed
two vague resolutions authorizing the governor to act in concert with the Confederate
commander to employ slaves by arrangement with their masters or by impressment. The
legislature also appropriated $20,000 to provision and house the laborers. Chesnut called the
passage of the resolutions “a grave error,” for they “suggested no plan” and had “no authority for
[their] promulgation.” No attempt at equalizing the burden of impressment on the planters was
made and the legislature failed to define what regions of the state were responsible for supplying
the labor. Even worse, said Chesnut, the legislature did not anticipate “that a large and
continuous supply of this kind of labor would be demanded for months.” The Confederate
authorities were to blame, too, he insisted, for failing to implement their plans for obtaining labor
and provide the state authorities with a timely estimate of the labor requirements.23
When the council first addressed the issue of procuring slave labor “Complaints were
already loud and frequent.” Its initial efforts were directed at limiting the act passed by the
legislature. On 6 February the council ordered the chief of Justice and Police to report “on the
propriety of rescinding, suspending or modifying any act or resolution of the General Assembly
of this State” to impress slaves for erecting coastal fortifications. The executive council clearly
would not hesitate to amend laws––in ordinary times, a legislative prerogative. In early March
the council asked General Ripley to confine impressment to slaves in the vicinity of Charleston
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or other areas where labor had already been disturbed by the enemy. Ripley objected, telling
Hayne that he wanted five hundred hands immediately but “under [the] present arrangements [I]
cannot get them.” Later that month after “The Confederate Generals loudly complained,” the
council decided on a scheme to hire labor from seaboard planters at a rate of ten dollars per hand
per month. To assuage planters’ concerns over the possible loss of their property the council also
guaranteed compensation in case of a slave’s accidental death or injury. But this plan fell short of
achieving the objective.24
Hayne was informed by an impressment agent on 12 April that “the expectation of hiring
labor has failed.” The problem was not the meager monthly rate: one agent appointed by the
council had tried to obtain labor in Barnwell District at twenty dollars per month but had
likewise failed. The problem was the council’s reluctance to extend the labor requisitions outside
the coastal districts. The Confederate authorities insisted that the council draw labor from the
interior districts also, “otherwise they cannot go on.” The council stood firm, however. It was
only after Union forces landed on James Island and the council was showered with complaints
from the Confederate authorities that it finally yielded, reluctantly agreeing to extend labor
requisitions to the interior districts below the fall line.25
This concession did result in more laborers being sent to the coast. The council appointed
Professor Francis S. Holmes of the Charleston College to oversee impressment. He was
authorized to impress slaves in the districts of Georgetown, Clarendon, and Orangeburg for one
month; planters were ordered to provide up to one half of their slaves liable to road duty. It soon
became apparent, however, that the burden was not fairly distributed. Chief of Justice and Police
Hayne prepared a circular on 20 June admitting that serious complaint “has arisen from the
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inequality of the operation.” While some planters complied promptly, others dragged their feet or
altogether evaded requisitions. This became “the cause of dissatisfaction and just complaint.”
Hayne, “with extreme reluctance,” threatened to use the military if necessary to enforce
impressment.26
Resistance continued, however. One week after the circular was issued, a seething
memorial signed by twenty-three leading planters from Clarendon District, including former
governors John P. Richardson and John L. Manning, appeared in the Southern Guardian. The
writers protested that the requisitions were now “very useless” because Confederate defensive
positions had changed drastically after the Battle of Secessionville (16 June). Moreover, to
remove large numbers of male field hands at this critical time would essentially mean
abandoning their whole crop. Moreover, the planters insisted, the Clarendon slaves “are entire
strangers” to the coastal climate and would likely contract malaria. Worse still, the proximity to
the enemy and to “the renegade negroes” who were escaping to the Union would corrupt their
slaves, heretofore free from such harmful influences, and thus spread black disaffection to the
interior.27
The chief complaint of the Clarendon planters was that “The system of impressment
contemplated is unjust and unequal.” They demanded that “all the slaves of the several districts
of the upper country, as well as of the middle, should be brought into service” without
discrimination. They furthermore criticized the appointment of Holmes as director of
impressment, pointing out that he was a private citizen, a mere “Professor in a College,” not a
public officer. Although a man of science and virtue, he “knows nothing of the wants nor
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interests of the Planters of Clarendon.” Finally, the memorialists protested “with astonishment
and dismay” Hayne’s threat to use military force to compel compliance. “We live in a State that
once boasted of its constitution and laws,” the planters thundered. If the council insisted on thus
enforcing a policy detrimental to the agricultural interests of the state and “wholly subversive of
all individual right and personal security,” citizens ought to “be prepared to defend their wives
and their children” from the “unbridled license of an unrestrained soldiery” marching on orders
from the council to subjugate its own people.28
The “Clarendon Manifesto,” as Mary Chesnut called it, was “in everybody’s mouth” after
it was published. She regarded it skeptically, chiding the planters who talked of patriotism and
sacrifice but when the council called for their “sacred property in the shape of negroes for coast
defenses––a howl.” The memorial and the responses to it damaged the already fragile
relationship between the planters and the council. Professor Holmes published a sharp rebuke to
the memorial, carefully refuting the planters’ objections and arraigning them for lack of
patriotism. These men, he wrote, “some of them the wealthiest cotton planters in the State,”
exaggerated the burdens to which they were subjected; many planters in other districts below the
fall line contributed a number of laborers “two or three times [larger] without a murmur.” It is
true, Holmes admitted, that their slaves would be laboring in an unhealthy climate. But, he asked,
“are the lives of the Clarendon negroes more precious than those of white husbands, brothers and
sons [serving on the coast], equally unacclimated”? Holmes explained that the council
“pertinaciously adhered” to the policy of impressing labor exclusively from the coastal districts
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until General Ripley said it was impossible to get enough there. General Pemberton was saying
the same thing now and “So says every agent who has been charged with the business of
collecting negroes.” As to the planters’ concerns that their slaves would be subjected to evil
influences, this too was a valid point. Yet, “if the labor is necessary, it is a patriotic duty to run
the risk.” It is universally admitted, said Holmes, that camp life subjects young white men to
demoralization, but “when the country calls we send our sons and younger brothers.” Finally,
“As to inequality,” if the Clarendon planters thought themselves unfairly burdened, “they forget
history and close their eyes to the present.” The displaced planters on the coast “have already
borne burthens and made sacrifices far, very far, greater than those of the Clarendon
memorialists.”29
The council members disagreed with the memorialists but could not ignore their
complaints. Similar objections continued to be voiced in July, particularly over the irregular
manner in which the calls for labor were made and over the inequality of the requisitions. These
concerns forced the council on 14 July to begin devising “a general scheme for procuring labor.”
Oversight of the slave labor program was transferred from Hayne to Military Department chief
Chesnut. On 28 July Chesnut presented a new plan to the council for approval. The subject of
impressing slave labor, he confessed, “is a difficult one.” Unfortunately, any scheme that would
attain the objective and “at the same time be equal and efficient, is almost impracticable.” The
impressment program must be efficient above all other concerns “and approach equality as near
as we can.” Chesnut’s plan called for state-wide impressment, including the twenty-two districts
where requisitions had not yet been made. The state was divided into four divisions, with each
division required to furnish one-third of all hands liable to road duty. The plan was intended to
supply about three thousand hands per month for four months. It was, Chesnut said, “as equal as
29
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I can make it” and “more efficient than any other scheme I can devise.” With the exception of
Lieutenant Governor Harllee, who was absent from the meeting at which the plan was
considered and who filed a sharp dissent on his return, the council approved of the new plan.30
It was one thing for the council to agree on a new plan but quite another to get the
planters to go along with it. The council continued to receive communications from planters
objecting to slave impressment. In fact, the new plan seemed only to aggravate the situation.
Less than a month after Chesnut implemented his scheme, the road commissioners for Abbeville
District assembled for the purpose of complying with the council’s orders. Before doing so,
however, they submitted a memorial to the council declaring that “there will be great difficulty in
the execution” of the plan and “humbly but anxiously” prayed for some modification. Their
objections were similar to those of the Clarendon planters. The most pressing concern was that
“the time for fodder-pulling is at hand” and many white farm hands were absent from the district.
The memorialists suggested that the council delay the call for labor until November or December
and that planters be given the opportunity to pay a commutation fee “in place of the actual
contribution of the labor.” Many citizens in Abbeville would “cheerfully” pay a sum sufficient to
hire substitute laborers in lieu of sending their own slaves.31
Chesnut promptly responded to the Abbeville memorialists. The subject of procuring
slave labor, he conceded, “has been from the beginning vexatious alike to the citizens and the
government.” Building fortifications on the coast had proved to be a monumental challenge
30
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unanticipated by Confederate and state authorities. But South Carolinians were at war and “The
world is disturbed around us––we participate in the disturbance––and we must make up our
minds to bear it.” The council members certainly understood the memorialists’ concerns,
Chesnut continued, “being like yourselves slave owners and planters,” but if slave masters
insisted on putting their own interests before those of the state, Charleston would fall to the
enemy, and then the memorialists could expect at their doorstep “an infernal war––one as
relentless and shocking as ever disgraced the character of man.” The request to postpone the call
for labor until November or December could not be granted because the Yankees might attack at
any moment. As to the health of slaves, “Many a noble fellow, without a negro in the world––
rich only in patriotism and character” had left his family behind and made the ultimate sacrifice
on the battlefield. Regarding the suggestion that the council allow the planters to pay a
commutation fee instead of sending labor, Chesnut retorted that “Labor is the thing wanted” and
if it were possible to procure it by money then “no measure of the kind under discussion would
have been resorted to.”32
The council’s efforts to procure an adequate labor supply were unsuccessful. On 29
August General Pemberton telegraphed the council stating that no work could be done on the
fortifications for want of labor. Two days later he warned the council that “If Charleston is to be
defended the supply of labor must be sent at once and kept constantly filled.” The council replied
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that Professor Holmes was busy forwarding all the laborers that he could get transportation for
and they would arrive shortly. Not satisfied, Pemberton again wired the council on 2 September,
protesting that “It is useless to say that the whole State is placed at the disposal of Prof. Holmes
unless you compel the labor at once. One thousand negroes today will be worth 50,000 next
month.” Right now, he said, “I have scarcely 300 negroes.”33
Exasperated by Pemberton’s “incessant and urgent demands,” the council instructed
Holmes to call out the third division of road hands four weeks earlier than scheduled but
informed Pemberton that it was “unable to expedite the supply of negro labor beyond the present
arrangements.” Meanwhile, planters in Newberry District complained to the council that the
slaves they sent to the coast had been retained beyond their four-week term of service. Moreover,
as anticipated by the Clarendon and Abbeville memorialists, the statewide impressment system
did indeed create disorder on some plantations. On 16 September the council received a
memorial from citizens in Chesterfield stating that “indications of insubordination of a serious
and threatening character had been discovered among the slaves” in their district and asking the
council to furnish them with powder, shot, and other means of defense. Ten days later the
council was presented with another memorial, this one from Darlington, requesting, “in view of
the popular apprehension of a servile insurrection” there, that the council send several companies
of reserves to the district for “service as a patrol and police force.”34
As September came to a close planters were more reluctant than ever to send their labor
to the coast. It did not help matters that the reported “insurrections” were occurring around the
same time that President Lincoln issued his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. The press
initially welcomed the proclamation, arguing that the measure would unite the white South,
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while its “effect upon our servile population will be null”; but within weeks that attitude
changed, and soon Governor Pickens was calling on “every man [to] sleep by his armor.” By the
end of October some planters were refusing to comply with labor requisitions despite the urgent
appeals. Colonel C. J. Colcock, commanding the post of Grahamville, reported that planters
“have refused to send their hands” to work on the fortifications at Coosawatchie, a point critical
for the protection of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad, and he asked the council for
authority to use military force to compel compliance. By now exhausted from dealing with the
labor problem, the council simply replied that if the Confederate authorities “deem the
employment of such negro labor necessary to the public defense,” Colcock should go ahead and
use military force. Thus, after repeated attempts to devise a system that would appease the
planters and secure their cooperation, the council found that the desired end could be achieved
only by the use of force. By the end of the year the council had expended considerable resources
to procure labor for the Charleston fortifications but had little to show for its efforts.35
The efficacy of the executive council should not, however, be judged solely on the issue
of mustering slave labor. There were other matters equally important to the war effort in which
the council enjoyed much success. When the convention created the council it ordered it “to
make, procure or employ arms, munitions of war, and whatever else may be required for the
defence of the State.” Aside from raising troops, the production of war material was the most
pressing task facing the councilmen. Although a few steps had been taken in 1861 to augment
South Carolina’s meager industry, much remained to be done when the council assumed power.
Throughout 1862 the state would undergo a revolutionary experience as the council developed
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domestic resources to sustain the war effort. As a result, the state was in a far better position to
wage war at the end of 1862 than when the council had assumed control in January.36
When Military Department chief Chesnut took charge in early January he found the
Ordnance Bureau in a “deplorable” condition, its “efficiency much injured” by mismanagement
in 1861. In December 1861 there were hundreds of South Carolina soldiers in camp, “and some
in front of the enemy, without arms of any kind.” Moreover, much of the state’s ordnance had
been shipped away to aid the Confederate army. When the army refused to return it, claiming
that it was now Confederate property to be accounted for in a future settlement, Chesnut vowed
“that we shall never again strip the State of the means of self-defence.” On 9 January, he
published a call for the collection and return of all arms belonging to the state. He then appointed
Captain T. W. Radcliffe as general agent to scour the countryside and purchase weapons in
private hands. Furthermore, many small arms and other war materiel were donated by citizens
and church bells were donated by congregations to be melted down for cannon. The thousands of
weapons collected were placed in the state arsenal in Columbia. Chesnut obtained the council’s
approval to appropriate the workshops on the statehouse grounds (then being used to construct a
new state capitol), and he appointed David Lopez superintendent for the manufacture and repair
of small arms. A considerable number of old flintlocks were converted to percussion and
bayonets were altered to fit the new designs. Despite issuing nearly 7,400 rifles and smoothbores
to South Carolina soldiers in early 1862, the state still had on hand another 7,700 in September,
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triple the number it had on 1 January. On 24 March, the council created the Construction and
Manufacture Department under the control of William H. Gist.37
Gist’s most important task was to establish an armory for casting cannon, constructing
gun carriages, and manufacturing small arms. He sent an agent to Richmond to confer with an
armorer at the Tredegar Iron Works. Pig iron from York District was tested at Tredegar and
determined to be suitable for casting cannon. Gist selected the town of Greenville as the site of
the new “State Works.” Heavy machinery was removed from Charleston to Greenville. More
machinery was purchased from the state of Tennessee after Nashville was abandoned to the
enemy and the contents of its armory were carted away by the retreating Confederates. In just
five months Gist’s department spent over $95,000. By 15 August construction of the Greenville
facility was complete and 143 workers were employed. Gist reported that they would be ready to
cast shot and shell by 1 October and cannon soon after.38
Constructing a state armory in such a short time was quite an accomplishment, but the
arms it manufactured would be of no use without sufficient quantities of gunpowder and lead. A
large amount of lead was purchased from various sources under the council’s authorization, and
Chesnut endeavored to obtain more from the Confederate War Department. He also employed
Dr. John LeConte, a physician and scientist, to examine the lead mines in South Carolina.
LeConte subsequently reported that one near Spartanburg was rich in ore and easily worked.
Arrangements were made with the proprietor to place that mine in the hands of the state and by
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the end of August 21,000 pounds of lead had been procured. The existing iron works in
Spartanburg were also appropriated by the council, for casting cannon.39
A far more ambitious program that the council instituted was the manufacture of
gunpowder. In 1861 the supply on hand in South Carolina was, in Chesnut’s words, “totally
inadequate,” and the state lacked the ability to manufacture more. The chief ingredient of
gunpowder, potassium nitrate (also called niter or saltpeter), was not found naturally in the state.
Although there were some saltpeter caves in Tennessee and Alabama, their potential yield was
far short of South Carolina’s necessities. Chesnut determined that there was only one way to get
sufficient saltpeter “and that was to produce it ourselves.” On 14 February he received the
council’s approval to begin advertising for contracts for the manufacture of saltpeter and also
sulphur. He had a Charleston chemist prepare a paper for publication explaining the process of
saltpeter production and issued a circular calling on all willing citizens to produce it for the state.
“With the application of a little energy and intelligence,” he said, South Carolina could be freed
from depending on the Confederacy for powder. After waiting a month and receiving no
response from the public, Chesnut set about producing saltpeter under the direction of his
department.40
By the end of March the council had leased five acres of land in Columbia to establish a
saltpeter plantation. Chesnut named Dr. W. Hutson Ford to superintend it. With assistance from
some professors of the South Carolina College, including John LeConte, Ford had a large
number of saltpeter beds established by the end of August. He estimated that within eight to
twelve months the plantation would be producing about a thousand pounds of saltpeter daily, or
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enough to make thirteen hundred pounds of powder. The Courier applauded the operation, which
was “being conducted on the most extensive scale known in the Confederacy.” Chesnut, too, was
pleased with it; he believed it to be “the first ever established on this continent.”41
The exertions of the council to increase the production of war materiel using domestic
resources unquestionably did much to place the state on a sounder war footing. But the council
did not rely on domestic resources alone. On 1 March Governor Pickens received permission
from the council to cooperate with the governor of Louisiana to obtain arms from the West
Indies. The council advanced $100,000 for this purpose and arms were brought in through the
naval blockade. Pickens was then instructed to work with other Confederate governors to
increase the importation of arms. On 11 March, at Chesnut’s urging, the council began to look
overseas for supplies, advancing $50,000 to Benjamin F. Evans with instructions “to purchase in
Europe the best rifles or muskets, and suitable bayonets.” Over 2,500 Enfield rifles were
eventually obtained from England. Another $10,000 was given to Evans to purchase medical
supplies, especially quinine. Although some of these supplies were thrown overboard while
running the blockade, Chesnut reported at the end of August that “nearly all have safely reached
us.”42
Blockade running was potentially very profitable. In March 1862 several wealthy
Charleston businessmen began organizing joint-stock companies to purchase vessels and run the
blockade. Although the risk was substantial and vessels were frequently lost, the stockholders
apparently lost no money on their investments. The South Carolina Importing and Exporting
Company, for example, paid dividends of $850 per share on 20 June. A month later, it paid
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another dividend, of $1,735 per share. Word of these profits spread throughout the community.
Susan Middleton heard rumors that “some people are making money without end.” The council,
aware of the enormous profits being made by some parties who “certainly have not brought back
return cargoes of arms, munitions or army supplies,” resolved to prohibit the exportation of
cotton and other items without council permission. It appointed an agent in Charleston to
authorize private vessels to export cotton under certain conditions. Those who wished to do so
had to obtain a license, attest that none of the cotton would find its way to the enemy, and give
bond with good surety that the full amount of the net proceeds would be brought back into the
state in arms, ammunition, or other army supplies.43
This policy of granting licenses to export cotton was working well and greatly benefiting
the state when the council received a sharp rebuke from the Confederate government. On 21
April the Confederate secretary of the Treasury, Christopher G. Memminger, wrote to the
council objecting to its policy and requesting that it “suspend any further action” on exporting
cotton until the Confederate Congress declared its policy on the subject. The council took
offense at this rebuke. Hayne wrote back to Memminger, arguing that the council was only
attempting “to carry out a settled policy sanctioned by nine-tenths of the people of the
Confederate States.” He agreed with the general principle that cotton should not be exported for
profit, but in this case the state’s “necessities were such as to make the importation of arms,
munitions, and army supplies” absolutely necessary, and “such importation more than
counterbalanced the evil of a limited exportation of cotton.” Hayne reminded Memminger that
the executive council was charged “with high powers for protecting the public safety” and that
the convention expected the council to exercise its “absolute right to appropriate all private
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property to public uses.” Indeed, the council was “incline[d] to think that any interference with
the exercise of this right by the Confederate Government, would be usurpation on their part.”
When Memminger again insisted that the council cease granting licenses to export cotton, the
council reluctantly agreed to do so, but not before Hayne reaffirmed his position that “The right
to enforce, in the way we propose, is, in my judgment, clearly in the State, and as clearly
delegated by the State to the Governor and Council.”44
There was tension between the two governments on other issues too, particularly
exemptions. Chesnut admitted that this “was a source of some embarrassment.” A sharp
controversy commenced in April when General Pemberton decided to abandon the fortifications
around Georgetown. At the same time, Congress passed its first conscription act. Thus, all the
troops that the council had organized for the defense of Georgetown were “at the very moment of
need, swept from us” by the Confederacy. This sparked a panic in the region, especially among
the civilians. It did not help matters that the conscription act provided no exemption for
overseers. Citizens were calling on the council to exempt overseers in order “to guard and secure
as much as possible our negros.” In late June the council ordered Chesnut to urge on President
Davis “the absolute necessity of exempting overseers” from Confederate conscription for the
remainder of 1862. Chesnut traveled to Richmond and conferred with Secretary of War George
W. Randolph, arguing that overseers be exempted because police powers were within the
jurisdiction of the states. Unfortunately, “The reply of the Secretary was not satisfactory.”
Undeterred, the council reaffirmed its right to exempt overseers, resolving that “State authority
shall be interposed to prevent” overseers from being drafted, and instructing the adjutant general
to order “all citizens of this State so exempted not to report to the enrolling officers of the

44

Charleston Mercury, 23 April 1862; Charleston Daily Courier, 23 April 1862; Camden Confederate, 11 April
1862; Convention Journal, 670-73.

156

Confederate Government.” The council made it clear, despite Confederate objections, that all
exemptions mandated by the convention and council “are valid in law and that they will insist
upon the same.”45
The executive council also exempted many other civilians, especially men engaged in
war-related work. Initially the council confined exemptions to workers in factories producing
cotton cloth. Soon, however, it extended exemptions to all “employees of factories, foundries,
and other establishments, engaged in such manufactures as are essential to the public service.”
The council also gave various industries direct aid, particularly railroads. On 1 March it loaned
$25,000 to the Charleston and Savannah Railroad Company to purchase additional cars and
switches to expedite the removal of slaves and non-combatants from the lowcountry, justifying it
as “a military necessity.” Less than a week later the council agreed to pay that same company
one half of the expense for placing guards at various bridges, and soon after loaned it another
$25,000 for strengthening the Ashley River bridge. In these and other ways, the council tried to
make the railroads more efficient for both the civil and military authorities, and the railroads
generally cooperated with the council. The Union and Charlotte, for example, agreed to transport
produce without charge for the Charleston Free Market. Thus the council served as a useful
intermediary between the sometimes conflicting private and public interests.46
Relations between the state and Confederate authorities were not always strained. Indeed,
the state greatly assisted the Confederacy in numerous ways. For one thing, the convention
appropriated $300,000 for harbor and coast defenses. Moreover, it instructed the council to
appoint a commission to cooperate with the Confederate navy on the construction of a marine
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battery and war vessels. At first Chesnut thought it unnecessary to use the funds and
“impracticable to obtain workmen and material,” but when the Union began to threaten
Charleston in early spring he changed his mind. The commission commenced its work on 8 April
and worked closely with a Confederate Navy Department official. Iron plates were sent to
Charleston and Secretary of the Navy Stephen R. Mallory cooperated with the council to procure
skilled workers. In just four months the gunboat Chicora was completed; Chesnut was pleased to
report on 23 August that it “now rides beautifully on the waters.” The vessel was transferred to
the Confederate navy and the state was reimbursed for the entire cost. Two more gunboats were
soon under construction. As the success of this project shows, the council was a great asset to the
Confederate war effort.47
Although the council was primarily charged with overseeing security and military
matters, it also took some steps to relieve suffering among civilians. As Isaac Hayne stated to
Memminger in his defense of exporting cotton, the council was charged not only with protecting
the public but also with “promoting the public welfare.” Shortages of the necessaries of life were
a persistent problem, especially the salt shortage. Salt was a prime necessity for the preservation
of meat and for other uses. The shortage of salt and its rising price deeply troubled the council.
The price skyrocketed in early 1862. In May, Lieutenant Governor Harllee was informed that salt
was selling in Charleston for forty to fifty dollars per sack. The Charleston provost marshal
declared that month that all owners of salt wishing to sell to the public must report how much
they had on hand and ordered that no salt be allowed to leave the city, under penalty of
forfeiture. On 27 May, at a public meeting in Lexington District, citizens passed resolutions
calling on the council to erect a salt works nearby and to supply the poor with salt. A week later
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a similar meeting was held in York District. The people of Lancaster District were also in need
of salt and “in a state of anxious inquiry how they shall be supplied.”48
The executive council energetically addressed the salt issue and by the end of May had
developed a plan to push forward the manufacture of salt. It offered generous contracts to private
parties who would engage in manufacturing salt and advanced them up to $5,000 apiece
provided they repay the loan in salt at three dollars per bushel by 1 October. Again the council
recruited Professor John LeConte, who prepared a pamphlet explaining five different methods
for making salt from seawater. Subsequently the state’s supply of salt increased dramatically. In
the middle of July the Mercury reported that there were twelve boiling establishments in
Charleston alone, yielding some thirty thousand bushels per year. In October Henry William
Ravenel observed that “Vast numbers of people are encamped along our sea coast, boiling salt”;
but still, he noted, “the supply is not equal to the demand.” Nor did the increase of salt
production seem to reduce prices. The editor of the Yorkville Enquirer grumbled that “The
increase of salt-works around us, seems to have the effect of raising the price of this necessary
article.” The price in York District was “fabulous, and must soon call for the interference of
government.” Naturally “extortionists” and “speculators” were singled out for blame. The
council resolved to punish the “unrighteous and unconscientious extortion on the part of
speculators” and referred the issue to a committee that was to consider imposing a schedule of
prices for salt and other provisions. It also instructed Governor Pickens to consult the governors
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of North Carolina and Georgia to learn what they had done about rising commodity prices. When
Pickens learned that neither state had enacted any price-fixing schemes, the council abandoned
the idea. Despite strenuous efforts to reduce prices, there was little that the council could do to
fix the problem. As one Charleston merchant pointed out, “Scarcity is upon us, and with scarcity
you can no more have moderate prices than you can have summer and winter at the same
time.”49
One commodity not in short supply was liquor. The executive council received numerous
requests from citizens to take action against persons distilling liquor from cereal grains. The
council responded, passing stringent regulations in regard to liquor production and sale.
Evidence for the need of such measures was abundant in early 1862. As one South Carolina
soldier encamped near Charleston noted, men in his company often “got tight” after acquiring
liquor. A group of Charleston ladies was “mortified to see so many intoxicated soldiers
staggering through the streets” and called on the authorities to address the issue. The problem
was not confined to Charleston. Indeed, “The distilleries have sprung up like magic all over the
country,” one citizen complained, and were “exciting alarm and indignation.” Over the last three
months he had “witnessed more drunkenness than I have ever seen altogether before,” most of it
among men in uniform. “[L]et any one visit our cities and see the number of intoxicated
soldiers,” said a Columbia resident, and they would immediately recognize “the necessity for
stringent legislation.” Complaints were voiced that distilleries were causing the price of grain to
surge. It was estimated that there were 250 distilleries in Anderson and Pickens Districts alone,
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consuming 12,500 bushels of corn weekly. The question, Governor Pickens declared, “is simply
whether we are to keep bread for soldiers’ families or allow it to be manufactured into poison.”50
Chief of Justice and Police Isaac Hayne was tasked with suppressing illegal distilleries
and imposing controls on the manufacture and sale of alcohol. On 7 February he authorized the
Confederate authorities in Charleston to act in concert with the mayor to close down all grog
shops and prohibit the sale of spirits in the vicinity of fortifications. The order closing down
barrooms was soon extended to Columbia and the council received petitions from citizens in
smaller towns pleading that it be extended to their districts. One citizen in York District begged
the council to close down all barrooms in the state for the duration of the war. In times like these,
he thundered, “Democratic measures must be postponed, and revolutionary and radical ones
practiced.” By 20 February the council had decided on a firm plan. It announced that after 10
March, for the duration of the war, the unlicensed distilling of grain in any part of the state would
be prohibited. A license could be obtained provided the distiller gave bond that the alcohol
would not be sold to any person other than a state agent authorized by the council. A fine of
$10,000, and up to a year in jail, were the penalties for violating this regulation. Hayne closely
monitored the railroads and prohibited the transportation of alcohol without the council’s
permission. All establishments within three hundred yards of a railroad station were prohibited
from selling liquor. In May, when Charleston was under martial law, the council decreed that all
railroad conductors would be appointed “special agents” of the Justice and Police department to
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enforce the regulations. The council also worked closely with General Pemberton to prevent
drunkenness on the part of troops.51
The effectiveness of these measures is debatable. They were difficult to enforce and, as
one Charlestonian opined, “Putting down distilleries can only be done at the point of a bayonet.”
In September Hayne reported several violations of the distilling law in the upcountry. Special
agents were sent to Pickens and Union Districts, but only eight arrests were made and the
accused were released after giving bond that they would not further violate the council’s orders.
The agents seized the stills and sent them to the cannon foundry in Spartanburg. Hayne stated
that drunkenness on railroad cars “has, to a great extent, disappeared, and public bar-rooms at the
termini of railroads and at railroad stations, have been effectually suppressed.” On the other
hand, there were indications that the liquor regulations were not rigidly enforced. One irate
citizen in Charleston wished to know if the council’s order closing saloons applied to the “back
doors of groggeries as well as the front ones?” He had repeatedly seen soldiers entering the back
doors of establishments purporting to be dry-goods stores when in fact they were barrooms. “Are
the police really possessed of so little vigilance,” he wondered, “or are such proceedings winked
at?” From the number of groggeries operating in the city, it was obvious to him that the council’s
attempt to suppress the sale of liquor “has proven to be a most signal failure.”52
As 1862 came to a close the executive council could look back on the past year and see a
mixed record of success and failure. There is no doubt that the tireless exertions of the council,
particularly those of James Chesnut, were responsible for putting South Carolina in a stronger
position to wage a protracted war. Yet in order to achieve this, the council had had to exercise
51

Cauthen, Executive Council Journals, 88, 97, 104-105, 134-35, 176, 179, 181, 283-84; Charleston Mercury, 22,
24 February, 4, 14 March, 12 May 1862; Charleston Daily Courier, 22 February, 14, 22 March 1862; Camden
Confederate, 21 March 1862; Yorkville Enquirer, 6 March 1862.
52
Woodward, Mary Chesnut’s Civil War, 307; Convention Journal, 675-76; Charleston Daily Courier, 22 April
1862.

162

the extraordinary powers conferred on it by the convention. In the process the council ran
roughshod over the state’s long tradition of curtailing executive power. The existence of an
extralegal body that could exercise executive, legislative, and judicial power simultaneously was
constitutionally dubious. Although the council ultimately achieved its objective and put the state
on a sounder war footing, the mere existence of the council sparked a firestorm of protest.53
“[T]he Convention created this imbecile and vacillating Directory,” wrote one enraged
citizen in August, “without the knowledge or the least anticipation of it, on the part of the voters
who created [the convention].” He urged his fellow citizens to vote only for politicians who
“would pledge to relieve them from the grievance of the Executive Council by the impeachment
of that anomalous Dictatorship at the next session of the Legislature.” Former governor John P.
Richardson agreed, believing that the council was “placed too high on the dizzy pinnacle of
power,” and he doubted that “Robespierre, Danton, or even Napoleon ever exercised more
supreme authority.” Others, however, disagreed, seeing the council as “a vast improvement upon
the then Executive Department.” It would be far better to retain the council “than to lapse into
the old inefficient regime.” South Carolina’s voters and politicians consequently became
embroiled in a lengthy and bitter dispute over the powers of the convention and the legitimacy of
the council. This controversy created the sort of internal conflict in 1862 that politicians had
wanted to avoid when they voted unanimously for secession. But as Governor Pickens declared,
the convention’s “direct violation of all the constitutional attributes” of the regular government
made that conflict unavoidable.54
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Chapter Five
“An Outburst of Furor”:
Discord, Controversy, and Ideological Opposition to the Council and Convention
On 11 January 1862, four days after the convention created the executive council, Mary
Chesnut observed that anti-council sentiment was already on the rise. She likened these early
expressions of opposition to “The beginning of the Bastille and the guillotine.” Over the next
twelve months indignant citizens called for the abolition of the council. By early spring, as
Chesnut remarked, there were plenty of men “ready to cut the council’s throats.” The editor of
the Carolina Spartan urged that the convention reconvene and then “commit suicide,” which
would automatically kill off the council, too, for it was but the creature of the convention. “One
thing is certain,” he declared, “a fever is spreading in the public mind,” and unless the
convention dissolved itself and abolished the council, there would come “an outburst of furor
such as has never been witnessed in these fair lands.”1
From the day of its creation the executive council was plagued not only by external
opposition but by internal discord. The relationship among the five councilmen was tempestuous
at best. Governor Francis Pickens was primarily a man of ideas rather than action. His
personality was basically conservative, yet his temperament often led to rash actions. He also had
an excessive concern for how posterity would judge him and an inflated sense of honor. Pickens
deeply resented the creation of the council, which essentially stripped him of traditional
gubernatorial powers. He would probably have accepted some restrictions of his powers, but the
council could conduct the full functions of the executive branch even in his absence. The
governor had grave doubts about the council’s legitimacy. By late summer he was often absent
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from the council meetings. But the discord between him and the other councilmen began early.
By mid-February Mary Chesnut was certain that “there will be no concord among them.”2
The first meeting of the council was on 9 January. It was clear at the outset that Military
Department chief James Chesnut and Justice and Police Department chief Isaac Hayne would
work together and control the council. Lieutenant Governor William Harllee, who had opposed
the creation of the council, often voted with William Gist in opposition to Chesnut and Hayne,
while Pickens was frequently caught in the middle. Despite Pickens’s pledge to “cheerfully”
execute the convention ordinance “to the letter,” his disinclination to cooperate with his peers
was apparent. Chesnut and Pickens often disagreed over military policy. In late February, when
Pickens insisted on proclaiming martial law below the Charleston and Savannah Railroad near
the coast, Chesnut sent him a fiery telegram reminding him that the decision was not his to make
and advising him to “Be patient that we may not have to undo to-morrow what is done today.”
On another occasion, when the council was desperately trying to obtain slave labor for the
coastal fortifications, Pickens was censured for being absent from the meeting. The councilmen
present unanimously resolved that in the future “it would be more satisfactory in this emergency
that the Council should act in conjunction with the Governor.”3
The most serious conflict inside the council, however, was between Hayne and Pickens.
The origin of their mutual enmity is uncertain, but it may have been sparked by a relatively
minor issue. On 9 April, at Hayne’s urging, the council resolved to dismiss its secretary, Franklin
J. Moses, for unsatisfactory performance of his duties. In addition to serving as the council’s
secretary, Moses was Pickens’s personal secretary. The council appointed Benjamin F. Arthur in
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his place. All the council members present voted for the replacement except Pickens. The
governor blamed Hayne for the dismissal, although it is likely that Chesnut was chiefly
responsible. Mary Chesnut noted on 29 January that her husband “says [Moses] is a liar, a sneak,
has no moral sense,” and a few months later added that “His hatred and contempt for Little
Moses amounts to a craze.”4
This minor issue found its way into the press. Richard Yeadon, editor of the Charleston
Daily Courier, jumped at the chance to attack the council for abusing its power. The dismissal of
Moses, he wrote, was “no mere matter of form, but . . . of substance.” That officer was not
removable by a vote of the council, said Yeadon, because the convention ordinance explicitly
stated that the private secretary of the governor was also to serve as the council’s secretary,
without additional pay. But the council “has not hesitated, for some purpose undoubtedly illegal,
to dismiss the officer.” Yeadon suspected that the council was attempting to shield its
proceedings from scrutiny by appointing its own secretary. This early episode of discord within
the council was only the beginning. By the late summer a veritable feud had developed between
Hayne and Pickens.5
A far more serious rupture became public on 1 August, when the Charleston press
published the leaked private correspondence between Hayne and Pickens. The letters were filled
with invective and put to rest any doubt that there was bitter discord inside the council chamber.
The quarrel began in June, when Union forces landed on James Island and threatened to advance
on Charleston. At that time the council was frustrated with General Pemberton and was trying in
vain to get him replaced. The council expressed dissatisfaction with the condition of Charleston’s
defenses and prepared a resolution to send Chesnut to Richmond to meet with President Davis
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about the matter. But before it could be voted on, Hayne learned that Pickens had already been in
contact with Davis on the subject.6
After hearing from Pickens, President Davis had ordered General Cooper to Charleston to
inspect the troops and coastal defenses and to consult with the state executive. Cooper met with
Pickens, on 20 June, but not with the other council members. When Hayne learned of this he
wrote Pickens, chastising him for taking “the whole affair into your own hands without
consultation with any member of the council.” And this was not the first time Pickens had
circumvented the council, said Hayne. “[I]n every instance, you have studiously avoided
consultation until your own action had already been taken.” Noting that General Cooper had
been ordered by the president to meet with the state executive, Hayne reminded Pickens that “the
Executive is, under our present Government the Governor and Council acting conjointly.”7
Hayne further rebuked Pickens: “To call the members of the Council into your room, and
present them individually after the conference had ended, and you had telegraphed to the
President your own conclusions upon that conference, I myself regarded as a disrespect of
official position, which closely approached personal discourtesy.” Moreover, “Your disregard of
your council is in marked contrast with the courtesy and consideration which the members of
that Council have extended towards yourself.” If Pickens continued to ignore the convention
ordinance imposing the council on the governor, Hayne told him, the council would assert its
“full share” of power in the executive branch.8
Pickens replied in kind to Hayne. Never in his life, he declared, had he read a
communication, “particularly from a high law officer, that contained in so short a space so many
palpable errors.” He reminded Hayne that he was the elected governor “under the fixed
6
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Constitution of the State,” and was responsible to members of the legislature and “to them alone”
for his public conduct. Pickens further protested that the council was an unconstitutional body
and that he had agreed “to acquiesce in this dangerous innovation in our State” only for purposes
of expediency. Regarding his meeting with General Cooper, Pickens retorted that “I had a perfect
right” to meet with him “and it is pretention to assume the contrary.” Moreover, he “never
imagined for one moment” that communicating with President Davis was encroaching on the
dignity or rights of the council and demanded “to see the grounds upon which I am to be
impeached for such telegrams.” As to his alleged discourtesy towards the council, Pickens
brazenly replied that “It is not my Council, but the Council of the Convention. If what was done
by some in the early meetings of that Council is considered by you as marked courtesy towards
me, then I do not envy your claim to being Chief of Justice.”9
This evidence of hostility between two men charged with governing the state was bad
enough. But more consequential and foreboding were the ancillary arguments in the
correspondence about the sovereign powers of the convention. Pickens was steadfast in his
conviction that it was “a dangerous exercise of power in the Convention to change the regular
and constituted Government of the State, and I have seen nothing since [that was done in
January] to induce me to change the opinion I then expressed.” He was the rightful governor,
Pickens insisted, and it was his duty to the constitution and the legislature to “defend the
authority of the one, and uphold the conservative provisions of the other.” In response, Hayne
demanded that Pickens explain by what authority “did the Constitution, to which you refer,
become binding in South Carolina?” How did the legislature, “whose vote you seem to suppose
confers upon you the right to protest” the convention’s action, come into existence? Hayne
answered the questions himself: “[T]he Constitution itself was the creation of a Convention, no
9
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more authoritative, and of no broader powers, than that against whose action you protest.” The
executive council, which the governor “will not stop to analyze,” derived its authority from the
same sovereign power that said, “let there be a Governor and a Legislature.” Hayne warned
Pickens that failure to comply with the convention ordinance creating the council would be an
act of “moral treason . . . a treason aggravated by the high position you hold.” Hayne concluded
by informing Pickens that he would “willingly appeal to our contemporaries to decide, against
which of us, the charge of ‘assumption’ and ‘arrogance’ could be most truthfully made.”10
When this private correspondence was revealed to the public, a political firestorm
erupted. The Marion Star characterized the exchange between the two leaders as “sarcasm mean
enough to make the paper blush on which it was written,” and warned that “A house divided
against itself cannot stand.” A citizen in the upcountry declared that the correspondence “must
convince the most skeptical that the Council is a failure”; although some convention delegates no
doubt had had good intentions when they voted for this “utopian” council, he suspected that the
primary motive in creating it was “to humiliate the Executive, supercede the Legislature, and to
gratify certain aspirants for office.” Richard Yeadon of the Courier was in favor of a true
executive council, which is “an advisory body, but our State oligarchy is the Executive of the
State. Read the Attorney General’s lecture to Gov. Pickens” and it will be evident that “We have
not a Governor and four counsellers, but five governors, each of equal authority.” The true
purpose of the council, Yeadon continued, “was, not to assist, but to rein in the Governor, with
both snaffle and curb, to shackle and reduce him to a cipher” by dividing his power among four
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men who could “pare him down to the little end of nothing.” A plural executive, he concluded,
“is a discordant one, and discord is an admitted element of weakness.”11
Many South Carolinians were understandably concerned about the discord in the council
chamber. However, that was not the only cause of dissatisfaction with the council. Citizens
complained that the council enacted many useless and obnoxious measures. Early in its existence
the council made several blunders that turned public opinion against it. The most egregious was,
ironically, a measure introduced by Governor Pickens. On 19 February he persuaded the council
to approve a resolution directing the Treasury Department to ascertain the amount of gold and
silver belonging to private citizens. His idea was for the state to buy the precious metals, melt
them down, and coin specie that could be used to fund the war effort. All citizens would be
required to inform their district tax collector of the number, weight, and value of gold and silver
articles in their possession. The tax collectors were instructed to report to the Treasury
Department the names of any who refused to comply. This governmental intrusion into their
independent households incensed the people to a degree that Pickens did not anticipate.
Expressions of outrage over the council’s order erupted immediately.12
Some complaints were directed at the financial practicality of the measure, pointing out
that the present realities of the economy rendered ineffective the use of gold and silver as a
medium of exchange. “Does not every one know that the currency of the country rests not now
on any such basis,” asked a citizen in Lancaster, but instead on the credit of the banks, which
rests in turn on government loans and the debts of individual borrowers? South Carolinians, he
assured the council, would gladly surrender their family heirlooms if doing so was necessary to
11
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purchase war material, but the plan was misguided. “Instead of ransacking all the cupboards of
the ladies of the country” for silverware and melting down the silver cups given to children by
their godparents, the council should “devise a masculine and statesmanlike scheme” that
developed the natural resources of the country to sustain the war effort. Others protested that “it
is the tone of the scheme that galls, not its purpose or object,” for it treated citizens “as subjects
rather than patriots.” One woman observed that “Many female tongues grew warm and eloquent”
against the order and they “indignantly declared that we would not submit.” A Spartanburg
resident warned that the council could expect “popular uprisings” if it did not revoke the order.
Pickens and the other council members quickly realized they had made a mistake. Two weeks
after publishing the resolution they rescinded it. The official reason given was “the trouble and
expense of getting the information,” but clearly the public protests were the true reason.13
The council made another serious error in the public mind when it revoked the privilege
of volunteers to elect their own field officers. In February, when President Davis called on South
Carolina to furnish its quota of troops for the war, the council quickly devised a scheme to meet
this requisition and designated a short period for volunteers to come forward before imposing a
draft. On Chesnut’s motion, the council resolved on 3 March that volunteers would be accepted
until 20 March. Units already formed would be allowed to retain their company officers, but all
field officers would be appointed by the council. Chesnut did not anticipate that his order would
provoke such a backlash in the coming months. After the Confederate conscription act of April
forced the council to reorganize the militia by creating two corps of reserves, Chesnut applied the
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same rule of appointing field officers in those units. These decisions sparked protests from all
corners of the state.14
Citizens denounced Chesnut’s orders on several grounds. It was a long-settled policy in
South Carolina, a York District citizen pointed out, that volunteers had a right to elect their
company and regimental officers. Indeed, it was a fundamental principle of democracy and selfrule. The council was attempting to “lay the axe at the very roots” of democracy, “degrade the
citizen soldiery,” and overthrow “our dearest rights as a free people.” An inhabitant of Edgefield
agreed, and asserted that the orders were “pre-eminently and universally condemned in the upcountry.” Others protested that the appointment of officers by the council would inevitably lead
to nepotism. Those who would receive such “gracious favors, graciously bestowed” were those
who had family connections to the councilmen. Concerns were also expressed about the
competency of appointed officers. “A Backcountry Man” demanded to know how the council
could choose more qualified field officers than could the soldiers. He pointed out that Gist had
spent most of his life in Alabama, Chesnut had lived in Washington before the war while serving
as a U.S. senator, and Pickens had been the minister to Russia in the James Buchanan
administration. Could such men really know the military capacity of the men back home? A
soldier from Charleston, having carefully examined the law, was “unable to discover the
authority for this extraordinary exercise of power”; he thought it not only improper but “illegal
for this Council or any one else to force appointees upon [us].” Over the signature “Vox Populi,”
a Lancaster resident asserted that the council had no more right to impose officers on the soldiery
than it did “to say that we shall not elect our Representatives in October next.”15
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Another source of controversy was the council’s decision to close the South Carolina
College, a venerated institution. The Fort Sumter crisis and the Union invasion at Port Royal had
disrupted the college but had not forced it to close. Dire problems arose, however, when the
executive council was forced to meet the Confederate quota for troops in February and March.
When the council declared that men over the age of eighteen who did not volunteer by 20 March
would be subject to a draft, all but three of the college’s seventy students enlisted. The faculty
thereupon cancelled all classes. The Southern Guardian criticized the council’s order, arguing
that the students under twenty should be exempted, “except when the State is actually invaded.”
The college faculty met on 11 March and declared it the duty of the patriot to uphold educational
interests even in time of war. An outraged “Carolina Mother” agreed: “Sad, sad, indeed will be
this war to us,” she wrote, “if it results in the utter neglect of our educational interests.” She
called on the council to reconsider its order and maintain public education.16
Despite the obstacles, the faculty was determined to keep the college going. Classes
resumed on 17 March, but only nine students, all freshmen or sophomores, were present. Richard
Yeadon seized this opportunity to denounce “the fatal order” of the council, which sacrificed the
college while procuring fewer than a hundred volunteers from it. He deplored the plight of the
faculty, who would now be forced to seek employment in other states “where the institutions of
education have not been ruthlessly, needlessly, and foolishly overthrown.” The council had an
obligation, Yeadon insisted, to devise some plan for keeping the students in college.17
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Pickens had attempted to do precisely that on 10 March, when he introduced a resolution
that all the students be organized into a special corps and held ready for active duty while
remaining at the college pending further orders. But consideration of this resolution was
postponed, and the council took no further action on it. The college’s prospects grew even
dimmer in the spring, when the council authorized the Confederate authorities to take over the
college buildings for use as a hospital. The faculty initially objected, but yielded after being
assured that the arrangement was only temporary. In September, with the new term approaching,
the faculty called on the council to end the arrangement. But the Confederate authorities,
struggling to provide adequate medical care for the army, asked for an extension, which the
council granted. The council continued to be condemned for its “very unwise and unnecessary
interference” with the college and soon a movement was underway to lobby the legislature to
reclaim the buildings and resurrect the college.18
The council order requiring citizens to register their gold and silver, the council’s
decision to appoint field officers, and its gutting of the South Carolina College all provoked
accusations that the council was misusing its power. Moreover, council actions on a number of
lesser issues exasperated many citizens. When a group of businessmen went to the Treasury
building in Charleston to claim their interest on state bonds, they found that “the State Treasury
had vamosed” to Columbia on the council’s orders. Reporting this story, the Courier remarked
that the council “seemeth to take delight in playing fantastic tricks to the annoyance of the
people.” Sometimes the council was wrongfully criticized due to false rumors. When the council
agreed to pay C. W. Geddes two cents a pound to make ice for the hospital in Columbia, a citizen
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in York District got the misimpression that the purpose was to manufacture ice cream for the
city’s civilians and protested that “We in the country don’t get ice creams [sic]. Is the Council
crazy?” On other occasions the council was blamed for policies over which it had no control.
The convention had set the councilmen’s salary at $2,000, but many South Carolinians thought
that excessive and blamed the council. A taxpayer in Columbia could not “see the propriety of
spending the money of the people in this way” and suggested that the councilmen serve without
pay.19
All these controversies contributed to the public discontent with the council, but the
fiercest challenge it confronted was a challenge to its very existence. Only weeks after it was
created there began a veritable crusade against it, waged in the press by newspaper editors and
many ordinary citizens. The council was an unconstitutional and irresponsible body, these voices
declared, which lacked legitimate authority to exercise power. These protests inevitability led to
questioning the powers of the convention that had created the council, rejecting the notions that
the convention embodied the supreme sovereignty of the state and possessed unlimited power.
Another line of attack was that the convention had been called for a specific purpose and had
fulfilled its mandate by passing the secession ordinance and ratifying the Confederate
Constitution; the duty of the convention now was to dissolve itself and restore the regular
government.20
The three fundamental questions underlying this controversy were these: what was the
intention of the legislature when it called for a convention in 1860, what did the citizens expect
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of their convention delegates, and precisely where does state sovereignty reside? The last
question sparked a debate over the legitimacy of the executive council.
In November 1860 the legislature had passed an act calling on voters to elect delegates to
a convention to be held in December. The language of the act was notably vague: the convention
was being assembled for the purpose of “taking into consideration the dangers incident to the
position of the State in the Federal Union” and to take necessary measures to ensure that South
Carolina “shall suffer no detriment.” This imprecision left considerable room for interpreting the
legislature’s intention. Citizens who wished to see the convention dissolved and the executive
council abolished argued that the legislature’s act was intended only to call into existence a body
that would take the state out of the Union, attach it to a Southern confederacy, and ratify its
constitution; once these objectives were met, the convention would have accomplished what the
legislature intended it to do and should dissolve immediately. Citizens who interpreted the
legislature’s intention in this way went a step further and argued that it was not only proper for
the convention to dissolve, but that it had a duty to do so, for it had no authority to sit indefinitely
or make further changes to the state’s organic law. As Richard Yeadon asserted, the convention
of 1860 had been called solely to modify an existing government; having achieved that end, “Its
power extends no farther, not an inch.”21
Not so, said the convention proponents. They held that the legislature’s intention was to
vest the convention with sufficient powers to carry out a much broader responsibility than merely
passing the formal act of secession and ratifying the Constitution. Indeed, the people had elected
their delegates with the expectation that they would take all necessary steps to achieve Southern
independence. Underscoring the particular language in the legislature’s act, Isaac Hayne asked,
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“Have the apprehended ‘Dangers’ ceased[?]” He argued that “A WAR was certainly within the
contemplation” of the legislators when they passed the act and surely the delegates foresaw this
possibility when they passed the secession ordinance. There was an implicit understanding in
both bodies, said Hayne, that Southern independence might “have to be vindicated by the sword”
and that provisions “must be made for the conduct of a Revolution of Blood.” This is why the
legislature’s act instructed the convention to ensure that the state “suffer no detriment.”
“Detriment from what?,” Hayne asked the convention opponents. Clearly from “the ‘measures’
taken; which were, Secession and the formation of the Southern Confederacy.”22
The convention opponents were not persuaded. The Courier led the attack against
Hayne’s position, insisting that the regular government was perfectly capable of steering the state
through the storm of war. A citizen in Barnwell District suggested that even if the regular
government was not up to that task, the convention had no power to interfere with it because the
legislature’s act explicitly called a convention to consider the position of the state “in the Federal
Union––not out.” The convention had done exactly this when it passed the secession ordinance
and ratified the Confederate Constitution. After taking these actions, no further dangers in the
Union existed because the convention had “annihilated them” by seceding. The convention was
now taking measures against “new dangers––dangers of a character the very opposite from those
mentioned in the Act.”23
These debates over the legislature’s intention when it called for a convention inevitably
raised the more theoretical question of the sovereign powers of the convention itself.
Unfortunately for those who wanted to maintain internal harmony in the state, these arguments
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threatened to expose old divisions that politicians had hoped to repress after the state seceded.
The issue had been around since the nullification crisis. John C. Calhoun had theorized that
sovereignty was illimitable and indivisible in nature. Sovereignty was an attribute of the people,
he said, and they exercised it through an elected convention. In this formula the convention
represented the sovereign people in action. The convention could not be guilty of usurpation or
despotism because the people cannot usurp power from themselves. In other words, a convention
was the essence of sovereignty because it embodied the people exercising their omnipotent
power. This is why the conventions in 1832, 1852, and 1860 all began with the pronouncement
“We the people of the State of South Carolina in convention assembled.” But it must be
remembered that South Carolinians were not of one mind in 1832 or 1852. The Charleston Daily
Courier had been the organ of Unionism during the nullification crisis and had supported the
nationalists and cooperationists throughout the decade preceding the Civil War. The Courier
now dusted off its old arguments against Calhoun’s theory. The Mercury did the same to defend
his theory. The result was an acrimonious debate between the two leading newspapers in the
state at an inauspicious moment.24
When the Union was tapping on the doors of Charleston in the summer of 1862, many
South Carolinians were busy fighting an ideological war among each other. On 24 May, just
weeks after martial law was declared in Charleston, the Mercury expressed its position on the
sovereignty of conventions. In every state there must be a supreme power, the creator of
governmental authority. In South Carolina, sovereignty “does not reside in the Legislature”
because that body as well as the executive and judicial branches are only agencies of the true
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sovereign. Nor is the constitution sovereign, because there had to be an absolute power that
created it. Under this theory, the Mercury insisted, there can be no doubt that the true sovereign
was the convention of the people, “whose authority is absolute and illimitable, in point of time as
well as subject matter.” The convention was therefore South Carolina’s “absolute master” and “it
is a vain and meaningless usurpation for the Legislature, its servant,” to try to limit its power.
Because the convention is superior to the legislature, citizens are “totally subject to it.” Indeed,
all loyal citizens, the editor concluded, owe the convention “a perfect and unquestioning
allegiance. To each and every citizen of South Carolina the Convention is Lord Paramount.” The
proper response of the people was to let the convention’s work continue “and leave the
consequences to God.” A citizen in Lancaster, in a letter to the Ledger, wholeheartedly
concurred with this position on sovereignty. He urged all South Carolinians to submit to the
convention’s authority just as royal subjects obey “the commandment of a King.”25
The editor of the Courier and many other citizens took the opposite position.
Conventions, Richard Yeadon declared, are not illimitable in power or duration. While
conceding that conventions are extraordinary bodies called for extraordinary purposes, he argued
that their existence should cease with the execution of their intended purpose. When conventions
go beyond that object and supersede the legislature, overthrow the elected governor, and prolong
their existence indefinitely, they have “usurped power, and set a precedent, fraught with danger
to liberty and regular government.” On this point another citizen, writing to Yeadon’s paper,
unhesitatingly agreed, for if the convention could prolong its existence for eighteen months, then
why could it not continue to sit for “eighteen years, or eighteen centuries?” More fundamentally,
as Yeadon pointed out, conventions were merely representative bodies responsible to their
constituency. The people, in other words, are the true sovereigns. How can a convention, he
25
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asked, “sitting with closed doors, and without any check on its absolutism,” represent the
sovereignty of the people? Did South Carolinians, when they elected delegates to the convention
in 1860, intend for them to constitute “a new body with powers absolutely unlimited, both in
extent and duration? This is the naked question.”26
Yeadon concluded his argument by asking his readers: “Are we freemen, or are we
slaves?” If the convention perpetuated its existence, South Carolinians would continue to be
victims of an irresponsible despotism, “nay worse, the bond slaves of a five-headed and wrongheaded dictatorship.” How much longer, he demanded to know, will the people tolerate an
unchecked council with powers to squander the treasury, appoint salaried officers, confiscate
private property, “aye, even arrest us for daring to write this article––and do any other high
handed act, which a Russian Czar or a Turkish Sultan may, in his autocracy, perform?” Yeadon’s
hyperbole was matched by others. Former governor John Richardson said the council was more
capable of abuse than the oligarchy of Venice. Another citizen remarked that if the convention
had created a limited monarchy and placed the second son of Queen Victoria on the throne of
South Carolina, it would have been a far less arbitrary government than the current executive
council, for one prince was less dangerous than five dictators. There was no doubt in his mind
that the council had placed the people under “a willful tyranny.”27
As this virulent rhetoric suggests, the disagreements over the sovereignty of the
convention had the potential to tear the political fabric of the state asunder. Grievances born
decades earlier and since muted now resurfaced at a most inopportune time. Yeadon criticized
the old nullifiers for changing the language of the opening pronouncement in the convention of
1832 to “We the people.” He then gave a lengthy history lesson to show that the first convention
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in South Carolina, which overthrew the proprietary government in 1719, did not contain this
clause. Nor did the conventions of the revolutionary era or the early federal period. Instead, they
began with the pronouncement “We, the Delegates of the people . . . in general Convention met.”
This was the proper phrase of a convention, the Courier insisted. It was a grave error when the
nullification party “departed from the old landmarks and safe anchorage of the past, and
transformed Conventions” from representative bodies into the sovereign people themselves, who
were endowed with absolute power. The result was a doctrine that empowered conventions “to
play such fantastic tricks before high Heaven, as would make the angels weep.” Thus, at the very
moment that unity in the state was most crucial, South Carolinians became embroiled in an
ideological controversy rooted in theoretical abstractions. A citizen in the Pee Dee region,
perturbed at this development, called for citizens to come together for the common welfare. He
regretted that the recent convention had created this “seething crucible in which our political
rights are being tested,” for now a “great civil revolution is raging” across the state.28
The primary reason why these arguments resurfaced in 1862 was the existence of the
executive council. There can be no doubt that South Carolina had been woefully unprepared to
wage war in 1861. Opponents of the convention had a difficult time maintaining their position
that the convention should have limited itself to enacting secession and ratifying the Confederate
Constitution, especially considering the invasion of Port Royal. Proponents of the convention
were quick to ask why, if the regular government was capable of waging war, Port Royal fell to
the enemy? “It must be remembered” argued one convention supporter, that the state had been
invaded and the legislature had passed a military bill inadequate to meet the emergency.
Moreover, slaves were running away and “growing crazed with wild dreams of freedom and
licentiousness,” and many plantations were abandoned and the planters were evacuating to the
28
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interior. Meanwhile, “the Governor was doing or could do nothing for the benefit of the State,
but much to produce confusion.” Indeed, Pickens was busy issuing “indiscreet and injurious
proclamations” while the enemy was attacking the coast. As a result of Pickens’s incompetence,
“Everything was in confusion, and every body complaining.” An inhabitant of Lancaster
similarly explained why the convention was justified in assuming broad powers. It had a
mandate to see that the commonwealth suffer no detriment, but “She was suffering detriment
from Executive inefficiency.” While conceding that constitutional objections might be raised
against the council, he concluded that citizens were obligated to “submit to unusual measures”
because the exigency of the times demanded that “The old forms of peace, and the habits of
society must be sacrificed for the public safety.”29
Many South Carolinians were not willing to submit to an unusual and unconstitutional
council, regardless of the crisis. The anti-convention forces channeled their loathing for the
council into a campaign to reconvene the convention for the purpose of dissolving both bodies.
This movement began soon after the council was created in January and was waged primarily by
the press. The Courier called on the Mercury and district newspapers to join “Our Holy War”
against the convention and its “bantling” council. Both bodies, Yeadon told his fellow editors,
had openly declared that “We are the State.” The Mercury declined the invitation, but every
other newspaper in the state except the Lancaster Ledger gladly accepted it. Damning the
council as “a snake which ought to be both scotched and killed,” Yeadon urged his fellow editors
not to “return their swords to the scabbard” until constitutional government was restored.30
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The district newspapers obliged. The Edgefield Advertiser opined that “If we are to be
enslaved, it matters not with us whether the unholy work” was carried out by a Northern or
Southern tyranny because the result would be the same. Still, it was a source of profound
embarrassment that South Carolinians had been “betrayed by the very men who were selected as
champions of freedom.” The Yorkville Enquirer concurred, declaring that the citizens had
become “slaves––ticketed and passported slaves, unable to move a step but at the will of their
masters.” If only the people would speak out and demand that the convention reconvene, thought
the editor of the Carolina Spartan, the council would melt away “like the frostwork of a winter’s
night.” The Daily South Carolinian warned that if the convention did not reconvene and abolish
the council, “we will have to recall our army to protect us at home.”31
The editorial campaign against the convention and council was effective. As early as 29
April, a petition was published containing over seven hundred signatures of Charlestonians who
were “anxious to prevent any political excitement” that might weaken unity in the state. The
petitioners urged citizens to call on their delegates to write to the president of the convention,
David F. Jamison, requesting that he reconvene the body so that it could abolish the council and
then dissolve itself. Similar published appeals appeared throughout the state, and public meetings
were held in several districts demanding that the convention reconvene at once. “Nothing short
of the unqualified repeal” of the council by the convention, declared a constituent in Lancaster,
“will be satisfactory to the incensed people.” Typical of the public meetings was one held in the
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upstate near Pendleton, where citizens demanded that their convention delegates remove “the
anomalous and vexatious pentarchy” and restore constitutional government.32
The convention ordinance of January required President Jamison to reconvene the body
once he had received written requests to do so from at least twenty delegates. By late August he
still had issued no such call, and the patience of some South Carolinians was wearing thin. “If
public rumor speak truly,” one citizen protested, “the ides of May had not passed before twenty
members” had formally asked Jamison to reconvene. “It is outrageous,” complained another
man, a resident of the village of Kingstree, that Jamison refused to reconvene the body against
the wishes of the people. Jamison was even accused (wrongfully) of withholding the names of
delegates who had written to him. When there was no response from Jamison, on 23 August
several members of the legislature wrote to Governor Pickens urging him to call for an extra
session so they could give “construction” to their act of 1860 calling for a convention. But the
same day this threat appeared in the press, Jamison announced that he had received the twentieth
petition and that the convention would reconvene for its fourth session on 9 September.33
In the weeks leading up to that session, the already heated political atmosphere in South
Carolina reached a boiling point. Supporters of the convention, theretofore lukewarm in their
defense of the body, were reinvigorated. The ideological battle fought in the press reached a
crescendo. Some council opponents suggested that if the convention failed to abolish the council
and dissolve itself, the legislature should call another convention to dissolve the current one. But
the Mercury countered that “The power of the Legislature in calling the existing Convention is
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exhausted,” and the notion that it could call another convention to control the existing one was
“supremely foolish and mischievous.” A citizen in Lancaster agreed: those who advocate such a
“revolutionary step,” he opined, are “either very ignorant of what [conventions] are about, or
have some sinister designs to accomplish.”34
The convention assembled as scheduled on 9 September. Immediately concerns were
expressed that the council was guilty of making appointments under the influence of
consanguinity. Chesnut assured his colleagues that there was not a single appointee “in whose
veins ran any of the blood” of the councilmen. But Hayne was forced to correct him: one
appointee claimed to have a common great-grandfather with Hayne, but the council had not
learned this until after the appointment had been made. On that same first day of the proceedings
Governor Pickens was ordered to submit a record of all the council’s transactions along with the
reports from the various department heads. In his initial communication to the delegates Pickens
distanced himself from the council and disowned responsibility for many of its actions. His
message and the departmental reports were referred to a special committee of twenty-one that
would review the council’s record and report any improprieties resulting from the council’s
actions.35
On the second day, John Phillips of the Charleston delegation introduced an ordinance to
abolish the executive council. This act would vacate all offices created under the council’s
authority and repeal all its measures that amended any act of the legislature. Phillips had joined
the convention through a special election to fill a vacancy in the delegation. He was nominated
as “the people’s candidate” on a platform of “constitutional liberty” and received 95 percent of
the votes cast, a clear mandate to abolish the council and dissolve the convention as quickly as
34
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possible. His proposed ordinance was referred to a special committee of seven tasked with
examining the critical question of what to do with the council. Thus the committee of twenty-one
and the committee of seven assumed the grave responsibility of investigating the two key issues
of the session.36
The convention proceedings were followed with great interest. Susan Middleton in
Columbia wrote that the women “are getting to be great politicians here! going every day to the
Convention” and listening to the debates. She found the speeches fascinating and became
“almost indignant on one occasion, when the gallery was ordered to be closed for a secret
session.” On this point the Mercury finally found a reason to criticize the convention: closing the
doors to the public, it declared, did more than anything else to discredit it. Perhaps secrecy was
appropriate back in January, when the convention created the council, but now there was no
reason for the delegates to cloak their activities. “The people can be trusted with the truth,
whatever it may be.” William John Grayson was also interested in the proceedings. On the
opening day he remarked in his diary that the entire affair was rather amusing, for every other
member of the Confederacy was satisfied with one state government, yet South Carolina “must
have two.” He followed the debates intently and prayed that the council and convention, which
wielded powers as “dangerous as any that the world has ever seen from the time of thirty tyrants
in Athens to the present day,” would be dissolved. This sentiment is precisely what the anticouncil and anti-convention forces hoped the committee of twenty-one would express. But they
would be painfully disappointed.37
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On 15 September that committee completed its review of the council’s record and
reported its conclusions. Chairman Robert W. Barnwell declared that the committee had
discovered nothing in the council’s proceedings that deserved repeal or animadversion. On the
contrary, the council members had discharged their duties “with signal diligence, ability, and
success.” In every case, the council’s actions were conducted with an exclusive regard to the
public welfare, all too often amid public controversies “mortifying to the patriot.” The regular
government, Barnwell continued, would have been entirely inadequate to place the state on a war
footing; thus, the extraordinary powers conferred on the council were essential. The committee
declined to offer an explicit opinion on the critical question of whether any limitation could be
imposed on the powers of the convention, but stated that “it seems plain” that every action of the
convention was implicitly authorized in the legislative act calling it into existence. Much to the
chagrin of the anti-council crusaders, the committee’s report was a resounding and unequivocal
endorsement of the council’s work.38
The committee of seven, charged with deliberating the fate of the council, had a more
difficult time agreeing on a recommendation. A majority report was presented by Francis
Richardson. It declared that the people were competent to govern themselves and choose men
capable of handling the current political crisis. The election for new members of the legislature
was fast approaching and that body would assemble for its annual session on 24 November,
Richardson continued, and it would be wise to have the convention and council expire on that
date. The majority also recommended that a committee prepare an address to the people
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explaining why the convention sat so long after ratifying the Constitution and why it established
the executive council. It furthermore recommended that the convention give the legislature
authority to establish a new executive council with powers identical to those of the existing one
and authority to choose the councilmen.39
A minority report, presented by chairman John Phillips, expressed the concern that the
majority’s recommendations would only continue to divide and distract the people; nothing but
the immediate dissolution of the executive council and convention would allay the current
excitement among the citizens, some of whom were dangerously disposed toward
“insubordination and bitter party feuds.” Several amendments to both reports were offered. John
Inglis wanted the council to expire on 8 December, and the convention on 17 December
(precisely two years from the date of its inception), leaving it up to the legislature to resurrect the
executive council in its current or modified form if it chose. Isaac Hayne wanted the council to
continue in its present form but be responsible to the legislature. William Harllee suggested that
the council continue but be responsible to the governor; it would also be wise, he thought, to
confine the council’s authority to executive functions. Ephraim Seabrook thought a new
“Advisory Executive Council” should be created with powers similar to those of the first council
of 1861.40
After these amendments were printed for the delegates, an impassioned debate erupted
over which to adopt. Former governor John Richardson spoke for those who wished to
immediately abolish the council and dissolve the convention. He was moved, he said, by the
grievances of his constituents, who were outraged by a dictatorial body that met in “dark and
murky chambers” where neither “the light of day nor the prying eye” could penetrate.
39
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Richardson denounced in particular the unrestrained judicial and legislative powers that the
council had assumed. It could suspend habeas corpus, arrest and detain persons accused of
disloyalty, and suspend other legal rights. Was the polity of South Carolina so unruly, he asked,
“as to require the curb and bit to be in her mouth and the reins held by five dictators?” He
thought not. Moreover, the council could repeal or suspend laws passed by the legislature, which
inevitably led to confusion and disorder. This vast assumption of power had provoked normally
peaceful and law-abiding citizens “to rebel, and rise up against their rulers.” Richardson denied
that the exigencies of the times called for such radical measures. The delegates were deluded last
January into believing that the condition of the state justified the extraordinary powers conferred
on the council. He had, under that false impression, voted for the ordinance creating council, but
now he wanted to “clothe himself in sack-cloth, and repent in dust and ashes.”41
Robert W. Barnwell spoke in opposition to Richardson, representing those who wished
the council and convention to continue. He vindicated the sovereign power of the convention and
upheld its right to create a council. True to Calhoun’s theory, he argued that the ordinance
creating the council was an act of the people themselves. It was a wise act, and the council had
done much to benefit the state. South Carolina was now threatened, he went on, by the Union
campaign against Charleston. At any moment Lincoln’s ironclads might penetrate the harbor,
allowing the enemy to seize the city and advance into the interior of the state. The fundamental
question for the delegates to consider was this: “has the danger passed in which we were in duty
bound to see that the State suffered no detriment?” Clearly not, Barnwell thought. He concluded
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by affirming the responsibility of the delegates not to “quail before the popular clamor, but [to]
remain at our posts and do our duty to the country, regardless of the consequences.”42
There was a middle ground between the positions of Richardson and Barnwell. John
Middleton had voted against the ordinance creating the council but now his opinion had changed.
After listening to the arguments and reviewing Isaac Hayne’s report, he was convinced that the
convention truly embodied the sovereign people of the state. He thought also that the public
opposition to the council and convention was actually quite minimal. He was now persuaded that
a convention, rather than the legislature, should control the state’s war effort. However, to
appease both sides, he supported a constitutional amendment creating an executive council; this
would put to rest any questions over the council’s legality. Theodore Wagner took a similar
stance after reading the departmental reports. He had, he said, petitioned Jamison to reconvene
the convention only because his constituents demanded he do so. After examining the council’s
record, he could now return to his district and explain with a clear conscience that the council
was necessary to conduct the war.43
The best reasoned argument over retaining or abolishing the executive council was
offered by Joseph Pope from St. Helena. He opposed continuing the council’s existence, but not
on the usual grounds. He did not doubt the power of the convention to make organic changes to
the law or take steps for self-defense. But he insisted that the issue of the council’s existence
could be decided without reference to the powers of the convention. He furthermore denied that
the council had ever displayed any “wanton disregard of private rights.” The councilmen were no
“nest of tyrants, seeking by their edicts to destroy the liberties of the people.” Nor were they
“foreign adventurers” coming into South Carolina to uproot its established forms of government.
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They were, in fact, “members of this body, equal with ourselves, having the same interest with
us.” The council had done much to benefit the state and its accomplishments should be
applauded by the delegates. But now that the Confederate authorities had taken control of
military operations on the coast and passed the conscription act, Pope questioned the need for the
council. He pointed out that in the spring, after the council had arranged for the fortification of
Georgetown, General Pemberton “without even giving notice to the council” had had the fort
dismantled and the cannons removed. And what could the councilmen do about it? “Nothing, sir;
nothing. They were simply powerless for good.” Likewise, when the council placed a garrison on
Cole’s Island to block the Stono River, General Pemberton on “his own will, in the face of the
most earnest remonstrances” by the council, withdrew the garrison. The council members all
thought that decision unwise, but were “simply powerless to prevent it.” For this reason alone he
believed that the council was now useless and should be abolished. He also advised that the
convention be dissolved, after a committee was formed to recommend which of its ordinances
should be retained by the upcoming legislature.44
Joseph Pope struck a chord with the delegates. However, perhaps due to concern that it
might appear to the public that the convention had blundered in creating the council, Phillips’s
minority report recommending the immediate dissolution of both the council and the convention
was laid on the table and the amendment offered by Inglis was adopted. Thus, the terms of the
councilmen would expire on 8 December and the legislature would choose their successors if it
decided to continue the council either in its current or a modified form. Also, under this
amendment the convention would dissolve on 17 December, the second anniversary of its
commencement. On 17 September the convention delegates assembled for what would be their
final meeting. In his closing remarks President Jamison congratulated the delegates on their unity
44
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of purpose and their “entire freedom from the influences of popular clamor or selfish interest.”
Had the delegates yielded earlier in the year to popular demands to abolish the council and
dissolve the convention, “at this moment our necks would have been under the heel of a detested
abolition tyrant” and South Carolina’s children would inherit nothing but “a legacy of poverty,
sorrow and shame.” Jamison then bid his colleagues adieu, and they adjourned.45
The convention was no more, but the controversy over what it had done, or failed to do,
was just beginning. In shifting the burden of deciding the council’s ultimate fate to the
legislature, the convention delegates had made a grave miscalculation. They made an even worse
one in allowing the convention to continue abstractly until 17 December. Some of the most
vehement denunciations of the convention came after its final adjournment. Citizens demanded
to know why it dragged out “an existence hateful to the people.” The reasoning contained in the
report of the committee of twenty-one upholding the power of the convention and the council’s
actions was especially castigated. One irate citizen thought it tantamount to arguing that “a
bucket of salt water is the ocean,” or more relevantly, that “the Russian Czar is not an autocrat
while he sends to the knout and to Siberia none but rogues and rascals.” Politicians who affirmed
such logic were fit “not for the State House” but for “the Asylum.” If the convention indeed
acted for the people, then it had done so “without authority from its employers.” The convention
was in fact “a criminal––a betrayer of solemn trusts––a robber of State rights.” Moreover, some
argued, while the councilmen might not be tyrants, it did not follow that “they are not autocrats
or oligarchs.” And, too, as a Lancaster citizen pointed out, by leaving it to the legislature to
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decide the fate of the council, the convention left unanswered a central question: “Who is to be
responsible for the murder of this Council?”46
Even before the convention assembled for its last session, Richard Yeadon had
determined to make the hated council the primary issue in the October legislative elections. In
August the Courier announced that there was “Lilliputian Lincolnism in our midst” and soon
began publishing the names of candidates on the new “People’s Ticket,” men who “are known to
be friends of a constitutional and regular Government.” District newspapers quickly followed
suit. The Marion Star declared that at this critical juncture in history, South Carolinians “have no
use for dumb men in our Legislative Halls” and urged voters to support only candidates who
have pledged “to impeach the five governors.” A voter in Lancaster informed the two candidates
in his district that “neither of you can get my vote until it is known in unequivocal terms what
position you occupy in reference to the present Dynasty.” As voters went to the polls on 14
October, the Courier reminded them that “This Odious Oligarchy has not yet been dethroned.”47
The anti-council voices were heard and heeded. The election resulted in a clear rejection
of the old leadership. The fire-eater Robert Barnwell Rhett Jr. of the Mercury and the radical L.
W. Spratt were both defeated. On the other hand, Richard Yeadon of the Courier and the
moderate Benjamin F. Perry of Greenville were elected. Many of the men elected would be firsttime legislators. William Gilmore Simms counted ninety-six new members, “each eager to fire
off his popgun” at the council. The editor of the Carolina Spartan, who back in the spring had
diagnosed the fever spreading in the public mind and had predicted “an outburst of furor” if the
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council and convention were not eradicated, must now have envisioned an approaching
firestorm. The political climate had changed drastically over the past eleven months, but despite
the protests and unrelenting attacks, the convention was still in existence on paper. Nor did the
convention technically abolish the council: although the terms of the councilmen would expire in
December, the fate of the council as a body was left to the legislature. A citizen, over the
signature of “A Word to the Wise,” warned the new legislators that the people wanted them to
abolish the council and restore their constitutional rights. They had expected this to happen in
September but the convention had failed them. If this happened again after the legislature
convened on 24 November, he said, “a voice of indignant rebuke will be heard from the coast to
the mountains.”48
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Chapter Six
“There Should Be Little Speaking and Much Acting”:
Abolishing the Council and Restoring Regular Government, November-December 1862
In November 1862 the weather turned cold in Columbia as the legislature began its
annual session. Since it last met in December 1861, many white South Carolinians had evacuated
the lowcountry and thousands of slaves there had been removed or had gone to the Yankees.
Charleston was threatened and the blockade was tightening. Inflation and scarcity plagued the
common folk; the 1861 law that aided soldiers’ families was increasingly criticized as
inadequate. Moreover, the polity was convulsed by the controversy over the executive council.
Citizens demanded that their legislators abolish the council and restore the regular government.
The legislature thus had to confront both the practical challenges of war and matters of
constitutional law. The Charleston Daily Courier opined that “seldom has a better opportunity
offered when our legislators have had it in their power to gain the gratitude of the people, by
prompt and energetic action.”1
The legislature convened on 24 November. Senate president William D. Porter opened
the proceedings by noting that “sad changes have taken place” since the last meeting. Many
South Carolinians had perished on the battlefield and “For us who survive, there are great duties
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to perform.” The war now being waged “upon a grandeur of scale almost without parallel in
history” would decide not only the question of Southern independence but “our very existence,
political and social.” If the legislature failed in its duty to defend the state and sustain the spirit of
the people, not only would cities and villages be destroyed, fields ravaged, and slaves
confiscated, but “ourselves and our children [will be] reduced to a most hateful bondage. The
alternative is between freedom and slavery, between fame and infamy.”2
The convention was set to expire on 17 December but the council’s fate was left to the
legislature. Fearing that this issue would provoke a lengthy debate and distract the members from
their other pressing responsibilities, Porter urged his colleagues to “discard all considerations of
person and party, and devote our whole energies to the safety and welfare of the State.”
Fortunately, he asserted, at this time “We are . . . not a divided people.” This claim was
disingenuous, however, at least as regards the executive council controversy. For the past eleven
months South Carolinians had been deeply divided over this issue. As Governor Pickens
remarked in his annual message of 25 November 1862, many citizens seethed with resentment
over “what they deemed an unnecessary and arbitrary establishment of an unusual and irregular
Government.”3
Pickens had no doubt that “the Constitution was grossly and needlessly violated” when
the convention delegates conducted “their remarkable experiment in government.” “No people
upon earth are more restive under arbitrary power than we [South Carolinians] are,” he averred,
and thus “our whole form of Government is conservative, and full of checks and restraints––
more so than that of any other State in the Confederacy.” The convention had “utterly
annihilated” the state Constitution by transforming the executive department. The council, “an
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anomaly in government,” should be abolished and “no other of that kind [should] be created.”
The legislators, “as guardians of the Constitution and Law,” must “now restore to the State the
regular and ordinary Government.”4
The press generally applauded the governor’s position on the council with one important
exception. The Charleston Mercury differed with Pickens on “the legality of its proceedings.
And the difference is radical.” But legality was no longer the issue. Rather, “the wisdom” and
“the need” of the council should guide the legislature’s deliberations. The editor agreed that the
council “was certainly an extraordinary experiment,” but thought it a wise one given the
governor’s incompetence. During the Fort Sumter crisis his “hesitancy and delay gave Lincoln
great advantages, if it did not encourage and inaugurate the war.” The fall of Port Royal was yet
another example of his ineptitude. The Mercury damned “the efforts which have been made to
divide the people of the State and excite the jealousy of the Legislature toward the Convention.
We believe it wrong in principle, and without good results.” But this concern was swept aside as
legislators began to argue over the council’s legality and took steps to abolish it. Many of the
newly elected members believed they had been sent there to “prevent any future engrafting of
such an excrescence on the body politic.”5
On the second day a special committee was appointed to consider the governor’s
recommendations. But before the committee could begin deliberations, William Whaley of
Charleston introduced six resolutions in the House concerning the conduct of the convention.
These resolutions shaped the debate over the council’s fate. They declared that the legislature felt
an “unabated respect and affection for our State Constitution,” and that the separation of powers
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was “fundamental and necessary.” The legislature should regard any attempt to set aside this
principle as “mischievous,” “inevitably lead[ing] either to anarchy or despotism.” Conventions
should be called only to make “important organic changes” to an existing government, and
should not be empowered to govern the state directly or indirectly through a council. The fifth
resolution affirmed the essential difference between the people and a convention of delegates; to
confuse the two “must in the end lead to gross usurpation and wrong.” The sixth deplored “any
measures which may have been adopted by the late Convention at variance with these
principles.” These resolutions were made the special order for the next day.6
The debate that ensued centered on legislative procedure. The primary question was
whether Whaley’s resolutions should be referred to the special committee or debated in open
session. A few members suggested that the special order should be postponed so the committee
would have time to deliberate and report a bill. This was the normal procedure for passing
legislation. But many others demanded that the resolutions be debated openly and immediately.
According to the Courier, “there seemed to be a general desire to throttle the oligarchy at once,
and the call was almost universal for ‘to-morrow.’” It was at this point that “the war” against the
council began to be “prosecuted with unabated vigor.”7
Campbell Bryce moved to postpone discussion and refer the resolutions. He worried that
“If we undertake to go into a discussion of this subject, where shall we stop?” There were more
important matters to be dealt with, he insisted, including the Yankees “now thundering at the
gates of the country.” Andrew Thompson disagreed, hoping “that we will not hurry here. Let us
do everything deliberately,” taking care “not to utter a syllable to excite unpleasant feeling.” He
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then excited unpleasant feeling by recounting his unceasing efforts “to find one of the members
of this Convention who was in favor of the Council, and I have never been able to find one
(Laughter).” Yet he was “glad of it, for it shows that they are ashamed of it.” There was no use
for a council that could “put a man in jail just for his looks.” Thompson thought it pointless to
wait for the committee’s recommendations because “The Governor has sued for a divorce, and
he’ll get it, too, sir, if one was never granted before in South Carolina (Laughter).”8
Bryce was not among those House members who were laughing. He fired back at
Thompson, asserting that “we have come here to do something else than to be entertained with
eloquence or humor, and I feel even more determined than ever in my motion. I insist upon it.”
But he found few allies. Robert Seymour tried and failed to sustain the motion to refer. He did
not understand why the council’s opponents insisted on debating resolutions before the
committee reported a bill. The obloquy they employed was particularly disturbing to Seymour.
“Any one who should have accidentally heard” what was being said about the council on the
House floor, he claimed, “would have supposed that every right had been taken from the State,
and that we were slaves, bound hand and foot––that even the right of the Representatives to enter
these walls was denied.” If such hyperbole continued, Seymour would introduce a resolution to
“subject this Assembly to military duty.”9
William Mullins denied that the rhetoric was overheated. He thought it proper to
excoriate the council, for “a new Legislature had been elected on this very issue. Is, then, this
question too unimportant to be discussed?” He specifically took aim at Bryce, arguing that
“There are more foes, sir, than [just] the enemy ‘who are thundering at the gates’ and the
8
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preservators of liberty must defend the State, as well from the secret sappers and miners as from
the bold insulting foe.” The convention and council had “promulgated dogmas which strike at
the very root of civil liberty”; the legislature must protect the people “whether the foe be at home
or abroad. . . . Let the debate continue.” At this point William Henry Trescot opined that the
discussion had already gone on too long. The legislature, he said, had been elected by a
constituency who demanded that the council be abolished at once. Moreover, it was clear that
“there is but one opinion in the House, namely, that the Executive Council should be abrogated
as soon as possible.” Now, Trescot advised, “there should be little speaking and much acting.”10
Wilmot DeSaussure agreed that the legislature had a mandate, but he could not consent to
limit the discussion. The controversy over the executive council “has shaken the country from
the seaboard to mountains,” he declared, and “On what we do, our civil liberty depends.”
Michael O’Conner concurred, insisting that the council’s fate was “one of the most grave and
important subjects that ever engaged the attention of a legislative assembly.” When the council
was created, “Democracy everywhere stood aghast, and the friends of Republican freedom
trembled for our condition and safety.” But Thomas Dawkins, although concerned by the
“uneasiness in the public mind,” asked, “If we adopt every one of these resolutions unanimously,
have we obtained anything but a mere expression of opinion?” He wanted to postpone the debate
and follow proper procedure by referring Whaley’s resolutions to the committee and then resume
discussion after it reported a bill. Until this was done, he was “not prepared to vote on abstract
principles.” DeSaussure retorted that it was crucial for the House to “stand from day to day,
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discussing an abstraction. An abstraction should be the subject of the debate.” William Mullins
enthusiastically agreed, declaring “that abstractions were the very first things to be discussed.” 11
Encouraged by the direction the debate was taking, Richard Yeadon now sensed an
opportunity for putting the council “to death at once.” “Abstractions,” he said, “involved
important principles––our forefathers of 1776, went into revolution on an abstraction.” The
leaders of that generation did not declare independence because they feared “an insignificant tax
of three pence a pound on tea,” but because “They snuffed the approach of tyranny in every
tainted breeze.” The executive council was tyrannical, for it could violate the Constitution “in the
twinkling of an eye.” Not only had it “exercised its powers arrogantly and insultingly,” but it had
“undertaken to amend and repeal the legislation of our predecessors, and what we may enact today, it may amend or repeal to-morrow.” Yeadon reminded his colleagues that “all of us,
whether in favor of or against the continued existence of the Executive Council,” had sworn an
oath to support the Constitution and were bound to uphold the rights of their constituency. This
oath could not be fulfilled if the council continued to exist, he concluded, because the
consolidation of three branches of government into one “is the very definition and essence of
despotism.”12
The last member to speak was the moderate Benjamin Perry, who “deprecated the
excitement of the debate” and was growing more perturbed with each acrimonious speech: “We
should seek harmony amongst ourselves while assailed by such powerful foes from without.” He
personally disliked the council but believed that the convention was a patriotic body and had had
a right to make organic changes to the law. Perry agreed that the convention had no right to
legislate, and admitted that the council possessed dangerous powers, but he was convinced that
11
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the councilmen had exercised those powers moderately. Many points of law could be asserted to
show that the council wielded unconstitutional powers, but he saw “no use in making a fuss
about them. [The councilmen] had done some things that were wise, and some that were foolish.
Why array them against the Governor, or the Governor against them?” The debate should end, he
concluded, and he called on the council’s opponents to “temper justice with mercy.”13
After further discussion, Whaley’s resolutions were referred to the special committee. It
recommended that the House adopt them and that they be sent to the Senate, which was done.
The Senate agreed unanimously to the first five resolutions but there was some disagreement on
the sixth, which expressed regret for any unconstitutional measures that the convention had
adopted. President Porter voted for the first five without hesitation because they were
declarations of principle. These were necessary, he thought, because “Any other doctrine would
place the people at the mercy of their delegates,” and the delegates “might bring about changes
in their organic law which they could restore only by force.” But he considered the sixth
resolution disturbingly “vague.” He was “unwilling to join a general censure” of the convention
that would only “perpetuate an antagonism between it and the General Assembly.” Nevertheless,
the Senate adopted the sixth resolution along with the others, and a bill abolishing the executive
council was passed on 18 December. The Courier praised the legislature for performing the
“final execution” and sealing the fate “of the Quintumvirate, affording to future times a never-tobe-forgotten lesson, in vindication of constitutional liberty and republican government.”14
After all the impassioned debate, the bill terminating the executive council was terse and
straightforward. It contained just one article, which stated simply that the council was thereafter
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abolished. The legislature failed to declare the law in relation to the proceedings of the council,
an oversight that would cause trouble with Confederate authorities. After determining to kill off
the council, the legislature further rebuked that body by repealing its resolutions appointing field
officers in the First Corps of Reserves. This unit of state troops was composed of men between
the ages of thirty-five and fifty. The council had offered its services to the Confederacy for
ninety days and appointed its officers. This created much dissatisfaction: “Are the men
composing the First Corps of Reserves regarded as mere boys, that the Governor and Council
should make the appointments for them,” asked the Lancaster Ledger, warning that “something
more than a mere paper resistance is seriously anticipated” if the council insists on its
appointments. Outright defiance occurred in the fourth and tenth regiments and consequently the
council disbanded them.15
The legislature appointed a special committee to investigate the troops’ grievances. It
found that dissatisfaction did indeed exist in these regiments but decided that “it is inexpedient at
this time to discuss the wisdom or justice of the course adopted” by the council and appealed to
the soldiers to put aside their complaints. But the committee also censured the council by
insisting that the governor ought to be free of restraints on his powers as commander in chief.
Moreover, the committee strongly disagreed with Chesnut’s report to the convention, which
declared that an unpatriotic spirit was responsible for these units’ disobedience of the council’s
orders. The troops, in the committee’s judgment, had acted “from no disregard to the sovereignty
of the State, nor because ‘the spirit was wanting,’ but from a conviction, common to many
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citizens of the State, that the extraordinary authority by which the calls were made was
unconstitutional and oppressive.”16
Senator Robert McCaw of York District pushed hard for a bill reenfranchising the
reserves. In his district four companies had resolved “that they will not submit to the
appointment of officers” because “they believe the principle wrong, and at variance with their
ideas of Constitutional liberty.” After condemning the council’s policy, the legislature proceeded
to pass a bill that repealed the council’s resolution disbanding the fourth and tenth regiments and
barred the First Corps from serving under Confederate authority beyond ninety days. More
significantly, the bill vacated the appointments of field officers in these units and ordered new
elections. Thus, at the very moment the reserves were entering Confederate service, the
legislature reorganized them. It was an ill-timed revival of the elective principle, which the
Mercury attributed to the “factious excitement” in the legislature. The appointed officers, said
the editor, were some of the wisest military minds in the state, but “unfortunately, the Executive
Council appointed these gentlemen, and the Legislature is furious against that body.” The effect
of the new law would be “disorganization and ill-feeling.”17
The legislature had one more council-related issue to take up before proceeding to other
business. Governor Pickens had strongly opposed the closing of the South Carolina College but
had been outvoted by the other councilmen. The legislature now needed to decide whether the
college should remain suspended or reopen in some modified form. Pickens hoped that there
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would be no “withdrawal of [state] patronage,” for the college was “too deeply consecrated in
the hearts of our people, by the blessings it has shed over the State, ever to be abandoned.”18
Richard Yeadon introduced a resolution in the House declaring that it was “the
imperative duty of an enlightened State, as well in time of war as in time of peace, to care for the
education of the rising generation,” and insisting that the closing of the college went against “the
expressed will of the Legislature.” The resolution instructed the Committee on Education to
investigate the matter with an eye toward “reorganizing the College, and restoring to the youth of
the State the inestimable blessings and advantages of collegiate education.” The chairman of the
committee was William Whaley, who had authored the resolutions rebuking the council for its
unconstitutional acts. The House committee’s subsequent report faulted the council for turning
the college over to the Confederacy, urged the Confederate authorities to vacate the college
buildings, and asked the trustees to resume operations as soon as possible.19
On 15 December the House was occupied nearly all day discussing the report. Yeadon
insisted that the fairground buildings in Columbia were “admirably adapted” to serve as a
hospital and regretted that the academic halls were “unnecessarily made the headquarters of
disease and perhaps of infection.” The misappropriation of the college buildings “was a wanton
and capricious exertion of power” by the oligarchy “miscalled the Executive Council,” which
“counselled the Governor by putting him in a straight jacket.” But a citizen who wrote to the
Mercury took issue with Yeadon. He believed “that many members of the Legislature . . . are not
only unacquainted with the true condition of things, but are even misinformed in regard to the
adaptedness of the Fair Ground buildings for hospital purposes.” These buildings were situated
“on a very bleak and exposed hill” and “the roof is so leaky” that the patients would have to be
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continually moved “to escape being drenched in their sick beds.” He hoped that the legislature
would not “deprive our troops of the comforts” afforded by the college buildings. Such
arguments were persuasive to many. The House report recommending that the hospital be
vacated and the college reopened was rejected.20
The Senate Committee on Education took the matter under consideration and reported
unanimously against reopening the college. After careful consideration, the committee had found
“no ground for casting blame on any one”; the surrender of the college buildings to the army was
“neither untimely nor injudicious.” The committee also examined the question of resuming
college exercises. All but three of the seventy students attending the college in 1862 had gone off
to serve in the army and the committee was unsure if any were willing to return. The faculty
estimated that not more than twenty-five people would apply for admission in the next year, “and
this without reference to the measure of their qualifications.” This would be “too small [a
number] to justify the expenditure that would be necessary to keep the College machinery
moving.” Some legislators suggested that the college might continue to operate by “reducing not
only the standard of admission, but the curriculum itself,” to allow boys under eighteen to enroll.
But the committee rejected this idea as a scheme to sink the college “to the level of Grammar
School”; it would be better to suspend the college altogether than to operate it “in this degraded
and modified form.” The committee concluded that the college should remain closed and the
professor’s salaries be reduced by half. The hospital could continue to operate, provided that the
Confederate authorities return the college buildings “in as good condition as they received
them.”21
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With the executive council and college issues out of the way, the legislature turned its
attention to the war effort. Governor Pickens urged the legislature to assist the Confederate
government wholeheartedly: “Withhold nothing, and make no complaint calculated to weaken
the hands of the Confederate authorities in any particular,” for the “implacable war” threatened
“not only subjugation, but our total extermination as a people.” Particularly important was
furnishing slave labor to work on the coastal fortifications. Pickens deemed it essential that the
legislature take up this matter because the system adopted by the council “has produced an
unpleasant state of feeling, and much complaint.”22
The governor proposed that a corps of slaves be raised and permanently attached to each
brigade as axmen and then placed under the Confederate authorities. If only 1 percent of the
400,000 slaves in the state were enlisted, a standing corps of four thousand slaves would be on
hand, thus relieving owners from arbitrary and irregular calls. This plan would also allow the
sending off of “all negro men who might be difficult to manage at home, where [white] women
and children are, for the most part, left alone.” Permanently placing a corps of slaves under
military regulations “would have the further effect of identifying our slave population, to a
certain extent, with our armies, which would produce a wholesome feeling of allegiance.”
Pickens believed that this system could be implemented quickly and cheaply. Although most
owners with few slaves would volunteer none, the large slaveholders would offer many,
particularly those who were “most unruly and uncertain, and secure them in the army,” thus not
only assisting the Confederate authorities but also providing “a good police arrangement, that
would strengthen the interior peace of the State.” This plan, Pickens added, was endorsed by
General Beauregard.23
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The concerns expressed by Pickens laid bare the fragility of a slave society beginning to
crack under the strain of war. Although planters often boasted of the faithfulness of their human
property, such claims amounted to whistling in the dark. The war had produced a crisis of
confidence in the slave society it was designed to preserve. By the end of 1862 more than five
hundred plantations had been abandoned in the South Carolina lowcountry and more than ten
thousand slaves had been lost to federal armies or were otherwise no longer in the possession of
their owners. The combined value of slave property lost was seven times the value of all other
property lost. It was the behavior of that human property that confounded all attempts to use
slaves for coastal fortification in any large numbers. Slaveowners fiercely opposed any
modification of the institution, but repeated requisitions on planters and the efforts of slaves to
gain freedom not only modified the institution but transformed it. By the end of 1862 many
slaveholders were asking not whether their society could be preserved, but whether it could ever
be rebuilt.24
Despite the urgency of the issue, the legislature moved slowly on a bill to procure slave
labor. On 3 December General Beauregard warned the governor that the legislature must act “as
soon as possible.” Pickens then sent another message urging “immediate attention to this matter,
as the demand is pressing.” One reason for the delay was that the Judiciary Committee was tied
up with the large number of applications from slaveowners for compensation for slaves killed or
injured on the coast. At this point there was no systematic plan to settle these claims. The idea of
establishing a special court of adjudication was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Meanwhile, the House Committee on Claims was instructed to tackle the problem. A resolution
was passed appointing James Tupper as the state agent to audit claims against the state for slaves
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lost in the public service, but it would take him nearly a year to regularize the process and even
then, he later reported, the system was plagued by “inequality and embarrassment.”25
On 18 December the legislature passed a new law to organize slave labor for coastal
defense. It divided the state into four sections and authorized the governor to make requisitions
through a state agent appointed by him. However, the law also stated that “each levy under the
call shall serve for one month.” This was hardly the permanent plan envisioned by Pickens and
approved by Beauregard. The law was further weakened by a provision mandating that the
governor wait to implement the law until the Confederate government gave “written assent and
agreement to [its] terms and conditions.” These terms and conditions included eight stipulations
that the Confederate government must conform to before the governor could direct the state
agent to begin the process. The most important stipulation was that the Confederate government
compensate owners “for any loss or damage” to their human property. This, of course, included
the loss of slaves who escaped to Union lines.26
Also problematical was a provision of the law allowing owners to pay one dollar per day
per slave in lieu of providing the state with the requested labor. A good many planters were
pleased to take advantage of this loophole. Thomas Moore, an upcountry planter serving in the
army, wrote to his overseer after the law was passed, directing him to either pay the commutation
fee or hire substitutes “even if you had to give twice the usual price, for [the slaves] are more
liable to disease in camp and moreover they would contract bad habits and perhaps run off to the
Yankees or be captured.” Representative Leroy Youmans tried to strengthen the law by adding a
provision empowering the governor to impress labor, but this motion was defeated. The
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weakness of the new law was a testament to the difficulty of convincing the ruling elite to make
the necessary sacrifices of slave property requested by Confederate and state authorities. 27
Other matters likewise demanded legislative attention. On 3 November 1862, three weeks
prior to the legislature’s session, the executive council had decreed that the permits it had
previously granted to distil grain would be revoked. The reason was twofold: converting corn
into liquor was driving up the price of the former; and the consumption of liquor “by our brave
but thoughtless soldiers, has done more to injure the discipline of our armies and to introduce
sickness and disease than any other cause.” But the council had subsequently repealed that
decree, and the matter was now in the hands of the legislature. The governor deemed this issue
“of the highest importance to the welfare of the people,” and urged the legislators to devise “a
wise and energetic system” in the best interests of the people and the war effort.28
There was little debate on this issue. “Will a Legislature of our State long debate which
of the two to choose––whiskey or famine?,” asked Representative Randall Croft of Greenville.
Distilling, he said, was “so lucrative that many persons, actuated by sordid or selfish motives,
would distill even if women and children starved.” It must be suppressed, he insisted, for “our
country’s good.” The legislature complied, passing an act on 18 December outlawing the
distillation of liquor from grain. (Exceptions were made to allow the manufacture of a limited
quantity of spirits for medicinal purposes.) The bill imposed harsh penalties for breaking the law,
including fines and imprisonment for up to two years.29
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The law failed to stifle the distilleries. A few months after it went into effect, a citizen in
Greenville, noting “the large quantity of Whiskey traveling about our streets––especially at
night,” inferred that the district patrol captains were not reporting violations to the magistrates as
the law required. Moreover, some of the distillers who had permits to manufacture spirits for
medical purposes were producing far more than necessary for that purpose, and were selling it to
persons not entitled to it. One resident in his neighborhood had reportedly purchased five gallons
of whiskey on the grounds of medical necessity. “What man ever uses five gallons of whiskey in
his family for medicinal purposes in a few months?” Another Greenville resident remarked that
in that town alone “there is enough whiskey to supply the necessities of the whole State for
medicinal purposes” for the next year.30
There were also gross deficiencies in the law passed back in December 1861 providing
aid to soldiers’ families. This bill had established in each tax district a Soldiers Board of Relief
empowered to levy a tax for poor relief. But complaints became loud and frequent that the law
was inadequate and unfair. James Farrow of Spartanburg was among those who demanded that
the system be reformed. Raising taxes by district was “all wrong,” he declared. “This is not a
local necessity; it is a necessity which arises in support of the war.” He advocated funding relief
from state taxes at large so that the poorer upcountry districts, “which have contributed most in
flesh in blood,” would not be disadvantaged.31
The deficiency of the law was evident in Edgefield. The local board imposed the
maximum tax allowed under the law (equal to 40 percent of the general state tax). But the
number of people qualifying for relief stretched the funds available very thin. By June 1862 that
30

Charleston Daily Courier, 26 March 1863; Southern Enterprise, 26 March 1863.
Acts of General Assembly (December 1861), 15-16; Zornow, “State Aid for Indigent Families,” 83-84; Edgefield
Advertiser, 5, 19 March, 9 April, 13 August, 12 November 1862; Lancaster Ledger, 23 July, 17 September, 19
November 1862; Charleston Daily Courier, 19 July, 6 December 1862; Yorkville Enquirer, 17 December 1862;
Carolina Spartan, 18 December 1862; Jas. Farrow to John Manning, 30 October 1862, Manning Papers.
31

211

number was 1,131. As the board’s secretary reported, this meant that the needy would receive
“only $1.25 per month per head, enough to purchase about three pecks of meal.” The law, he
concluded, was “entirely inadequate”: “the poor of this village and vicinity need much more.”
The editor of the Edgefield Advertiser, having received a petition in November “signed by ten
suffering women” and written in “pitiable terms of unaffected distress,” concurred. The law
“must be amended,” he wrote, and he called on the legislature “to look the question full in the
face and act promptly up to the necessities of this demand.” The Charleston district board, facing
similar problems, put it bluntly to the legislature: “Neglect the soldiers’ families, and your praise
and your eulogies [for the soldiers] will be received as nauceating [sic], heartless lip-service.”32
Another defect was ambiguity about who was entitled to aid. Some boards interpreted the
statute to mean that aid to the family would end if the soldier died, but the law was not explicit.
An upcountry citizen saw this policy as unjust and detrimental to the cause: if one soldier gets
out of the fight on some pretext but another dies in battle, he opined, the family of the soldier
who failed his country was entitled to aid but the family of the soldier who did his duty was not.
“Is this fair?,” he asked. “Is it not offering a premium for absence in battle?” If this was the
proper construction of the law, the matter “requires the early attention of our next Legislature.”
A Lancaster District grand jury agreed, declaring that this interpretation “is certainly not in
accordance with the spirit” of the law.33
Governor Pickens deemed it the legislature’s “solemn duty” to amend the law aiding
soldiers’ families. Echoing James Farrow’s concerns, he pointed out that the upcountry districts
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furnished the most soldiers but “are the very Districts that raise the least general taxes,” whereas
“the fund is more than ample in those Districts where the white population is sparse, and the
slaves dense.” Although Pickens wanted a “more efficient system,” the plan he outlined was
complex, requiring a change in property valuation. He had suggested this in December 1861 but
the legislature had failed to heed him. Nor did it comply at this session. His plan also included
the creation of a common fund to distribute aid. Additionally, he suggested that slaveowners be
forced to contribute grain to the boards based on the number of their able-bodied male slaves;
and he wanted to empower the boards to confiscate grain from citizens known to be speculating.
He confessed that this last idea might be considered too authoritarian, but argued that if “our
poor and patriotic men are exposed in defence of our homes, we owe it to justice and to every
generous and manly feeling to place their helpless families beyond any suffering.”34
The legislature repealed the law of 1861 but only one provision that Pickens suggested
was included in the new bill. A common fund was established and an appropriation of $600,000
was made to aid the families who had a member in the army or had lost one in the service. The
law gave direct state aid to each election district based on the white population. The legislature
would appoint each relief board, but could not do so until the delegation was nominated in both
houses. This stipulation, not much noticed at the time, would create considerable controversy
after the law went into effect. The boards could continue to levy taxes up to 40 percent of the
state tax if they chose but could not go beyond that amount. Although the state rather than the
boards now assumed the responsibility of providing aid, the law was not otherwise
fundamentally altered.35
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In addition to its already heavy responsibilities, the legislature had to elect a new
governor. Pickens’s term was set to expire in December. Given the controversy over the council,
this election was bound to generate considerable excitement. The number of candidates was
unusually large. Pickens boldly suggested that the Constitution be amended to make a sitting
governor eligible for reelection. He saw “no reason why so important an office should be filled
every two years by a new man, if the duties have been performed faithfully” by the current chief
executive. But the legislature was in no mood to make fundamental changes to the executive
branch in the wake of the council controversy. The election issue grew exceptionally heated after
the council’s fate was decided. One commentator remarked that anticipation over who would
assume the governorship became “the question.” A Columbia citizen suggested that the
legislature could “promote the public interest by deferring the election of another Governor until
after the war.” This solution, he argued, “would prevent unnecessary excitement, and suffice to
tranquilize the minds of the people.” The Courier, although sympathetic to Pickens, rejected this
radical proposal, asking if the citizens “desire or expect this from a Legislature which finds its
chief distinction in curbing and rebuking the infringements of the Constitution charged against
the Council?”36
Early in the race it appeared that John S. Preston would be elected. But as the
proceedings got under way, it became clear that no defender of the convention or council would
be considered. Preston had defended both. William Gilmore Simms was certain that “There is no
chance of any member of the Convention or Council being elected.” In fact, “There is no chance
for any truly able man” to become governor unless James L. Orr resigned his seat in the
Confederate Senate and made himself available, which he declined to do. John Manning’s
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chances were probably the best of any, Simms thought, because he was “busy, morning, noon
and night, electioneering.” But Simms also heard rumors of a plot by Pickens and his supporters,
one that evidenced “the large strides which we have taken and are taking toward anarchy.”
Pickens was supposedly determined to be reelected despite the constitutional prohibition on
serving consecutive terms, and his friends in the legislature were reportedly ready to “cast blank
votes, prevent all election,” and thus allow him to remain in office by default.37
Simms feared that the executive council controversy had so divided the polity as to
“inaugurate the birth of two fierce factions in which all our conservatism and securities are
destined to be torn to pieces.” Indeed, he lamented, “the struggle for place and pension, for
corruption and intrigue, so long restrained in our State, having found a beginning is destined to
go on . . . with more intensity and heat, and appetite and passion than in any other State in the
Confederacy.”38
As it turned out, the frontrunners were passed over due to the appearance of a dark horse
candidate. On 17 December, Milledge L. Bonham was elected on the third ballot and became the
second war governor from Edgefield. He had been appointed a brigadier general in the
Confederate army in 1861 and had commanded troops at Manassas but later resigned over a
dispute involving his commission. Known for his strong states’ rights principles, he was serving
as a Confederate congressman when elected governor. His election seems to have met with
general approval; but, as the Courier warned, whoever was elected would find the position “a
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hard road to travel, and will be fortunate, if he shall close his career with as much éclat and
popularity as Governor Pickens.”39
It is true that Pickens emerged from the executive council controversy with greater
popularity than he had enjoyed at any other time since assuming office. But this was merely an
aftereffect of the council’s dissolution and it should not obscure the more consequential point
that the citizenry was more suspicious of executive power than ever before. A striking example
of this suspicion had occurred less than three weeks before Pickens left office. After a Darlington
resident named William Wingate was convicted of murder, Governor Pickens commuted the
death sentence on the condition that Wingate enroll in the Confederate army and never return to
South Carolina. Pickens certainly did not feel that he was abusing his pardoning power, but the
citizens of Darlington felt differently. On 1 December they held a protest meeting and resolved
that Pickens had committed “an unpardonable violation of the spirit of our State Constitution,
and a gross perversion of the discretionary power therein reposed in him.” They also
memorialized the legislature, protesting the pardon and urging that the Constitution be amended
to restrict or eliminate the privilege of executive clemency to prevent its “capricious exercise . . .
in the future.” The meeting concluded with a stirring condemnation of the governor’s “criminal
conduct.” Even the pro-Pickens Courier decried this example of executive overreach: “There is
little use in making laws to punish murderers, if a Governor can disregard the verdict of a jury,
the sentence of the judge, the will of the people, and release criminals at his pleasure.” The editor
believed that Pickens should be held accountable for his “unwarrantable exercise of power.”40
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On 18 December the legislature agreed to suspend its proceedings and recess until 20
January 1863. But it still had many important bills pending. One of these addressed the extortion
problem. Introduced by Richard Yeadon, it was endorsed by the Committee on Commerce and
Manufacturing, which declared that the practice of extortion had become a “crying enormity”
that “demands legislative rebuke and severe punishment.” The public agreed: a Spartanburg
resident pointed out that in his district “Thousands of the poorer people are at this moment on the
verge of starvation from this cause alone”; if the legislature failed to suppress it, the people “will
find an outlet for their hungry passions, in a manner that will shake the Confederacy to its
centre.” Nevertheless, Yeadon’s bill was “snowed under in the bustle of the Governor’s
election,” as the Yorkville Enquirer reported, and indefinitely postponed.41
Another crucial matter was implementing the law providing aid to soldiers’ families.
Although a new relief bill had been passed, the legislators inexplicably decided on the last day of
the session that the board of commissioners would not be appointed until the second session in
January. Representative William Foster of Spartanburg was incensed at this delay, protesting that
many families in his district “may be starving or dead before the 20th January.” A citizen in
Columbia was likewise outraged “that our law-makers adjourned without making available the
munificent fund now set apart for the relief of the families of soldiers.” This was, he fumed, “a
great neglect and a great pity.”42

41

House Journal (1862), 145, 209; Charleston Daily Courier, 5, 6, 12 December 1862; Yorkville Enquirer, 17, 24
December 1862.
42
House Journal (1862), 205; Carolina Spartan, 18, 25 December 1862. On 23 December 1862, five days after the
legislature adjourned, Governor Bonham issued a proclamation stating that because the General Assembly had failed
to appoint members to the boards of relief, he would make the appointments himself. In the weeks following,
Bonham was criticized by several members of the legislature and William Henry Trescot successfully moved to
create a committee of inquiry to examine Bonham’s action. In the resolution calling for the committee, Trescot said
Bonham’s authority for appointing members to the boards “could not exist in any Government claiming to exist
under constitutional limitations, for such a power would be simply making the Executive an unchallenged autocrat.”
See Charleston Daily Courier, 8, 23 January, 3, 4 February 1863; Southern Enterprise, 12 February 1863. This
controversy is examined in the conclusion.

217

Public condemnations of the legislature’s fecklessness were scathing. A Yorkville citizen
observed that “The Legislature drags its length slowly along. Charters and Incorporations pass
readily, but bills of great importance, are burthened with amendments, and finally laid on the
table, or indefinitely postponed.” Representative William Foster seconded that complaint, noting
near the end of the session that “We are doing but little in the way of Legislation. . . .We work
here all day upon a bill and conclude the business in the evening by indefinitely postponing or
laying [it] on the table.” One observer regretted that the legislature had “perfected but few bills
of importance, leaving several others that should have been paramount, until after the recess.”43
Five days after the legislature adjourned, the Courier succinctly summarized the session:
“A large portion of time was consumed in speech making, and but little progress was made in
legislative business.” Indeed, the recorded proceedings of the legislature show that there was
much speaking and little acting, precisely the opposite of what Trescot desired. The controversy
over the executive council had proved to be a considerable distraction. Arguments over the
council’s legality and disagreements concerning procedural matters caused much delay, and the
repeal of the council’s actions meant that the legislature had to start anew on important issues.
And, too, many members were serving for the first time and thus lacked experience. William
Gilmore Simms remarked that “The Legislature is reported to be the feeblest body known there
for fifty years.”44
Richard Yeadon must have been dismayed by the public assessments of the legislature.
He had worked tirelessly to get anti-council men elected in October. Although the legislature had
fulfilled its mandate to abolish the council, it had missed the opportunity to gain the gratitude of
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the people by prompt and energetic action in matters affecting them more tangibly. The
provisions in the bill aiding soldiers’ families remained unimplemented due to the legislature’s
failure to appoint board commissioners. The stay law protecting debtors at home and in the army
“occupied the House all day” on 14 December, but was postponed because “the lawyers have
pulled and hacked it every which way.” Yeadon failed to resurrect the South Carolina College,
and his extortion bill was postponed thanks to legislators “who prate of ‘constitutionalities,’
sumptuary laws, to the delight of landsharks, many of whom throng the gallery and lobby.”
Indeed, the Yorkville Enquirer reported, Yeadon had “thrown his force into every measure likely
to prove effectual” to relieve suffering, but all were postponed. Even the general appropriation
bill for the next fiscal year, which provided $200,000 to supply soldiers with shoes and clothing,
was put off until after the recess. Still, there would be an opportunity in 1863 for the legislature
to redeem itself. The members were scheduled to reconvene in January and perhaps at that
session, the Courier hoped, “a better and wiser spirit will rule our legislative counsels.”45
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Conclusion
On 1 January 1863 the Charleston Mercury remarked that the New Year dawned with a
“cheerful face.” Despite the desolation of homesteads and the sacrifice of many lives, “the great
Cause prospers.” There was good reason for this confidence from a military standpoint.
Confederate forces had achieved a stunning victory at Fredericksburg, Virginia, in December
1862. The editor believed that “A few more sturdy blows” would bring “peace, and a glorious
peace, before the end of the summer.” Confederates had another key advantage: “Doubt and
discord reign in the councils of our enemies. With us, all is confidence, and unity of purpose.”1
During the previous year, however, doubt and discord had reigned in the South Carolina
polity and political unity had been fractured by the controversy over the executive council. That
body had been abolished by the legislature in December and it was hoped that harmony would
prevail in 1863. But even though the council was now gone, its actions continued to affect state
government. The council had spawned, in the minds of many South Carolinians, a deep fear of
executive power. That the council experiment continued to reverberate is evidenced in several
controversies that shook the legislature in January-February 1863.
The administration of newly-elected governor Milledge L. Bonham got off to a turbulent
start when he issued a proclamation on 23 December 1862 implying that the legislature had been
negligent in adjourning before appointing commissioners to the relief boards. Citing the
“pressing importance of immediate relief” and unwilling to delay the appointments until the
legislature reconvened on 20 January 1863, Bonham proclaimed that the commissioners
appointed under the law of December 1861 were authorized to distribute the new $600,000
appropriation for soldiers’ families. When the Charleston Daily Courier commended Bonham
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for “promptly [meeting] the difficulty” created by the legislature’s nonfeasance, one citizen
responded that he “was surprised to see this proposition advanced by your paper.” The December
1862 act clearly stated that the commissioners appointed under the 1861 law were decertified and
that the appropriation must not be turned over to the relief boards until new commissioners were
appointed by the legislature. “Has this been done? Confessedly not.” The governor thus had no
power to make the appointments. Although he had good intentions, his “plea of necessity, to
palliate the violation of the law in a good cause, will be a precedent for doing so in a bad one.”
The new governor, like the convention and council, was guilty of exercising a power “unknown
to the Constitution and laws of the State.”2
The legislature convened as scheduled on 20 January. Governor Bonham had not yet
delivered his opening message when the Courier reported that “a very animated debate sprang
up” in the House over a resolution offered by William Henry Trescot. He called for a committee
of inquiry to examine the governor’s proclamation and determine “what circumstances (if any)
required its publication.” Trescot deemed this a very serious matter: Bonham’s action was
unconstitutional, “a direct and dangerous infringement upon the privileges of this House.” The
proclamation might be “in itself a very small matter,” Trescot conceded, “but the principle upon
which that right is claimed and exercised is not a small matter.” South Carolina was in the midst
of a revolution that involved the “vindication of law” and the principle that “the Constitution of a
people is sacred.” The legislature “has a high and responsible duty to the people,” Trescot
concluded. “[W]e must . . . protect [the Constitution] not only against its enemies, but sometimes
against its friends.”3
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This episode demonstrates how profound an impact the executive council controversy
had on the minds of some legislators. It also reveals a more general concern that balanced
government was being abrogated by executive overreach across the Confederacy. Trescot
warned of the “strong and growing tendency throughout the South to the extension of Executive
power,” and he criticized citizens who were “applauding what it is fashionable to call ‘the
vigorous action’ of this or that Governor.” South Carolina had been embroiled in a dispute over
the same tendency but “this Legislature, fresh from the people,” had wisely restored
constitutional government. “The most striking feature in our peculiar Constitution,” Trescot
argued, “is that it is essentially legislative.” Indeed, “all power, great and small, is entrusted to
the Legislature, and the Legislature alone.”4
Benjamin Perry, while agreeing that the governor’s action was “wrong and
inconsiderate,” moved that discussion over the resolution be postponed, for the House had not
yet received the governor’s message and Perry wanted to avoid a bitter argument on this first day
of the session. But Richard Yeadon welcomed the debate; he thought it “highly important to
vindicate at once the violated Constitution and the invaded privileges of the Legislative body.”
He moved to lay Perry’s motion on the table and the resolution was adopted. Governor Bonham
then reconsidered the matter, agreed that he had overstepped his authority, and suspended all
action under his proclamation. The governor having offered what the legislature considered “a
satisfactory apology for his inconsiderate course,” the majority and minority reports on his
conduct were laid on the table.5
The controversy over Bonham’s proclamation was thus resolved, but the governor soon
had to deal with another constitutional dispute stemming from the council controversy. On 12
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January 1863 the superintendent of labor, Francis S. Holmes, issued a proclamation stating that
the Confederate government had declined to accept the terms of the legislature’s law of
December 1862 to procure slave labor, and therefore “the Act of the Executive Council remains
in force.” In his opening message Bonham told the legislature that he had received a letter from
Secretary of War James Seddon informing him that the Confederate War Department could not
assume liability for slaves lost in the public service, for “Congress alone can provide for such a
payment.” The committee of inquiry appointed to investigate Bonham’s proclamation was also
instructed to inquire into Holmes’s authority to issue his proclamation. The majority report
subsequently adopted in the House declared that the superintendent’s “late call for slave labor
was illegal.” Benjamin Wilson succeeded in getting a Senate resolution passed declaring that the
legislature’s slave-labor act of December “is now the law of the land, and no impressment of
labor is legal which is not made in accordance with its provisions.”6
Trescot fired off a message to Holmes, asking “what authority he had to make and
unmake the laws of the State.” Holmes replied that he had issued the proclamation “under the
instructions of the Governor, and in conformity with the written opinion of the AttorneyGeneral.” Governor Bonham corroborated this and justified his action by pointing out that he had
received a telegram from General Beauregard requesting that labor be sent to Charleston
immediately, and thus he did not feel “at liberty to arrest the operation” of the council’s policy.
This rationale incensed Trescot all the more; he demanded to know “of what possible value is the
legislation of this body, if it can be superseded, suspended and annulled by a proclamation of the
Governor, an opinion of the Attorney-General, or a declaration of the Superintendent of Labor.”
If these infringements of the Constitution were “allowed to pass unrebuked by the Legislature,”
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he fumed, “we will be, when we adjourn, the most discredited body that ever sat in this
chamber.” Clearly the council’s shadow and the fears of executive overreach continued to disrupt
the state government and provoke the wrath of the legislature.7
The council’s past actions also affected military policy in early 1863. In December 1862
the legislature passed a law ordering new elections for officers in the First Corps of Reserves.
These officers had previously been appointed by the council. Governor Bonham informed the
legislature that the adjutant and inspector general had carried out the terms of the law of
December by ordering new elections. However, he also pointed out that the council had
transferred those regiments to the Confederacy for ninety days and therefore the legislature had
“no power to order an election” in them. Although it was Bonham’s “inclination and pleasure, to
enforce every Act of the Legislature,” he urged that this law be repealed. The legislature then
reluctantly repealed the law and drafted a new bill reorganizing the militia. All actions taken by
the convention and council altering the militia laws were voided except the ordinance exempting
overseers. This military bill was lengthy, comprising twenty-one sections, which led a citizen in
Lancaster to opine that “Our militia laws are becoming so voluminous that . . . it will be
exceedingly difficult to know what the law is.” A disgruntled Charlestonian agreed and thought
the legislators in Columbia “can better employ themselves than to be most of the time tinkering
on military bills.” Indeed, the legislators ought to “feel more solicitude about provisions and
other indispensable supplies for the country, than they do about purely military matters.”8
The legislature seems to have heeded this advice. The council controversy subsided after
the legislature adjourned in February 1863. The fear expressed by William Gilmore Simms that
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arguments over the council would “inaugurate the birth of two fierce factions in which all our
conservatism and securities are destined to be torn to pieces” did not materialize, at least not in
the context that he predicted. Animosity over the council abated; but what did not abate were the
many problems that continued to plague the home front. In 1863 the legislature stopped debating
political theories related to the council and addressed questions about the legitimate role of the
state government. The factions that Simms feared did develop, but they did so over questions
concerning the propriety of laws punishing citizens for engaging in practices deemed harmful to
the war effort. As George Rable has argued, although “the South Carolina convention marked the
full flowering of radical politics” when it created the executive council, there was still a great
concern among politicians and ordinary citizens that “In the long run, the war might force a
reordering of class relations and a redefining of political legitimacy.”9
Arguments over the legitimate role of government were frequent in the legislature and
newspapers during 1863. Legislators who adhered to a libertarian ideology and sought to protect
the traditional rights of citizens clashed with those who advocated laws that increased the power
of the state at the expense of individual rights. In February an intense debate erupted over a bill
to limit cotton cultivation to three acres per hand. Many legislators and civilians favored the
proposal, including one from Abbeville, who deemed it “no interference with a man’s inalienable
rights to dictate to him how much Cotton he must plant.” Yet when the bill came up for
discussion in the Senate, Alexander Mazӱck demanded to know “Who and what are we that we
should take it upon ourselves to dictate to the people” how much cotton they could plant. The
proposal went against “the great law of nature,” he thundered, depriving citizens “of their natural
rights.” A Camden resident agreed and did not care if the law would help sustain the war effort:
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he was convinced that the legislature “had no authority to touch the subject. It is contrary to a
fundamental principle of our constitution.”10
Disagreements over the proper role of government were also evident in the debate over
an anti-extortion law. Richard Yeadon had worked tirelessly but unsuccessfully in December for
a law to prohibit extortion. He renewed his efforts in January, declaring that “the people demand
some action on the subject.” Some citizens indeed expected action. A merchant in Camden
complained that “the planters [sic] barns and graneries [sic] are bursting with abundance,” but
they were withholding corn from the market in order to “screw from their neighbor, and perhaps
creditor, two or three dollars per bushel.” The Mercury, however, opposed extortion legislation
for practical reasons: “Laws against extortion are almost invariably mischievous in their
consequences.” Not only did they discourage production, but they generally were easily evaded
or rendered inoperative by legal stipulations. More fundamentally, “Laws can hardly be made to
prevent men from making good bargains.” Senator Henry Lesesne agreed that mischief would
result from this legislation. He argued that “It is impossible to define extortion for the purpose
proposed. The Bill confesses it by leaving the jury to determine in each case whether the offence
of extortion is made out, without attempting to explain the offence.” This law, he feared, would
become “a trap to catch some whom none would desire to see fall under its condemnation,” and
he cautioned that “In times like these there is constant danger of violating principle for some
public benefit,” but “nothing can be really a benefit which is purchased at such a price.” Indeed,
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“the moment the Legislature undertakes to do what transcends its proper functions, it ceases to
be entitled to public respect.”11
The controversies lingering from the executive council period and the legislative debates
about the proper role of government that ensued in early 1863 show that white South Carolinians
continued to wrestle over policies that threatened to transform the nature of their government.
Some citizens demanded greater state intervention to sustain the war effort; others protested what
they considered the illegitimate exercise of governmental power. This conundrum exemplifies
what George Rable has called attention to at the national level, namely “the constant tug between
political ideology and political practice,” which forced Confederates to “reconsider their most
fundamental political assumptions” as they attempted to wage war. Confederate political culture,
he reminds us, “evolved in an atmosphere of crisis and conflict.” South Carolina’s executive
council––an extralegal body created in the midst of crisis––and the political and ideological
conflict resulting from that experiment indicate that divisions over the legitimate role of
government were equally if not more intense at the state level. The council controversy and the
political repercussions from that experience are worthy of study because they exemplify the
agitation that can develop between state and citizen and between political ideology and practice.
More crucially, they demonstrate how the exigencies of war can undermine citizens’ faith in
their own political system. In South Carolina, loyal citizens vehemently protested a political
body of their own making. The notion, long held by many political leaders during the antebellum
period, that the convention could legitimately exercise omnipotent power over the people was
soundly rejected by the polity.12
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The executive council experiment was launched in response to the Union invasion of
South Carolina. This emergency created an economic and social crisis as plantations were
abandoned, cotton was burned, and thousands of slaves escaped bondage. During the convention
proceedings in September 1862, Joseph Pope reflected that “Had no enemy landed upon our
coast there would have been no Council.” The situation in and around Port Royal was so chaotic
that Pope reluctantly voted to “supersede the regular constitutional Government of the State, and
to inaugurate a revolutionary Government in its stead.” That Pope voted for the ordinance
creating the council is instructive. The greatest irony of the executive council story is that the
controversy that ensued came about because in the public eye the very men who were elected to
protect constitutional government failed to do their job. Former governor John Richardson sat in
the convention that September and pondered who was responsible for this gross violation of the
public trust. It was easy to point fingers at the Yankee invaders; but “The truth is,” he regretfully
concluded, “the blame and the fault of this oligarchy is ours.”13
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